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 Abstract 
 
This thesis enters the debate regarding liberalism and multiculturalism and provides 
an answer to the question of how the state is to treat cultures. This involves first 
breaking down the assumptions made relating to culture into links and investigates 
how these links interact and form chains. This approach allows us to more easily 
examine the coherence of our thinking on issues relating to culture by showing us 
how a position on one element relating to culture has consequences for the outcome 
to our reasoning relating to how the state is to treat culture. 
The thesis then builds on this approach and constructs a contractualist answer to the 
question of how the state is to treat cultures, premised around the most burdened. 
The position of the thesis is that the state is to act in the way which the most 
burdened could reasonably accept. After examining the assumptions which this 
thesis is premised on the project then applies this to four examples of the type of 
issues which the state is called on to take action in relation to cultures. Concluding 
that the state is best placed in taking action in situation where this would lead to an 
increase in the options of the members of cultures, and less suited to act when the 
action would decrease the options available. 
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Introduction  
The debate on how the state is to treat cultures has often been framed in terms of 
multiculturalism on the one hand, and Liberalism on the other. This thesis will add to 
this debate by adding a new method for considering and analysing our assumptions 
related to culture. And by constructing a contractualist answer to this question of how 
the state is to treat cultures.  
The first five chapters of this project will elaborate on this method which consist in 
breaking down our assumption into links and then considering how these can be 
linked into chains. Then the project will construct a contractualist answer to this 
question. The need for a project of this sort can be seen in David Cameron’s 
comment that state multiculturalism has failed.1 If this position were to be accurate, 
we would still need a position on how the state is to treat cultures, controversial 
cases involving culture would still occur and the state would need to take a position 
or action. And as the state embodies our collective coercive power, this action needs 
to be justified. The motivation for this is the aim that people not be disadvantaged by 
their membership of their culture, either due to those outside the culture, or those in 
the culture. 
This project will take a broad view of the state and assume that it is a liberal 
democracy. The reason for assuming this as a liberal democratic state is twofold, 
first that a democratic state is more likely to view the fates of cultures as its 
responsibility or to be concerned with cultures being mistreated, and second that 
democratic states are responsible to their citizens, representing the citizens coercive 
collective power, making the citizens complicit in the exercise of the state to some 
degree. Further to this it will also assume a certain degree a presence of what 
Parekh calls ‘the facts of multiculturalism’.2 The facts of multiculturalism is that there 
are multiple cultures existing together in a shared space, further to this it will also be 
assumed that the state is not actively hostile to this fact. We will also adopt Rawls’s 
description ‘‘A modern democratic society is characterised not simply by a pluralism 
of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
                                                             
1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 
2 Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory Basingstoke: Macmillan (2000). 6 
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incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is 
affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future 
one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly 
all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the 
exercise of human reason within the frame work of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime.’3 Our 
starting position is then that society contains within it a multitude of different 
individuals and groups, and that this is not only a description of facts, but a desirable 
state of affairs.  
This approach of breaking positions on how the state is to treat cultures into links 
and chains will allow us to examine how coherent our views relating to culture 
actually are. This will in turn allow us to construct a view of how the state is to treat 
cultures which would not be incoherent. This project will examine a number of 
assumptions relating to both the nature of culture and assumptions relating to how 
cultures should be treated, before constructing its answer. The first chapter will 
highlight some of the background and examine some of the authors who have 
written on the subjects which we are considering. The second chapter considers 
what type of value cultures can possess, intrinsic or instrumental. The third chapter 
examines what the sources of our obligation towards our culture would be founded 
in, with gratitude, reciprocity and consent as the possible sources. The fourth chapter 
concerns the ontological nature of the people who make up our culture and examine 
if they are atomistic or holistic. The fifth chapter examines the advocacy positions of 
communitarianism and individualism, as well as elaborating on the ends of the state. 
The sixth chapter outlines contractualism and defends it from the charge that it is 
excessively atomistic and individualistic. And the seventh chapter will draw on these 
previous chapters and construct an answer to how the state is to treat cultures. 
 
                                                             
3 Rawls, J. Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 2005). Introduction xvi 
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Summary of chapter 
 
The first will provide an overview of the background for our deliberations. It will be 
done by highlighting the writing of influential writers in the field of multiculturalism 
and issues related to the links which we are going to examine. Highlighting authors 
such as Kymlicka, Barry, Parekh, Taylor, Modood, Okin, while also introducing 
issues relating to advocacy, ontology, the value of culture, the division between the 
private and public sphere. 
Chapter 2 concerns what type of value which our culture can possess and outlines 
the characteristics of intrinsic value and of instrumental value. The chapter first 
describes what moral standing entails in this context, which would entail an object 
being worthy of respect and consideration. Section 2.2 outline instrumental value, 
which is when an object possesses value by virtue of its relationship to some 
external factor which possesses value. An object then is of instrumental value if it 
can act as an instrument for this other object. This means that object of instrumental 
value are only valuable in the appropriate context and if that context changes then 
the object can lose its value. Applied to cultures it would mean that a culture is only 
valuable if the culture can act as an instrument for something else. An example can 
be found with David Miller who describes the value of culture in an entirely 
instrumental manner, where culture is necessary in order for the solidarity necessary 
for individuals to make sacrifices for one another.4 Here then the culture is valued for 
what it provides rather than for its own sake, which is the reverse of the position of 
intrinsic value which is examined in section 2.3. Intrinsic value then is where the 
object is valued for itself rather than as a means to some other end. This has the 
effect that objects of intrinsic value are not dependent on context for their value but 
has it independently. This leads to the difficulty of how to assign intrinsic value, what 
is it that decides that something is valuable in and of itself? Section 2.4 contains my 
suggestion for a solution to this with a constructivist approach where those objects 
which a reasonable person would find to be intrinsically valuable could be treated as 
such, this would preclude the possibility of any malicious objects being thought of as 
                                                             
4 Miller, D. Citizenship and National Identity,(New York Palgrave Macmillan 2000), 31-32 
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intrinsically valuable as no reasonable person would think of them as such. The 
chapter ends with section 2,5 which examines this distinction in the types of value by 
examining how prominent thinkers in the debate surrounding culture and 
multiculturalism map onto this scheme, these thinkers are David Miller, Charles 
Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Tariq Modood, Brain Barry, and Bhikhu Parekh. 
In chapter 3 I examine the sources for our obligations towards our culture, with 
obligation rooted in gratitude, reciprocity, and consent as the options for 
consideration. Section 3.1 defines how obligation will be used in this thesis, this 
definition can be summarised as that which we are morally obligated to do.5 Further 
this section outline Jones’s categorisation of group rights, where group rights can be 
divided into collective and corporate forms of rights. With the corporate view of group 
rights, it is possible for the group to hold rights separate from the individual members 
that make up the group, and it is possible for the group to hold rights against the 
members of the group. While on the collective view of group rights, the group holds 
its rights through its members rather than by itself, here the rights can be exercised 
collectively but is ultimately held by the individual members of the group. Section 3.2 
examines gratitude as the source for our obligation towards our culture. In this view 
our obligation towards our culture is due to our culture having provided us great 
benefits and so it incumbent on us to show our gratitude towards it. We do this by 
cherishing and acting in the interests of our culture. This would make it possible that 
we would have a duty to cherish parts of our culture which we find disagreeable. 
Section 3.3 considers reciprocity as the foundation for our obligation towards our 
culture. This view has similarities with the gratitude based view in that it is concerned 
with paying back for the benefits which we have gained from our culture, but here 
there is no requirement to adopt a positive emotional attitude towards our culture. 
And section 3.4 will examine consent as the origin for our obligations towards our 
culture. Two immediate problems with this approach is that we generally do not 
consider our cultural membership as being the result of a choice, and several of the 
definitions of culture earlier examined held that culture was a prerequisite for being 
able to make decisions, meaning that without already being a member of a culture, 
we could not choose to consent to be part of a culture. My suggestion is that we cast 
                                                             
5 Darwall, S “Moral Obligation: Form and Substance” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2010), 31 
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this as consenting to be part of a system of obligations, which include within it 
cultural obligations rather than envisioning choosing to be part of a specific culture. 
Chapter 4 considers the question of ontology, what is the nature of the humans who 
make up these cultures.  Section 4.1 covers the definitions of atomism and holism. 
With atomism taking the view that the individual is to be the focus in questions of 
ontology, the view is that social phenomena is explained best in terms of the 
individual, while Weiskopf takes the view that atomism is when ‘A concept's identity 
is not even partially constituted by its relations to any other concepts.’6 While holism 
focuses on the social dimension and views society as being more than just the sum 
of individual actions.7 After establishing these definitions the chapter moves onto 
section 4.2 where the consequences of these ontological positions is expanded 
upon. 
Chapter 5 considers the issues of advocacy and the ends of the state. 5.1 examines 
individualism and communitarianism. Individualism being described as the view that 
it is the individual which is a focus on the individual and individual rights,8 amongst 
other considerations. We will then consider communitarianism which placed 
emphasis on the community and instead considers common institutions and 
understandings to be the source of moral standing.9 5.2 examines how this coheres 
with the previous links. 5.3 and 5.4 considers the ends of the state, what is it we 
think the state is for? 5.5 examines multiculturalism and the ends of the state, taking 
the view that the multicultural view of the ends of the state has not been as explored 
in the literature as the liberal view of the ends of the state. 
Chapter 6 elaborates on and examines contractualism. 6.1 outlines the meta-ethical 
position of constructivism, the view that truths should be viewed as practical truths 
and are valid if they are the ones which would be chosen by the idealised 
deliberators.10 6.2 establishes contractualism, the view that an action is allowable if 
they would be agreed upon under the appropriate circumstances.11 An example 
                                                             
6 Weiskopf, D “Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79,1 (2009), pp. 
131-163 
7 Uyl, D and Rasmussen D “The Myth of Atomism” The Review of Metaphysics 59.4 (2006) 847 
8 Avineri, S and De-Shalit, A. Communitarianism and individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992) 7 
9 Thigpen, R B., and Downing L. "Liberalism and the Communitarian Critique." American Journal of Political Science 31, 3 
(1987) 638 
10 Milo, R. “Contractarian Constructivism.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, no. 4, 1995 202 
11 Vallentyne, P. “Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 56, no. 2, 1989 187 
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being Rawls’s famous veil of ignorance.12 6.3 will consider contractualism in 
conjunction with the links which the previous chapter have established, and will show 
that far from requiring an atomism view of ontology and a individualist view of 
advocacy is compatible with a wide range of links. We also elaborate on the idea of 
using both forms of ontology at the same time. 
Chapter 7 will construct our answer to the question of how the state is to treat 
cultures. 7.1 will establish what we take the ends of the state to be, in our case it will 
be plurality. 7.2 outlines our position on the links for this project, where we take the 
view that cultures have instrumental value, that the source of our obligations towards 
our culture is found in consent, and that we will use both forms of ontology. 7.3 
begins to pull all these elements together to construct our own contractualist view of 
how the state should treat cultures, with the most burdened as our idealised 
deliberators. 7.4 highlights some of the difficulties posed by the division between the 
private and the public sphere, in particular as it relates to internal dissent. And 7.5 
applies this to four examples, the first is Modood and his view that certain cultures 
need to have their members protected from irreverent literature.13 The second is the 
exemption for Sikh motorcyclists from helmet regulation. The third is the events 
around the Ashers bakery. And the fourth is based on Okin’s comments on how 
some cultures places limits women in ways which it does not place limits on men.14  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice Revised Edition 11 
13 Modood, T. “Muslims, race and equality in Britain: Some post‐Rushdie affair reflections” Third Text 4:11, (1990) 134   
14 Okin, S. “Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions”. Ethics, 108,4 (1998) 682 
7 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Background 
This chapter will give a brief background of the literature and issues relating to the 
issues which we will examine in this project.  
Multiculturalism as a term can refer to different things, as Okin points out, it is most 
commonly used to refer to either a set of educational practices, or refer to a 
normative position that take the view ‘that minority cultures or ways of life are not 
sufficiently protected by the practice of ensuring the individual rights of their 
members, and as a consequence these should also be protected through special 
group rights or privileges’.15 It is the later one of these which we are going to concern 
ourselves with. Culture itself in this context can be defined in different ways, one 
example would be Watson who describes culture as a distinctive way of life and that 
which separates us from others.16 An alternative approach is to focus on particularly 
important parts of culture or to focus in on particular facets, such as Kymlicka’s focus 
on ‘societal cultures’ which can provide a ‘meaningful way of life’ for its members.17  
Different authors associated with multiculturalism make different assumptions on 
issues relating to culture and its relationship with liberalism. In this chapter we will 
see some who take an oppositional approach to liberalism, while others such as 
Kymlicka combine them into a liberal form of multiculturalism. And then the chapter 
will also look at some liberal criticisms of multiculturalism.   
Parekh defines his form of multiculturalism in contrast to liberalism, taking the view 
that one of the flaws in liberalism is its ethical absolutism,18 that liberalism assumes 
that it is the only morally acceptable position. Liberalism uses itself as the standard 
and compares every other approach against it and categorises everything else in 
terms of its similarity and compatibility to liberalism, and in doing so conflates non-
                                                             
15 Okin, S, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? edited by Joshua Cohen, et al., 
Princeton University Press, 1999 2 
16 Watson C Multiculturalism (Buckingham: Open University Press 2000) 41 
17 Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Clarendon Press, 1995.75-76 
18 Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 110  
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liberal positions with illiberal positions.19 The issue with this according to Parekh is 
that it on the one hand ignores the cultural and specific circumstances which lead to 
the development of contemporary liberalism, and on the other hand overlooks the 
possibility that other conceptions can have merit.20 Parekh takes the view that there 
are multiple worthwhile and acceptable moral outlooks and not just the liberal 
outlook. Parekh maintains that this does not mean that this will lead to moral 
relativism but rather that we have a moral pluralism of several viable ethical outlooks 
all with their own cultural and historical contexts.21  
Taylor also takes issue with certain forms of liberalism, specifically what he calls the 
proceduralist liberalism which imagines that it can be neutral on issues of culture.22 
The view which Taylor expresses is that the state cannot be neutral on issues 
relating to culture, and by pretending to be neutral this form of liberalism mistakes its 
particular views for that of universal moral truths. While both of these thinkers take 
issue with certain forms of liberalism, they are not best described as being illiberal, 
Taylor advocated a resurgence of a form of complex liberalism which is not 
committed to this proceduralism, a liberalism not committed to neutral states and 
exclusively negative conceptions of liberty.23 Indeed, as Rorty highlights, Taylor’s 
arguments for culture promoting policies are based inside the liberal state.24 As his 
rejection is not of liberalism, but the type of liberalism which are not capable of 
accommodating collective identities, particular the contractualist form of liberalism.25 
Taylor and Parekh are far from alone in that they view liberalism’s claim to neutrality 
as overstated, Fierlbeck highlights how this only serves to make the view and 
priorities of certain sections of society seem natural.26 A more sympathetic view can 
be found with Seth who takes the position that while liberalism is not neutral, and 
cannot be, it can still provide the grounds for a form of multiculturalism.27 However 
                                                             
19 Parekh, B ‘Contemporary liberal responses to diversity’ in Matravers, D, and J Pike, editors. Debates in Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: an Anthology.  (Routledge, 2003) 240 
20 Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 110  
21 Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 127 
22 Taylor, C and Abbey, R ‘Communitarianism, Taylor-Made: An Interview with Charles Taylor’ The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 
68, No. 1 (Autumn, 1996) 3 
23 Taylor, C and Abbey,  ‘Communitarianism, Taylor-Made: An Interview with Charles Taylor’ 9 
24 Rorty, A. “The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification.” Political Theory, vol. 22, no. 1, 1994, 152 
25 Birnbaum, P and Strong T. ‘From Multiculturalism to Nationalism’ Political Theory, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), 34 
26 Fierlbeck, K ‘The Ambivalent Potential of Cultural Identity’ Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de 
science politique, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 6 
27 Seth, S ‘Liberalism, Diversity and Multiculturalism’ The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 62, No. 3, Special Issue on 
Globalisation and the State (September 2001) 
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this does not mean that multiculturalism necessarily has to be thought of as being 
incompatible or hostile towards liberalism, as we saw with Seth. Parekh was 
described by Rajan as a respect- based-liberal, as while he rejects the monoism of 
many forms of liberalism he is not against all of its features.28 The debate then is not 
most accurately thought of as being between multiculturalism on the one hand and 
liberalism on the other, but is better described as being a discussion between 
varieties of liberalism.  
The reason for Taylor and Parekh taking this approach to liberalism is that they take 
the view that liberalism does not adequately address the importance of culture for its 
members. The assumptions which are made on issues related to culture have an 
impact on their views of how cultures are to be treated. An example of this is Taylor 
who takes the view that all cultures have value, and that all cultures which have been 
the foundation for societies for a considerable amount of time have something of 
value to say to all humans.29 This is derived from the view of the equal dignity of the 
members of the different cultures, and this dignity owed each member means that 
they are owed the presumption of value for their cultures in a similar way in which 
they are owed other rights, such as political rights.30 However others, such as Barry, 
take a different view and take the position that equal respect for individuals does not 
entail respect for their culture.31  
Part of the supposed antagonism between multiculturism and liberalism can be seen 
in Cowan’s description of liberalism insistence on ontological atomism, the view that 
the individual is to be viewed as an isolated atom, is in his view at the very 
foundation of liberalism.32 Parekh takes a similar view, as he puts it  ‘The view that 
the individual is conceptually and ontologically prior to society and can in principle be 
conceptualized and defined independently of society, which we shall call 
individualism, lies at the heart of liberal thought and shapes its political, legal, moral, 
economic, methodological, epistemological and other aspects.’33 While we will 
explore this further in chapter 4, this characterisation of liberalism as atomistic is 
                                                             
28 Rajan, N ‘Multiculturalism, Group Rights, and Identity Politics’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 27 (Jul. 4-10, 
1998), 1701 
29 Taylor, C, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, (1994) 66 
30 Taylor, C, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 68 
31 Barry, B. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism Polity Press (Cambridge) 266 
32 Cowan, J K. “Culture and Rights after Culture and Rights.” American Anthropologist, vol. 108, no. 1, 2006, 15 
33 Parekh, B. “The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy.” Political Studies, vol. 40, no. 1_suppl, 1992, 161 
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something of a simplification, and even were it not it could hardly be said to be a 
universal feature of liberalism. As Jovanovic points out, some thinkers, such as 
Kymlicka and Raz, are not atomistic in their view of ontology, but this does not mean 
that they automatically embrace a communitarian view of what we will term 
advocacy.34 This is a distinction drawn from Taylor which we will consider in chapter 
5. Taylor examines the different ways in which ontology and advocacy can be 
combined, in this project we will consider how the value of culture, obligation towards 
culture, ontology and advocacy all interact and shape our view of the ends of the 
state and how we are to treat cultures.  
While it would be inaccurate to describe the previous forms of multiculturalism as 
being illiberal, we can see a more explicitly liberal form of multiculturalism with 
Kymlicka, who positions his form of multiculturalism as drawing on the theories of 
Dworkin and Rawls, taking the view that culture ought to be consider a primary 
good.35 Kymlicka basis his form of multiculturalism around individual liberty, as we 
can see in his division between internal restrictions and external protections, with 
external protections being when a culture receives group rights to protect it from 
outside forces and is to be allowed, while internal restrictions is when the culture is in 
a position to place restrictions on its members and is to be disallowed.36 For 
Kymlicka culture is a resource which we all require, amongst the things which our 
culture provides for us is that of a context of choice which allows us to evaluate and 
makes choices.37 Similarly, Parekh describes one of the functions of our culture as 
being a system of meaning, it also allows us to evaluate and make choices,38 and 
also being part of our identity and providing a sense of rootedness.39 Macintyre also 
takes the view that our culture is part of our identity, as he says ‘The story of my life 
is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my 
identity.’40 This brings up the issue which we will explore in chapter 2, whether the 
value which a culture has is dependent on the benefits which it provides its 
members, or if its value is intrinsic to the culture itself. And depending on the type of 
                                                             
34 Jovanovic, M ‘Recognizing Minority Identities through Collective Rights’ Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 
2005), 631 
35 Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community, and Culture Oxford, Clarendon Press (1991) 166 
36 Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship: 35-36 
37 Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship 82 
38 Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. 143 
39 Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 162 
40 MacIntyre, A After Virtue: a study in moral theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1984) 205 
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value which our culture poses, different options for the types of obligations which we 
can owe to the other members of our group, which we will explore in chapter 3. 
Barry is against the type of accommodations which the multicultural side have often 
argued for, and while he does not think that the state is necessarily required to 
repress freely chosen illiberal cultures, this is not based on a view of equal respect 
as we saw with Taylor, but based on the respect that is owed to the individual and 
their rights of free association.41 Explicitly distancing himself from thinkers such as 
Parekh, who took the view that as we are culturally embedded creatures, respect for 
individuals also entailed respect for cultures.42 Barry further disagrees with what he 
terms the ‘rule and exemption’ approach to issues relating to culture.43 The idea with 
a rule and exemption approach is that in certain circumstances, some cultures could 
receive an exemption from a rule due to the effect which this rule would have on the 
members of that culture. Barry instead takes the view that if a rule had sufficient 
motivation to be enacted to start with, then it would have sufficient motivation to 
overrule the cultural considerations, otherwise if it cannot outweigh the cultural 
considerations it should not be a general rule to begin with.44  
Those are some of the characteristic positions of multiculturalism and liberalism, a 
critique of both can be found in Okin and her comments on the role which women 
play in these theories, or rather do not have. Okin has critiqued Rawls for not initially 
including family as a jurisdiction of justice.45 She has also criticised multiculturalism, 
for example in her work, Is multiculturalism bad for women? Okin takes the view that 
the desire to be respectful to culture could do great damage to the women and girls 
in those cultures.46 In her view all cultures, including that of western liberalism, 
disadvantage women to some extent due to their design.47 And to give special group 
rights would result in these disadvantages being exacerbated.  
This is partly due to the focus of these theories on the public sphere, where much of 
the control of women happen. This leads to situations where while these women’s 
political and civil liberties appear to be respected, they have their options severely 
                                                             
41 Barry, B. Culture and Equality 127-128 
42 Barry, B. Culture and Equality 127  
43 Barry, B ‘Theories of Group Rights’ 249 
44 Barry, B. Culture and Equality 33 
45 Okin, S. “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice.” Ethics, vol. 99, no. 2, 1989 236 
46 Okin, S. “Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and Cultural Differences.” Hypatia, vol. 13, no. 2, 1998, 46 
47 Okin, S, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ 2 
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limited and it might even lead to their deaths.48 This is something which Kymlicka 
acknowledges and concedes is a problem, but he does maintain that his principle is 
sound and usable.49 Other critics would be Prokhovnik, who argues that the 
separation between the private sphere and the public sphere serves to devalue the 
private sphere, and that while some women choose to live mainly in the private 
sphere, others have their choices limited by social pressures.50 Modood offers a 
different perspective, and criticised forms of multiculturalism which sought to 
maintain this distinction between the private and the public spheres, and takes the 
position that this distinction will only serve to prevent the emergence of 
multiculturalism.51 
It should be noted that Okin does not refute the argument that the individual is in 
need of their culture, and indeed takes the view that this line of reasoning is a strong 
one.52 But this could be characterised as an issue of priorities, where Okin takes the 
view that when there is a clash between the needs of our culture and the needs of 
women, it is the side of women which ought to prevail, while Kukathas takes the 
opposite view.53 This speaks to their differing views of the ends of the state, what we 
consider the state to be for. This is an issue which we will examine in chapter 6 and 
will be important for us in chapter 7 where we give our answer to how the state is to 
treat cultures.  
An alternative view is offered by Vlopp, who takes the position that the view of 
multiculturalism and feminism as being in opposition is based on flawed 
assumptions, such as the assumption that cultural minorities are more likely to be 
oppressive towards women than western liberalism is. This is an assumption which 
she attributes in part to colonial origins, leading to assumptions which hides and 
obscures violence and repression of women in the west.54 
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These assumptions are what we will break into links, and the links covered in this 
project forms chains which effects our deliberations of how cultures are to be treated 
by the state. With different possible links being more readily compatible than others, 
and if we wish to construct a coherent theory to how the state is to treat cultures it 
will be helpful to use these links to consider how our underlying assumptions fit 
together. My project provides first a different way of conceptualising these 
assumptions in the form of the links, and shows how they interact. And then uses 
this to build an answer to the question of how the state is to treat cultures which is 
coherent and can form a chain from beginning to end, which centres around the idea 
of considering the perspective of the most burdened.  
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Chapter 2. The Value of Culture 
 
This project concerns how the state is to treat cultures, this chapter will elaborate on 
the type of value a culture can possess in order to assist in this aim. The chapter will 
consider what type of value a culture can be said to possess, with the two types 
being that of instrumental and intrinsic value. The first one is where the culture is 
thought to be valuable due to the benefits it can provide for the members of the 
culture. And the second type is where a culture is thought to be valuable in itself, 
rather than because of what it could provide for its members. This second type, the 
intrinsic view of the value of culture, invites questions on the source and origin of this 
type of value, I will suggest that a form of constructivism could help to answer this. I 
then apply this division between intrinsic and instrumental value to several of the 
thinkers we have already considered in this project, in order to elaborate and make 
clear how this division impacts what culture is thought be and what it is thought to 
provide for its members. 
The first part of this chapter will outline and consider the different types of value 
which we are going to consider, then the second part will use these categories and 
apply them to theorists and see what assumptions they have made relating to the 
value of culture. 
The aim of this chapter is to make clear the difference between instrumental and 
intrinsic value and the importance of what moral standing we apply to cultures will 
have for the rest of this project. Once the value of culture has been examined then 
succeeding chapters can consider the nature and sources of obligation which our 
culture might create and the ontological nature of our culture and as well as what 
advocacy positions this might lead to, which in turn affect how we view the ends of 
society which is examined in chapter 6. Before we outline my suggested approach to 
how the state is to treat cultures.  
 2.1 Moral standing and moral value 
15 
 
An assumption which will be made in this chapter is that culture has some form of 
moral standing or value which makes it worth considering and spending a project of 
this type on. This idea of moral standing will take different forms depending on the 
context and author, an example would be W.D Ross who talks about intrinsic and 
extrinsic goodness.55 The value would then be found in an object, we will use the 
word ‘object’ to refer to that which might potentially have value, and in its relationship 
to goodness. It is something which is good in itself and is so possessing intrinsic 
goodness, while a different object could have an extrinsic goodness, where the 
goodness is located outside the object, in this description then the goodness is what 
has moral standing and the objects derive its standing from its relationship to this 
goodness. 
This connects to this project with its aim of discerning how the state is to treat 
cultures, as it would be necessary to understand why we are considering culture and 
its role in decision making. Is it based on practical and prudential grounds or is it a 
normative judgement. Are we saying that cultures are useful or do they have moral 
standing on their own or is there a combination of the two? This because, if we view 
it in a practical manner then culture could be viewed in terms of preference in a way 
which is similar to other forms of association, which would be in the manner in which 
Brian Barry views it.56 This however is normally not how we approach culture where 
we usually view culture as something more than a personal preference. A point 
which we shall see throughout this project. 
One way of approaching this idea of moral standing, would be to think of it in terms 
of respect. Something with moral standing would be something which would be 
worthy of respect. Here it might be helpful to think of Kant’s humanity formulation, 
where people are to be treated as ends in themselves rather than merely as 
means.57 While we shall return to this view later to examine it further, here it captures 
something which is helpful in understanding this concept of moral standing as we will 
be using it. The point here then is that people are worthy of respect, as ends in 
themselves not only as means. Similarly, cultures would be worthy of respect in 
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themselves, and to not treat a culture with this respect would be a moral 
transgression. 
 
These are the essentials that will inform our thinking in terms of moral standing in 
this chapter and it is a helpful concept to keep in mind throughout the chapter. Next 
we will consider the manner in which something has moral standing or value, 
instrumentally or intrinsically. Starting with instrumental value before moving on to 
intrinsic value and then to consider how the different authors we have considered 
before would fit into this way of dividing value. 
 
2.2 Instrumental value 
 
In this project we are using a division between intrinsic and instrumental view of the 
value of culture and how it relates to moral standing. We have already seen W. D 
Ross use a distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goodness, Raz also uses 
this type of distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, as well as what he 
calls conventional value.58 Though I will argue that this is actually a category of 
instrumental value rather than an independent category. 
This way of approaching cultures relation to moral standing by considering its 
relationship to value is based on categorising the relationship to value as being 
either intrinsic or instrumental. If it is intrinsic, then the value is found in properties 
and factors which are intrinsic to the object, while if it is instrumental, then the 
objects value is found in things which are extrinsic to the object. 59 That is the 
simplest way to describe the difference between the two approaches to value. There 
are other ways to divide different types of value, for example Mason, who in addition 
to the intrinsic instrumental divide also adds the category of extrinsic and non-
instrumentally valuable.60 However this additional dimension would not add anything 
for our purposes except for the possibility for confusion, and as with the conventional 
value mentioned before, these additional categories would in our way of looking at 
these concepts end up being subsumed in the categories we will be using. Here in 
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this project the divide between intrinsic and instrumental will be sufficient and so 
those are the concepts we will make use of.  
 
We will then limit ourselves to these two different types of value, which on the face of 
it would appear to be quite simple and intuitive, but on consideration we discover 
them to be more complicated then they might initially appear. 
 
An object then, as we term it, is of instrumental value if the source of its value is 
found outside the object itself, if the value giving properties are extrinsic to the 
object. 
One way to consider this is to think of objects that are of instrumental value as being 
those whose value is contingent. It only has value depending on the context, and this 
value is contingent on the thing which the object is an instrument for.61 The object is 
deriving its value from some other object and is in a manner of speaking sharing its 
value. This would have the consequence that if the object which we are considering 
would cease to be an instrument to that which it derives its value from, then it would 
no longer have any value. Or if indeed the object which is conferring value on the 
instrumental object no longer was considered valuable then the instrument would 
also no longer have any value. 
This leads us to the question, if an object of instrumental value derives its value from 
some other object, then from where does this prior object derive its value? An 
example of a view would be Thomas’s description of Hume, where desires are what 
confers value on objects, and so if an object allows us to achieve our desires it has 
instrumental value.62 As an example, if we were wishing to cross a bridge then a 
bridge would possess instrumental value for us. 
 
While some do argue that desire is a suitable source of value or standing,63 this for a 
few reasons would be insufficient for our purposes. One reason would be that this 
does not answer the question of from where an object receives its value, rather it 
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moves the question to another place, if an object is instrumentally valuable because 
it facilitates our desires then we would also need to establish that desire is in itself 
worthy of moral standing, and without such a position, then this formulation of 
instrumental value does not help us in this project. Another reason would be that this 
formulation does not help us to distinguish between benevolent and malevolent 
desires. If someone wished someone else harm, then a weapon would be an 
instrument to that desire, would that mean that we would have to label the weapon 
as having value and moral standing? Certainly the weapon would be useful, but this 
formulation does not take the normative dimension into consideration. When we 
discuss the value of a culture and the role and weight it should be given in decision 
making, it is not this type of value, that is the same as use, which we are talking 
about. This can be seen if we remember one of the other ways of considering moral 
standing, that of the object being worthy of respect. The tool for a malevolent desire 
would scarcely be worthy of respect.  
This points towards further consideration about instrumental value being necessary 
before we have fully established how we are going to use the concept in this project. 
 
In this context then, when we talk about value it is as an instrument for something 
else. This means that for object of instrumental value to have any value, it must be 
deriving it from something which does not derive its value instrumentally. It would be 
possible for there to be a chain of value relations where A derives its value 
instrumentally from B and B derives its value instrumentally from C and so on. But 
unless we find at the end of this chain something that derives its value not from 
some other object but rather is valuable in it-self, something which is not 
instrumentally valuable but intrinsically valuable.64 A different way to explain this by 
reference to Aristotle and his view “…in every action and rational choice the end is 
the good. Since it is for the sake of end that everyone does everything else.”65 Here 
we have the idea of a good at the end, which we do other actions in order to arrive at 
and for Aristotle this chief end would be happiness, as that is a complete and self-
sufficient good, we do not strive to be happy so that we can then arrive at some 
other good to make life worthwhile, the happiness is the end point.66 
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For Aristotle there was an end for which sake we did everything else, showing how 
there needed to be something to anchor the value for the other steps of the chain to 
be constructed from. One way to explain this to make it simple, is to express this in 
the terms of a formula. The formula for an object of instrumental value then would be 
O + C = S. here O stands for the object which has the instrumental value, C is the 
context and the S is for (moral) standing. The main element which this is meant to 
show is that for an instrumentally valuable object to have moral standing it needs the 
appropriate context, if the context disappears than it can no longer connect with this 
value. This, as will become more apparent when we shift to the intrinsic view of 
value, plays an important part in differentiating the two types of value. 
A different approach is that by Kymlicka, which could be described as taking a view 
where cultures are treated as a resource for its members, and it is incumbent on the 
state to try and ensure that people have access to this resource.67 The reason for 
wanting everyone to have access to this resource is that cultures provide a context 
of choice which is necessary to allow members of cultures to evaluate and make 
choices, and so they ought to be added to Rawls’s primary goods in his thought 
experiment.68 We will consider this further in the section which focuses on how the 
thinkers approach the type of value which a culture can have. 
The main element of instrumental value then is that its value is contingent and 
dependent on context to possess any moral standing or value. This leaves us then 
with the alternate view, that of intrinsic value. 
 
2.3 Intrinsic value 
 
The other form of value we will consider is that of intrinsic value, which as a concept 
also raises some of the same challenges as the instrumental view did. Part of this 
problem is in deciding on a workable definition and in how to avoid circularity in how 
to ascribe value to that which confers value onto other objects. 
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A common definition of intrinsic value is that which is chosen for itself and not for its 
consequences.69 Bradley describes one view of intrinsic value along similar lines 
with 
“Intrinsic value is a kind of value such that when it is possessed by something, it is 
possessed by it solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties”.70 These two descriptions 
have a certain intuitive appeal, if we describe instrumental value as being contingent 
and depending on outside objects for its value. Then defining the alternative 
approach to value where the object is valuable due to factors internal to itself and for 
its own sake, would, on the face of it appear to be a simple way to define intrinsic 
value. However, this would leave important questions unanswered. 
 
Two of these issues are that of what it means for value to be intrinsic, and what it is 
which gives objects of intrinsic value, its value. To use an example from Raz to 
demonstrate the difficulties in labelling something as being intrinsically valuable. The 
example he uses is that of a sunset, which he finds to be of intrinsic value as the 
factor which gives it its value, its aesthetical beauty, is contained entirely within it and 
it has no extrinsic properties which can be said to be such as to make the object be 
one of instrumental value.71 
 
But this example shows some of the difficulty with this approach to intrinsic value. 
First, there is some question as to whether we can call the value that sunsets 
possess intrinsic. As it would be possible to argue that what a sunset possesses is in 
fact instrumental value and not intrinsic value. In this example it is not really the 
sunset that has value but the beauty that it contains, it would seem that the value is 
not in the sunset but in the mind of the observer of the sunset who finds it beautiful. 
And the second problem which this reveals is that this example does not help us to 
understand why a sunset would be thought of as being valuable. Here it is suggested 
that it is the aesthetic beauty which gives the sunset its value, but this means that 
the object only has value if a) beauty is considered valuable, and b) the sunset can 
be determined to be beautiful. This then would mean that the value of a sunset is in 
fact contingent on the observer of the sunset, they have to think that it is beautiful 
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and that the effect that this beauty has on them is valuable or that the existence of 
beauty is in itself valuable, meaning that the beauty of the sun would only be 
valuable if it was already thought of as being valuable. 
 
This point is made clearer by the third value which Raz identifies, the 
aforementioned conventional value. An object possesses conventional value if it is 
traditionally considered valuable or if people find them valuable.72 These would be 
objects that are valuable because they are valued. The source of the objects value 
lies in people projecting value onto them. If we consider this in conjunction with the 
example of the sunset and the issues mentioned, then we could say that this 
conventional value might be a better description for the value of a sunset than would 
the intrinsic value label. The conventional valuable object is that which has value 
because people ascribe value to it, in this case an observer appreciating the 
aesthetical beauty of a sunset, and so find it to be valuable. But this would mean 
then as pointed out earlier that this type of value would be contingent upon its 
circumstances, where we would need to have the observer be of the sort to find 
something valuable in the object. 
 
If we remember the definition we used earlier, then the objects which are of intrinsic 
value are those that find value in factors intrinsic to themselves, and instrumental 
value is when the object finds value in factors extrinsic to the object. To continue with 
the example of the sunset, then one of the arguments for it being intrinsically 
valuable is that the factor which is imbuing it with value, its aesthetic nature, is 
intrinsic to this object. But if we remember the formulation we used for instrumental 
value earlier, that of O+C=S, then as we have said the sunrise would qualify for 
instrumental value as it is dependent on context in order for the object to have 
standing and value. And the same would apply to Raz’s description of conventional 
value, as those objects would be those which are valuable because they are valued, 
which requires a context in which we have people who can value them for the object 
to have standing. Meaning that in the way in which this project is approaching the 
types of value, conventional value would be a form of instrumental value rather than 
being a distinct third category. As devoid of the appropriate context the sunset would 
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have no value. This all then means that this example of the sunset is not an example 
of intrinsic value, and we must consider the nature of intrinsic value further in order 
to understand it. 
 
One way suggested by Bradley to determine whether or not something is of intrinsic 
value is to think of it as something which when maximised, increased or brought 
about would mean an overall improvement of the world and the absence of it would 
be a loss.73 Now this is not a true ironclad definition or test as we shall see in a 
moment, but I think it can be helpful in examining the nature of intrinsic value, first by 
looking at this as it is and then by inverting this little thought experiment.  
 
One of the reasons I want to use this device is that it demonstrates the danger of 
confusing intrinsic value and instrumental value. An object might be missed if it was 
to disappear, but it would be fully feasible for us to miss it due to the instrumental 
ability and value that it possesses. Using the sunset again as an example we could 
still miss it even if we take the view that it holds instrumental value in as much as it 
gives pleasure to the spectator. In fact, we could say that the pleasure we gain from 
witnessing a sunset is unique to that object and can only be gained through it. But 
the value would still be instrumental as it is only a means to another factor, the 
enjoyment of aesthetic beauty, which is our actual goal. Imagine that one particular 
type of medicine or antidote were to cease to exist, we would no doubt miss it and its 
absence would be a loss to the world, but only as far as we would miss it being able 
to cure disease. Once the disease is gone then the medicine is no longer valuable to 
us. There might be some temptation to suggest that as the properties that make the 
object valuable is contained entirely within the object, it is to be thought of as having 
intrinsic value. But as it is possible to desire an object for its intrinsic properties in an 
instrumental way, as is the case with this sunset, what is desired is its aesthetic 
beauty which is contained entirely inside the object, but we desire this object for 
instrumental reasons, in this case the effect that the object has on us. We would 
need to find a way to describe intrinsic value in such a way as to avoid including 
within it objects which would be more suitable to be thought of as being of 
instrumental value. 
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To further look at the concept of intrinsic value it would be helpful to look at a 
different description of intrinsic value. Here instead we should consider the point 
made by Brandt and consider the object in complete abstraction, without any 
considerations given to what consequences or effects it might produce.74 In a way, 
here we are doing the opposite of the earlier method of imagining the absence of the 
object we are here considering it in isolation. 
 
Obviously in the case of most objects it would be impossible for it to exist in isolation, 
but here the point is to see if in the absence of other considerations or context there 
can be any object of value. As Kagan puts it regarding intrinsic value ‘Philosophers 
sometimes try to get at this kind of value by suggesting that it is the value that an 
object would have even if it were the only thing existing in the universe.’75 As any 
value it possesses must be due to intrinsic factors as there would be no other factors 
at play. This device is mainly helpful in demonstrating its deficiency and the 
problems it creates. As we just saw Brandt suggests that an object is intrinsically 
valuable if we find it of value when it is viewed abstractly and distinct from its 
consequences and context.76 This would seem to solve the problem of having 
objects of instrumental value being mistakenly viewed as objects of intrinsic value by 
requiring that all objects of intrinsic value be such that it can be thought of as 
valuable in complete abstraction, or in our version, complete isolation. As objects in 
isolation cannot provide any instrumental effects or consequences, all that would 
remain would be the factors what would give it intrinsic value. And while this indeed 
would solve this particular issue by disallowing objects of instrumental value, it would 
also seem to make very few objects intrinsically valuable. 
 
Looking at the definitions of intrinsic value that we have come across so far, which 
relies on the object finding its value only in factors that is intrinsic to the object 
itself.77 Earlier in the chapter we described the instrumental value as O+C=S, and 
now we will do the same for intrinsic value. The way to describe the formula for 
                                                             
74 Harman, G "Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value." The Journal of Philosophy 64, 23 (1967) 794 
75 Kagan, S. "Rethinking Intrinsic Value." 278 
76 Harman, G "Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value."794 
77 Kupperman, J. "The Epistemology of Non-Instrumental Value." 661 
24 
 
intrinsic value and its relationship to moral standing would be O=S. This is to signify 
that an object does not need any further context or additional factors to achieve 
moral standing, this means that everything which gives this object standing and 
value must then be contained within the object. As unlike instrumental value which 
draws its value from its relationship to other objects which have moral standing, here 
the standing is not due to some relationship with anything else but is entirely self-
contained. So here the objects we are considering to be intrinsically valuable are 
those that are valuable in themselves. 
If it is necessary for an object to be valuable in itself for it to be of intrinsic value, from 
where can this value be derived from. How can we know if something is valuable or 
not? 
 
This returns us to the issues that were raised at the beginning, about what it means 
for an object to have moral standing. One interpretation being that ends imbue 
objects with value and the other being that value and standing means that the object 
is worthy of respect. There are a few issues which appear in conjunction with this. 
One is, how in either of those positions objects ultimately come to be considered 
valuable and worthy of respect, how would the end which brings standing to other 
objects itself acquire standing. Another question is whether this value is objective or 
not. 
The first of these issues, regarding what makes either ends or respectability valuable 
is hardly a new one, as Mill pointed out ultimate ends do not admit of proof and that 
first principles cannot be justified by reasoning alone.78 If we cannot prove the worth 
of the principles which are used to determine what is of value then it would seem that 
we cannot have objects of intrinsic value as then we could not prove that the 
qualities which they possess are indeed valuable, as the question of what it is that 
makes an object valuable would not be possible to answer. If for example we were to 
take the position that happiness is valuable and that it has intrinsic value, then the 
question becomes what it is that bestows moral worth on happiness, we might use 
the answer that Mill used, that everyone desires their own happiness.79 But then we 
must already have taken the view that having our desires be satisfied is valuable. It 
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would seem to me that to ascribe value to any object is to bestow it with some 
manner of pre-moral worth in order to designate it a valuable good. But to designate 
any object as a pre-moral good is to make a moral judgement, bringing us back to 
the issue of how to confer worth or goodness onto an object. One way to look at this 
issue is found in the work of Quinn who describes the difference between 
teleological and deontological theories as being different in how they view intrinsic 
value, with teleology being based on pre-moral judgements regarding what is of 
value while deontology relies on certain act types derived from reason.80 Pre-moral 
judgements in this context being that some goods or objects are judged to be 
valuable, and after this has been determined we can derive our moral judgments 
based on these pre-moral judgements and use them as the starting point of our 
deliberations. But this way of looking at intrinsic value does not solve the problem as 
the shape of our pre-moral judgements has consequences on our subsequent moral 
assumptions, it means that the choice of our pre-moral judgements is a normative 
one, If for example we were to have as our pre-moral judgement that the 
preservation of life ought to be the overriding goal of our decisions, then the question 
why life and not something else like liberty or dignity could well be asked and we 
would be back in the problem Mill found himself in. If we cannot find a way to ascribe 
value to cultures or that which cultures provide, then we cannot justify giving culture 
this specific attention which we are giving it apart from practical considerations, 
rather than normative ones.  
  
So the problem before us now is the need for some way to find a way to imbue 
objects of intrinsic value with their value, and these objects can then in turn share 
their value with objects of instrumental value. And second how to establish if any of 
these objects of intrinsic value hold their value objectively, and if not does this mean 
that value is a subjective evaluation akin to a preference, which would bring us back 
to the question of why the satisfaction of a preference would be worthy of respect.  
 
2.4 Constructivism 
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The answer to both these problems can be found I believe in embracing some form 
of constructivism. There are both meta-ethical and normative forms of 
constructivism, one relating to how we arrive at normative judgments, the other 
about the truthful nature of these judgments, we will return to both of these concepts 
further in a later chapter focusing on contractualism, for now we will only consider 
the necessary elements for our present purposes.  
When it comes to finding objective first principles there are a number of different 
approaches one can take to what constitutes objectivity. The common colloquial use 
of the word objectivity tends to be used in a way which would correspond to how a 
mathematician might use the word, in that something is objectively true regardless of 
the circumstance or our opinion of the fact, 3+4 will always equal 7 no matter what 
we think of it. For Ross, objectivity comes from the fact that when he looks for 
objects of intrinsic value he looks for objects that hold this self-evidently.81 What we 
have here is a case where objects are valuable in a similar way to a mathematically 
objective truth, we might decide on whether or not to observe and adhere to these 
self-evidently true principles but we cannot decide whether or not these are true or 
not.82 An alternative use of the concept of objectivity is found in Kant who uses it to 
mean ‘objectively, i.e., from grounds that are valid for every rational being as such’.83 
This represents a very different view of objectivity, where in the first version that 
which is objectively true is true independent of our judgment, while the second one 
presents a view of objectivity which is based on being valid for everyone. This shift in 
how one views objectivity allows us to create a position from which we can arrive at 
our first principles, or in the language this chapter has been using, to find what can 
be said to have intrinsic value.  
 
If we look at what Rawls calls a Kantian constructivism, which is concerned with how 
to arrive and decide on first principles than we can see that it is quite helpful to use a 
similar approach here.84 While Rawls uses this to try to find first principles for the 
basic structures of society,85 an approach which he develops further in his A Theory 
of justice. Here we are using it to try and find a way to establish intrinsic value. As 
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mentioned before, one of the other views on the source of intrinsic value frames it in 
term of finding what is self-evidently right, leading to the objection that any attempt to 
try and adopt or construct first principles must be flawed as we cannot simply chose 
what is right or valuable because that is an issue of truth and not one of opinion.86 
The answer to this objection would be that when we make use of constructivism of 
this type, be it via a device like Rawls’s original position or similar, we are not trying 
to come to an agreement on pre-existing principles that are already established 
independent of the people who are going to be living by these principles.87 Rather 
the starting point is that there is no such objective true moral order which we are 
trying to agree upon, but rather we are trying to find what the most reasonable moral 
order is.88 The main core of this type of Kantian constructivist approach is to look for 
a device or a procedure ‘in which rationally autonomous agents subject to 
reasonable conditions agree to public principles of justice.’89 One example of such a 
device would be the aforementioned original position with its veil of ignorance which 
limits the rational agent’s access to certain information, such as their ultimate ends 
or natural talents.90 Here it is the ethos rather than the specific intricacies of the 
original position which we are after, that of reasonable people agreeing to 
reasonable principles regarding intrinsic value.  
 
What this means for this work is that I take the most plausible source of intrinsic 
value to be that those objects are those that reasonable people could agree to find 
intrinsically valuable. This would mean that acts or objects of malevolence would find 
it hard to be considered reasonable by reasonable people. This would then also 
mean that an object that all could reasonably consider to be of intrinsic value would 
also be considered to be objectively of value, with objects of objective intrinsic value 
being those that everyone could reasonably agree to for their own sake, rather than 
the instrumental benefits that an object might have. We will return to this in the 
chapter on contractualism.  
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2.5 Applied to other thinkers 
 
The aim of this the first part of the chapter was to look into what it means to have 
moral standing and how an object might have this standing, the second part of the 
chapter will look at how some of the prominent thinkers on issues regarding 
multiculturalism and the treatment of culture view the value of culture. This to try to 
apply the schema of types of value outlined in part 1 to these thinkers in order to 
help our deliberations on how much value our culture possess. 
 
The first theorist who we are going to look at is David Miller. Miller describes culture 
as almost exclusively possessing instrumental value. Culture he believes is 
necessary in order to establish solidarity between members of society, with this 
solidarity being necessary for one member of society to make sacrifices to the 
benefit of another member of society.91 Two interesting elements stand out in Miller’s 
description of the value of culture. One is the wholly instrumental basis for culture. 
And the second is that this view places the value in how it benefits society rather 
than it benefiting the individual members who are part of these cultures.  
He does offer more in the way of justifying ascribing value to culture, this in his view 
that our sentimental attachments ought to have an impact on our ethical 
considerations.92 This together with his view that we all do indeed have deep 
sentimental attachment to our culture, or nation in his vocabulary,93 hence our 
culture ought to have special standing in light of this sentimental attachment. This 
then for our purposes means that culture would have instrumental value. As it comes 
to our sentimental attachments, then it would only have value as far as it fulfils our 
desire for them, here culture would only be the means to an end, with the end being 
our sentimental preferences. Using our formula from earlier, the sentimental 
attachment would be the C (context) and the culture would be the O (Object) and it is 
when those are together that they can reach S (standing). 
 
This does have implications for how we view the value of culture when it comes to 
the question of whether or not this is an objective or subjective value. As Miller 
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believes that our culture does have value and requires ethical consideration in that it 
can create duties towards others in the same culture.94 But if the source of this 
obligation is the attachments we have towards our culture then that would seem to 
indicate that it would have to be a very subjective value and obligation, where we 
only have an obligation towards other in our society if we feel like we do. Miller tries 
to answer this by commenting on how different cultures can have different political 
cultures as part of them, so that someone from a culture which has a more 
communitarian orientation would have a different obligation towards others in their 
culture than would someone from a more individualistic culture.95  
This would mean then that while it is not possible to say that everyone who is a 
member of a culture has a specific duty which is the same in every culture, we all 
have duties which derive from the particular culture we are in. But while this might 
allow us to say that we all have a duty to follow the precepts of our particular culture, 
it does not help us answer how everyone might come to have these obligations and 
not just those who feel a particular attachment to their culture. While he does 
establish that the sense of believing oneself to be part of the culture is a defining 
element of it.96 That does not help us in the cases where someone does not believe 
themselves to be part of the culture  
This would make it seem to me that if we were to use Miller’s view on culture then it 
would mean that we would also have to accept a certain amount of subjectivity in the 
level of value that culture can possess. 
 
The second author we are going to look at is Charles Taylor, whose view of the 
nature of the value of culture is very interesting, as it has both elements of intrinsic 
value and instrumental value, but the former is placed much more central than the 
later. The instrumental nature can be seen among other places, in the insistence on 
the harm of misrecognition. Here your identity is a source of self-respect, in this 
sense it provides an instrumental function. It gives us the basis we need for self-
respect, in this sense culture mainly has value in that it is capable of providing this 
form of identity and self-respect. This provides an interesting paradox where if our 
culture, which is a reflection of our identity, provides self-respect and to be 
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misrecognized is to suffer harm,97 then it would seem that as our identity and culture 
is misrecognized and brings us harm, the less able to provide us with self-respect it 
is and the less value it would have. But this is only one of the features or facets to 
Taylor’s view of culture. The main aspect of culture is its intrinsic qualities and not its 
instrumental consequences and effects. It is our culture and our communities that 
help us to achieve some form of orientation towards the good life.98 It is our 
orientation towards the good that allows us to discern what in life is of value and 
shape a worthwhile life assumes, it is through this that culture can act as a 
constitutive good,99 it acts as a source from which we can derive our morality. If we 
look to Quinn’s definition of intrinsic value as being that which is goodness or value 
making,100 then it would seem that there is a degree of compatibility here with Taylor. 
If we take the view that our culture is that which can orient us in our moral views,101 
culture would be the object which provides us with our first principles and our 
ultimate ends. Here culture would be goodness making in the sense that it is in 
relation to our culture that things are deemed to be good or not, or of value or not. 
This stands in contrast to the Kantian constructivist approach mentioned earlier, 
where our first principles came from reasonable agreement, unlike here when they 
depend on our cultural membership. One of the main sources of contention between 
these views is in the assumptions it makes with regard to the people who make up 
these cultures and societies. Taylor seeks to question what he sees as the atomistic 
approach that some theories, with particular mention of the social contract theories 
of the seventeenth century, have adopted with regard persons.102  
 
This atomism has meant that many theorists have taken a view of the individual 
which entails treating them as solitary agents who peruse their ends independently 
of each other and create their identities also independently of each other,103 this in 
contrast to how Taylor views identity formation and subsequently creation of a view 
of the good life, which is dialogical in nature. As mentioned before, our culture 
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enables our identity and it does this in part by allowing us a language community.104 
This allows us to engage in dialogue with others of the same culture and through that 
process discover our identity and our relation to the good life. Our culture also makes 
possible the extension of this dialogue to those who came before us and so our 
culture allows us to be placed in a historical perspective.105  
 
This also creates a duty on us to make sure that this community with its culture 
remains viable for the future and to also make sure that there are people who in the 
future will want to be part of said culture or community.106 This could include 
implementing policies which aims to ensure that future members of a culture will 
continue to identify as that culture, with an example being the French speakers in 
Canada.107  
 
This is markedly different form the Kantian constructivism that we looked at earlier. 
instead of asking if arrangements are such that reasonable people would accept 
them, it becomes incumbent on society to ensure that people identify with their 
particular culture and to make sure that future generations does the same. This as 
mentioned before comes from different starting positions and different aims. For 
Taylor culture is a necessary part of our personality which we cannot reasonably 
agree to as it is our culture which shapes what it is we find to be reasonable. We will 
return to this question of atomism later and explore it more thoroughly.  
 
Kymlicka’s position on the value of culture is based primarily on its instrumental 
properties. One of the important roles which he sees culture playing is that of 
providing a source of self-respect and self-confidence,108 which indicates an 
instrumental view of the value of culture. 
For Kymlicka culture does not only provide a source of self-respect but also provides 
a context of choice for the members of the culture, as he puts it “The decisions about 
how to lead our lives must ultimately be ours alone, but this decision is always a 
matter of selecting what we believe to be most valuable from the various options 
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available, selecting from a context of choice which provides us with different ways of 
life. This is important because the range of options is determined by our cultural 
heritage.”109 It is our culture which enables us to evaluate and make judgements 
about what ways of life and which options are meaningful and worth perusing. This 
has some similarities with Taylors’s constitutive goods, in that both concepts provide 
the individual with a sense of what is the good. The difference can be seen in that 
Taylors’s constitutive goods enables or creates the good while the context of choice 
allows us to evaluate existing goods. For Kymlicka our culture plays a key part in 
creating this context of choice and culture is explicitly described as being valuable for 
being able to provide a context of choice ‘…then it is important to remember that it is 
a good in its capacity of providing meaningful options for us, and aiding our ability to 
judge for ourselves the value of our life-plans.’110  
Kymlicka in his Liberalism, Community, and Culture argues that, not only are special 
rights for minority cultures compatible with liberalism, but it is in actuality essential 
that liberalism contains special rights for cultures. Taking the view that culture should 
be placed amongst the primary goods to be considered in Rawls’ original position. 
Developing further Rawls’s position that the sources for self-respect would be 
amongst the primary goods Kymlicka refines this and takes the view that culture is 
uniquely suited to provide the source of self-respect and the context of choice.111 An 
objection to this approach can be found with Redhead, who takes the view that 
common goods, such as culture ‘…cannot be reduced to the individual interests of 
the citizens who share them because they in fact make possible these interests. To 
speak of common goods like a culture in instrumentalist terms as mere context of 
choice from which to construct one’s own identity is to miss the larger normative 
issue: that a common good, such as the Québécois’ francophone culture is 
something more than a mere Rawlsian primary good.’112 The problem for Redhead is 
that in framing culture in instrumental Rawlsian terms, Kymlicka has shaped and 
biased our conception of culture to one which can be made compatible with a 
proceduralist liberal approach. 113 A different interpretation of Kymlicka can be seen 
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in Quong, who describes it as an attempt to help those who find themselves in 
cultures that are in precarious circumstances, and by treating cultures as primary 
goods to which everyone is entitled, cultures could be protected in a liberal 
scheme.114  
Continuing the theme of Kymlicka attempting to construct this multicultural approach 
within the frame of liberalism, again this can be seen in the focus on the individual 
and on their choice. In addition, we also have the distinction between internal 
restriction and external protection. In short, internal restriction is about prohibiting 
intra-group limitations while external protections are about protecting against inter-
group dominations.115 This is about ensuring that authorities inside the groups are 
not in a position to place restrictions upon other members of the group.116 While the 
external protections are about ensuring that a majority group is not in a position to 
marginalise or put restrictions on a minority culture.117  
In essence what we arrive at is the situation where we disallow policies which would 
constitute internal restrictions, meaning that they would decrease the choices and 
options available to the members of minority groups. While allowing policies which 
aim to protect cultural minorities from having their options limited by the majority 
culture. This can be contrasted with Parekh’s comments that one of the flaws of the 
western liberal approach is that choice is itself not a choice but an assumed 
essential component in the human make up.118 
One of the difficulties which Kymlicka, and others arguing for multicultural policies, 
encounter is that of internal dissent, where a culture is divided on an issue, which 
places the state in the position where it will end up marginalising some culture no 
matter what actions, or inaction, it decides to take. This is a problem which we will 
return to later in the project, bit it is worth pointing out that this is one of the things 
which the prohibitions on internal restrictions is meant to remedy. But this illustrates 
the problem, if one section of the culture is arguing that a policy would amount to an 
internal restriction and so should not be allowed, the other side of the culture in 
favour of the policy could argue that not instituting it would be undermining the 
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culture, and so whatever the state does, some section of the culture is left 
dissatisfied. This issue will be considered more fully in later parts of the project. 
The next thinker we are examining is Patten, who takes a very complex view of 
cultures, that potentially also lends itself to being interpreted as utilising elements of 
both intrinsic and instrumental views on the nature of the value of culture. 
Patten describes culture in this manner “A distinct culture is the relation that people 
share when, and to the extent that, they have shared with one another subjection to 
a set of formative conditions that are distinct from the formative conditions that are 
imposed on others.”119 What this means is that a culture is to an extent a practice 
and a set of beliefs, what distinguishes culture from other practices and beliefs on 
this account is that a culture has a particular social lineage.120 The current members 
of a culture were inducted and socialised into the culture by people who were 
inducted and socialised into it by those who came before them, who in turn where 
socialised by those who came before them and so on. This view of culture would not 
be helpful for us in this project. As we are trying to find how the state is to treat 
cultures, we cannot define culture in such a way that the state could not understand 
that use of the word culture. And while this is a very interesting and in certain 
contexts possibly illuminating account of culture, it would not be feasible for the state 
to be aware of the manner and degrees in which individuals have been socialised 
into their specific cultures, and so is not a useful definition for us.  
One of the issues which Patten uses his view of culture to analyse is that of cultural 
change and the ways in which cultures expire. While Patten takes the view that his 
description of culture can be combined with both an intrinsic and an instrumental 
account, I would suggest that his view is more suited to instrumental rather than to 
an intrinsic view of the value of culture. One reason why we might think the reverse 
was true is in his description of culture is his social lineage account as not 
addressing or speaking to the content of any particular culture.121 This account of 
culture then does not speak to anything specific which a culture can allow its 
members to do, however, this would not preclude the possibility of our culture being 
able to enable us to evaluate choices, but it would mean that it would not speak to 
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the range and quality of those choices. And indeed, Patten acknowledges that some 
cultures would provide more options than others and some would qualify as being 
oppressive.122 This would weaken the compatibility with instrumental value as here 
we could not rely on a culture necessarily providing a range of options for the 
members, and so the options based argument would become contingent on the 
realities of specific cultures. Despite this I would suggest that this view of culture is 
still better understood as an instrumental view rather than an intrinsic one. Part of 
this can be seen in Patten’s arguments relating to the disappearance of cultures. 
This again relates to our culture providing us with a range of options, and if our 
culture were to disappear or to cease to be viable, then the members of minority 
cultures would lose valuable options, in the sense that they would not be able to rely 
on their culture for the options which it would provide, and in the sense that the 
options available in the dominant culture would likely not be viewed as being as 
valuable to the members of minority cultures.123 This description of the value which a 
culture possesses is entirely based on the instrumental aspects, in how it provides 
options.  
Patten takes the view that his account of culture is also compatible with an intrinsic 
view of the value of culture, but here I would suggest that this is not necessarily so. 
This, as his description of the intrinsic view of culture rests on the value which the 
members of the culture place on the culture,124 this could either be similar to Raz’s 
description of conventional value, which I suggested was in actuality a form of 
instrumental value, in that our culture would be considered valuable because it has 
traditionally been considered valuable. Or that the culture is valuable because of the 
preferences of the members of the culture, which would fit into our definition of 
instrumental view of culture as it would be both contextual and a means to the end of 
preference satisfaction. 
Patten then would best be described as using an instrumental view of culture, rather 
than both as he suggested, and his definition of culture would be one which we could 
not make use of, as it would be exceptionally difficult for the state to make use of it. 
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Moving on to Tariq Modood. Modood has some similarities to some of the other 
theorists in that he places culture at the source of self-respect and self-image.125  
He also tries to solve the same problem as other authors who place culture as the 
core of pride and self-image, as he argues that vulnerable cultures need protection 
as they act as sources of group pride, and to lose that pride makes the members of 
that culture more vulnerable to attacks to their self-esteem.126  
 
Nevertheless, Modood doesn’t put culture as the sole possible source of this pride or 
esteem, but rather as one possible source. This would give culture a general 
instrumental value, this does not mean that culture is unimportant in Modood’s 
description. In fact, he views it as a very important part of our identity and our sense 
of self, and to be misrecognised by society can cause enormous harm to the person 
and displays a great disrespect in regards to that person.127 We also see in his views 
on how society should act in order to protect members of minority groups how he 
differs from some of the other theorists mentioned in this section. In particular his 
view that there are times when it might be allowable to empower the minority with 
some power that the majority does not possess, the example here being the 
protection from irreverent literature, 128 as some groups may be able to make use of 
the irreverent material, other would be harmed and demoralised by it and it would 
therefore be good if not every group were exposed to the same degree of irrelevant 
literature.129  
 
This is quite different from Kymlicka and his internal restriction /external protection 
distinction, where choice was the end goal. Here instead the individual must be 
protected from certain literature on the grounds that it might do him or her harm. If 
we return to our constructivist approach from earlier, it would present some difficulty 
in being certain that all reasonable agents would opt for a system of first principles 
which would end in them not having access to some material on the grounds that it 
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might be considered irreverent. As someone would have to make the decision on 
what would and would not be allowable material, as it would be of little use to have a 
principle where anyone can access whatever they want and then afterwards decide 
that it was damaging and that they should have been protected from it, the result 
would be that someone would have to decide on behalf of the whole of the minority 
what they should be protected from. 
 
While Modood places a great level of importance on culture, it is still instrumental, 
but that does not mean that it is not important, here it means that it is a means for 
self-esteem and self-image, it is a unique object in that it is necessary in order to 
have these other considerations, but it is still instrumental.  
 
The final author is Bhikhu Parekh. Like Taylor, Parekh thinks that one’s culture can 
create meaning, but one difference between the two is that Parekh has a lesser 
focus on the transcendental element of culture. For Taylor our culture is something 
that exists before us and will continue long after we are gone.130 That is not to say 
that Parekh doesn’t also view our culture as something which exists before us and 
will go on after us, but he places a greater emphasis on the change that we bring to 
our culture and on the malleability of our culture.131 This difference notwithstanding, 
they both view culture as something of intrinsic value. As Parekh puts it “Cultural 
communities are not voluntary associations like clubs, political parties and pressure 
groups, and are wholly misunderstood if conceptualized as such. They are not 
instrumental in nature in the sense of being designed to promote, and to be 
discarded if they fail to promote extrinsic interests.”132  
 
This can be contrasted with Brian Barry who, as alluded to earlier describes culture 
and community in terms that would make it very similar to a voluntary association.133 
That does not mean that he does not recognize that there are some differences 
between the two, and that we generally do not choose our community but find 
ourselves in them. But that if someone has the ability to leave their community but 
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does not exercise that ability, then society should interpret this as the member 
perceiving the benefits of membership as being greater than the benefits of leaving 
the community or association.134 I bring this up to demonstrate the difference in 
approach that these two authors take when it comes to the value of culture. As for 
Barry it is cast in terms of benefits to be evaluated, with the problematic cases for 
society occurring when it is such that the (instrumental) value of leaving the 
association or community is so low in comparison to remaining in the community that 
the individual member does not have any meaningful choice in whether they should 
stay or leave.135 This contrasted with Parekh who as the earlier quote shows does 
not place the value of culture or community in what it can do to further the individual 
member’s extrinsic interests. That is not to say that Parekh does not believe that 
membership in a cultural community provides benefits, there are some benefits 
which it provides which he considers vital, such as our cultures ability to provide a 
structure and foundation for our identity.136 A different way in which Parekh highlight 
some of the importance of culture is in his view of culture as duty making where we 
have a duty to other people in the culture, which in turns generates duties to the 
culture itself, Parekh asserts that we have a duty of loyalty to our community which 
means that we are obligated not to harm or damage it as this would be harmful for 
the other members of the culture,137 part of this entails being loyal to the core 
precepts and principles of our culture.138 This is not to say that this means that we 
must unquestionably accept every element of our culture as we also have a duty to 
try and improve our culture, meaning that we must look outside it and see if we can 
discover something which our culture could benefit from incorporating.139 
 
For Parekh culture is a system of meaning, it creates and shapes the good for its 
members.140 Parekh’s view of the value of culture is intrinsic in the same manner that 
Taylor’s is in that they both view them as good making objects that are capable of 
acting as the foundation of value for objects of instrumental value. Again, similar to 
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Quinn’s view of intrinsic value as goodness making,141 here our culture is what 
provides us with our conception of the good life, enabling us to live rich and fulfilling 
lives.142 This might make it seem like culture fills a mainly instrumental role, that of 
providing a perspective from which one can orient one’s life and to provide its 
members with a vision of the good life. But as mentioned, if we here take the view of 
intrinsic value as being something which can create goodness or value, then as 
culture would be that which creates values for their members then this could work. 
Alternatively, if one takes a view which follows the Aristotelian line then one could 
possibly argue that culture represents a self-contained and self-sufficient good, a 
good which is only sought for itself and which makes full life possible.143 
 
If one were to try and fit in this particular view of culture into the constructivist view 
looked at before then a number of challenges appear. For Parekh the source of our 
obligation towards our culture is not rooted in some form of reasonable consent. One 
of the main factors that are singled out as being the source of our obligation towards 
our culture comes in the form of reciprocity. The reason for us owing loyalty to the 
culture we grew up in is that we benefited in growing in a culture, and we therefore 
owe loyalty to it and its members.144 We also see that in regards to decisions that 
people make that ‘their lives belong not just to them but also to their family’145 and 
that our family should not be excluded from important decisions if that is an important 
part of one’s culture, as values such as personal autonomy and choice cannot be 
thought of as universal values but are culturally contingent.146 But that leaves us with 
the question as to why reciprocity should be regarded as a universal value and be 
considered strong enough to create loyalty towards our culture. 
 
I would also suggest that it is unlikely that a reasonable person would agree to a 
system of morals which places the origin of our first principles in the culture we grow 
up in, leaving us in positions where depending on the circumstances surrounding our 
                                                             
141 Ibid. 126 
142 Ibid. 132-133 
143 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans/Ed. R, Crisp. 11 
144 Parekh, B C. Rethinking Multiculturalism  160 
145 Ibid. 275 
146 Ibid . 275 
40 
 
upbringing we are in a position where personal autonomy is considered desirable or 
not. 
 
2.6 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to establish how we are going to approach the concept 
of value and moral standing as it relates to culture. The chapter considered the two 
variations of value which we will make use of in this project, that of instrumental 
value and intrinsic value. Instrumental value is where a culture is considered 
valuable due to the benefits which the culture provides for its members. An essential 
component of instrumental value was established to be that of its contingency, an 
object of intrinsic value only has value in the appropriate context, this was explained 
with the formula O + C = S. With O standing for the object, in our case culture. C is 
for the context and S is for standing. This highlight the contextual nature of 
instrumental value where if the appropriate context disappears, so does the standing 
of the object. 
Then we examined the concept of intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is where the object 
does not derive its value from external properties but due to intrinsic qualities. These 
objects are not contingent in the same way in which objects of instrumental value 
are. It was emphasised that there was a risk to mislabel objects which are valuable 
because of our enjoyment of them as being intrinsic rather than as instrumental as 
would be more accurate, as in those cases that object would require the context of 
having a person who are in a position to enjoy the object for it to have value. Objects 
of intrinsic value were said to be those who hold their value independent of the 
context in which we find the object, this was expressed with the formula O=S, where 
again O is for the object and S is for the standing. An object of intrinsic value has 
value in itself regardless of its context. It was also highlighted that a shortcoming of 
this definition was that it does not explain why an object becomes intrinsically 
valuable. And I suggested that the answer to this is a form of constructivism where 
the objects which a reasonable person would find to be valuable would be 
considered valuable, this has the benefit of excluding malevolent desires or object 
from being considered valuable. 
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This division between the types of value was then applied to a number of thinkers 
where Miller, Kymlicka, and Modood were of the view that cultures were of 
instrumental value. And Parekh was of the view that cultures were of intrinsic value 
with Taylor having elements of both. This was to display the consequences and 
potential that adopting different positions on the type of value that a culture can 
possess. As well as elaborating on concepts which will reoccur frequently in the 
project. 
This chapter expounds on the type of value which we will attribute to culture in this 
project and establishes why culture merits any special consideration in considering 
its moral standing. The next chapter builds upon this and considers the obligations 
which a culture might potentially claim against its members based on this value, and 
consider the potential sources of obligation to be found in either gratitude, reciprocity 
or consent. 
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Chapter 3. The Source of Obligation 
 
The last chapter considered what type of value that a culture might possess. This 
chapter considers the possible sources of the obligations which members of a 
culture might potentially have towards their culture. This helps us to understand how 
to analyse cultures better as this helps us to see why members of cultures would 
have obligations towards their culture.  
The question of whether we have obligations towards our culture can be approached 
in different ways. One would be Taylor, who takes the view that cultures are owed 
respect, but that this is the expression of respect owed to the members of the 
culture.147 A different view is that of Parekh, who takes the view that obligations can 
be owed both to the members of a culture, but also to the culture itself.148 For Parekh 
our obligations towards our culture entails being loyal to the value and tenets of the 
culture.149 In this chapter we are going to consider if we have any obligations 
towards our culture, then what could these obligations be based in, and who are they 
actually owed. 
The three sources that are going to be considered are gratitude, reciprocity and 
consent. Gratitude as the source of obligation is based on the idea of members of a 
culture being grateful to their culture for the benefits which they have received and 
as a consequence they have an obligation to support their benefactor in its aims. 
The second view of the source of obligation towards our culture is reciprocity, where 
the obligation is to pay our culture back for the benefits which it has provided us, I 
will also consider the consequences of shifting the beneficiary of reciprocity from the 
culture itself and instead aiming it towards our fellow culture members. And the final 
source to be considered is that of consent, where the weaknesses of a consent 
based approach is highlighted and I attempt to respond with a heavily Rawls inspired 
solution. 
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These three will also be considered in conjunction with the types of value considered 
in the last chapter, as well as with two different types of group rights based on 
Jones’s division between collective and corporate group rights. 
The aims of this chapter are to build on the previous chapter and to establish what 
view of the source of obligation is open to us and how our position on group rights 
and the type value of culture will impact on the available possible positions one can 
take on the nature of obligations towards our culture. In this chapter, we can also 
start to see the interconnectedness and interdependence of these links, and how 
taking a position on one link can have consequences for the possible positions we 
can adopt on other links. 
3.1 Meaning of obligation 
The meaning of the word obligation, as with most concepts, is dependent on its 
context and by the author. One view expressed by Hart and utilised by others such 
as Rawls and Simmons is that an obligation is only that which we have agreed to 
incur.150 Or to put it differently, on this view the word obligation refers to those 
demands or constraints which are the result of our own choices or actions.151 Here 
then obligations are strictly voluntary in a way which separates them from duties.152 
Duties here being that which we must do regardless of us having agreed to have 
these duties or not, they are not contingent on us agreeing or contracting into 
anything. One of the noteworthy distinctions between duties and obligations which 
can be drawn under this potential separation is that obligations are owed to specific 
and particular people,153 where for example A could have an obligation towards B. 
While on the other hand a duty can be held in rem, i.e. be owed to no one in 
particular but more general in nature.154 Here the duties would be owed by each of 
us, to each of us.155 We will return to this distinction later. 
Using this terminology then obligation as presented here would be more suitable for 
our use than would duty. As when making an argument for us having obligations or 
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duties towards our culture, it is usually specifically our own particular culture that we 
have this obligation towards, not all people or cultures in general. It would be strange 
to require of a member of a culture that they are obligated to work for the 
advancement of cultures in general rather than their own specific one. 
It is easy here to become trapped in a game of semantics, the aim of this chapter as 
stated at the beginning is to find the source and nature of our obligation to our 
culture, if indeed we have any, and at this stage fixating on whether or not what we 
have is a duty or an obligation or perhaps some third category would be a mistake 
and would confuse the issue needlessly. Here when we talk about obligation we are 
talking about a moral must. In the words of Darwall ‘… what it would be morally 
wrong not to do’.156  If we do not live up to the obligations we have we are 
committing a moral wrong. These obligations are that which morally we ought to do, 
or are required to do or to act according to. We will return to this distinction between 
obligation and duties later in this chapter in the section addressing obligation from 
consent. 
If then as we saw earlier, obligations are owed by one identifiable entity to another 
identifiable entity. Then the distinction which we made earlier between an 
instrumental and an intrinsically valuable culture will have an important part in 
discerning what our obligations towards our cultures are and on what grounds we 
might have them. Are cultures the type of entities which can make claims against 
their members as separate valuable entities or are they only able to do this in 
reference to the value of the members of the culture? This goes to the issue of who 
we have an obligation towards when we say that we have an obligation towards our 
culture. Is our obligation towards the individuals who make up the culture, or is it 
towards the culture itself? On one view the obligations we owe to our culture is 
actually something which we owe the other members of that culture,157 that would 
mean that on that view if we fail to live up to the obligations we owe to our 
community it is actually the other members of the community we are failing rather 
than the culture/community itself, the parts rather than the whole. This would mean 
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then that when we are under an obligation to our culture it is the members of that 
culture who are in the position to claim this obligation. 
If we can be said to have an obligation towards our culture itself, the whole rather 
than the parts, would this mean that our culture has a right against us? Here it is 
helpful to look at Peter Jones’ view on group rights.  
Using Jones’s division of group rights, where group rights can be divided into either 
collective or corporate group rights. With a collective group right, the group (in our 
case the culture which we are part of) possess the right through its members,158 here 
the right is derived from the rights and interests of the individual members but it is 
exercised as a group, while on the corporate conception of group rights it is the 
group itself apart from its members that hold the right.159 To expand on this, starting 
with the corporate conception of group rights where it is the group rather than the 
members of said group who holds the right. On this view it would be quite possible 
for one or several members to be under a duty towards our culture and the culture 
having the right to demand that this obligation is observed. This as the culture 
possesses moral value and standing in itself which is separate from the value of the 
members of the culture. What this means is that this could potentially create the 
situation where the members of the group and the group might have separate 
interests from that of the culture.  
What allows for this situation where the interests of group and members diverge is 
that under the corporate view the group have this moral standing in itself, which it 
does not have as a means for the ends of its members. If we remember the earlier 
chapter when we looked at the type of value that a culture could possess, then we 
can see that this would assign intrinsic value to the group, giving it a value that is 
separate from its members. It would also seem that it would not be possible to 
combine the corporate group rights for culture with an instrumental view of value. As 
then our culture (which if using an instrumental view is a means to an end) would 
take priority over our own interests, or we would have a conflict between the means 
to further our interests and the aims and interests themselves. Or rather in some 
views, we would be under obligation to the means to our ends with these means 
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having possible claims against us. This would mean then that the group which 
derives its standing from its being an instrument for our ends, would then have 
standing which would be separate from us and have us under obligation towards it. 
This incompatibility comes from the fact that as our culture’s moral standing is 
ultimately derived from its members, while at the same time it is in a position to hold 
obligations against us. 
But if we suppose that our culture does indeed have some form of value which is not 
only gained by the use it is to its members, it would be easier to imagine an 
argument for the culture to exercise a right over its members. This would then 
depend on the view that this cultural value can be of a type that can in certain 
situations take priority over individual interests.  
On the collective group rights view, the right is held by the group, but is exercised 
through the people in the group rather than the group itself.160 This casts the group 
right as being something of a tool for the members to use in situations where their 
individual rights do not suffice, this could be because what they are trying to claim a 
right to is something which could only be exercised in a group, as an example, a 
right to free association can only be utilized in a group, as an individual would not be 
enough to have an association. Or possibly there could be cases where individual 
rights would be outweighed by other considerations, the establishment of a road in a 
particular place might take place over the objection of one or two individuals but they 
might have a better chance of stopping this if they were to press their opposition in 
the terms of a larger group (a village) being against the road. 
This leaves the collective form of group rights as being the most suited for the 
instrumental view of value, as this is a type of right that serves to enable members of 
groups to do what they could not do as individuals and the instrumental view of value 
places value in things (this case a culture) in as far as it allows us to accomplish our 
goals. Here then, the group or culture would not have any value that is separable 
from its members. And this feature of collective group rights makes it difficult to 
combine it with the intrinsic view of the value of culture, which means that a situation 
where members are under obligation towards their group/culture when their interests 
diverge becomes harder to imagine, as the group would derive its value from its 
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ability to further its members end, which would mean that it could not really form 
ends that are separate from that of the members and a member with a different 
interest from the group would now no longer be part of the group, as the element 
which makes them group members is the shared interest.  
A complication to this appears when we add to this the view that it is the other 
members of our culture which we owe our obligation to rather than the culture itself, 
this would be incompatible with the collective conception of group. As it would mean 
that we again would be obligated to sacrifice our interests in the service of our 
interests. 
3.2 Obligation from Gratitude 
Here then we will consider gratitude as the source of our potential obligation towards 
our culture. In essence this idea would be that if something gives us a great benefit, 
then we have an obligation to be grateful to this thing,161 in our case, our culture. As 
we need our culture, we would be bound to be grateful towards our culture. In 
examining this closer we will first contrast this with reciprocity to give a clearer 
outline of the concept before moving onto the emotional component that this 
approach requires from members of culture, where we are to cherish our culture. 
Before considering the potential drawbacks of this view where it would leave little 
room for personal preference and that this risks treating members of cultures as 
means to the cultures ends. 
In trying to explain what I mean by gratitude in this context, it might help to contrast it 
with the similar but distinct concept of reciprocity, which we will return to again later 
in the chapter. Starting with some of Parekh’s writing helps to frame the issue of 
gratitude in relation to culture, as we could interpret his views such that we do indeed 
have an obligation towards our culture and this obligation finds its source in 
gratitude, as Parekh describes it ‘We then feel and should feel a sense of loyalty 
towards our culture because of its profound contribution our lives’.162 Part of this is 
that we have a duty to cherish our culture due to the positive influence it has had on 
our lives.163 Here is where we can see where the confusion with reciprocity can 
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occur, if we take reciprocity in its simplest form to mean to pay back in kind for what 
we receive.164 How this could be read is, that when we cherish our culture for the 
benefits it gives, we are paying it back. But the difference between gratitude and 
reciprocity in this context is that the former requires an emotional component, we are 
to have a positive attitude towards our benefactor.165 And a well-meaning attitude 
towards the benefactors’ interests and aims.166 With reciprocity we generally mean 
that someone should respond to actions with the same kind of actions, A does B a 
favour and B later does A a favour in return.  
Transposing Walker’s point on gratitude and obligation from political obligation to our 
discussion on culture, he takes the view that “The person who benefits from X has 
an obligation of gratitude not to act contrary to X's interests.”167 It becomes 
incumbent on the recipient to be grateful towards their benefactor and to advance 
their interests, in the case of culture, its continued existence. 168 
As an example of this, with Parekh we have an obligation to cherish our culture, 
together with another obligation we have towards our culture would be to not 
damage it.169 The combination of these two would suggest that it would not be 
enough to simply not slander or deliberately damage our culture, but that we have to 
be actively positively predisposed towards it and work towards its furtherment.  
The main difficulty with this view of obligation towards our culture is that it would 
seem to put an unreasonable burden on the individual member of a culture. The 
difficulty is the obligation to cherish the culture, this could be difficult if the individual 
member takes the view that some core aspect of their culture is disagreeable.  
If we remember the types of value which we looked at in the last chapter, and use 
that to see what sort of value this particular view of our obligation towards our culture 
would be most compatible with, intrinsic or instrumental, then also consider which 
form of right our culture can hold against us. Then in this case I believe we find that 
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this view would be most compatible with the corporate form of group rights. Here it is 
the group in separation from its members that holds the right against the members, it 
is not necessarily the other members we must feel gratitude towards but the culture 
itself, it is the culture that we are to avoid damaging.170 When it comes to which type 
of value a culture possesses, here the most compatible view would be that culture 
has intrinsic value. As it is the culture which is to be cherished rather than the other 
members it is not being viewed as a means to our ends but is something with value 
on its own.  
That was a look at obligation from gratitude, we will now look at two slightly different 
ways of using reciprocity as the basis for our obligation towards culture. 
3.3 Obligation from reciprocity 
In this section we will examine how it could work to use reciprocity as the foundation 
for obligations towards our culture, before moving on to the final section which looks 
at consent as the basis for obligation.  
Here we are going to consider two different approaches to reciprocity. First a view 
based on Parekh, where the focus is on avoiding inflicting damage to our culture or 
leave it in a worse state than how it was when we had use of it. While the second 
view instead focuses on the effort we devote to our culture and the avoidance of free 
riding. 
If we read Parekh in a different way from how we have done in this chapter until now 
and instead of thinking about our obligation in terms of gratitude and instead shift 
towards reciprocity, then we might find something a bit more coherent. The main 
difference that would allow us to do this would be to remove the element of 
sympathy towards our benefactors from our discussion, and move away from 
obligation requiring members to have certain emotions and attitude towards their 
culture and instead focus on what action they need to take in regards to their culture. 
This still leaves us with a set of issues to look into before we can see if reciprocity is 
a suitable source of obligation towards our culture.  
Staying with Parekh we can find an example of this with his view that we have an 
obligation not to damage our culture, and to leave it in no worse state than we found 
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it.171 This particular duty is quite compatible with the idea of reciprocity as its basis. 
What we have here then would be an obligation pay-back to a culture what we got 
out of it. Here then as our culture helps us to become fully functioning individuals, we 
would then have an obligation grounded in reciprocity to pay back to the culture as 
we have befitted from it a great deal. 
For Parekh as we have mentioned before, our culture is a vital part of who we are, it 
gives a sense of rootedness172 and a system of meaning.173 What we have then is a 
situation where the individual is reliant on his/her culture in order to be a complete 
individual, and so owes their culture or community a debt for having provided this 
service. Part of this obligation is as said before not to damage our culture, this could 
mean for example a duty to not act in a way which would make our culture appear 
bad in the eyes of others or in some way lower the prestige of our culture.174 Our 
duty is not only to our culture and the current members of it but also to previous 
members of our culture as well as to the future generations of the culture.175 This 
duty to future members takes the form of making sure that our culture continues to 
exist in a recognizable form for future generations.176 
There are a few issues with this view of obligation towards our culture which makes it 
potentially quite undesirable. One is the circular nature of this view of our obligation, 
as what we have here are members of a culture who are under obligation to try to 
keep their culture recognizably similar to its current configuration, a responsibility 
they inherited from the previous generation who had the same obligation and will 
pass the same thing on to the next generation.177 This would then mean that every 
generation would be duty bound to continue the culture in its present form without 
the members having an opportunity to make any choice in the matter.  
A second important point in this view of reciprocity is that it in a sense treats its 
members as a means, going against the classical Kantian idea of always treating 
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people as ends in themselves.178 What I mean here is that the aim is not the 
fulfilment of the aims of the members but the aims of the culture or community, with 
the members being treated as a means to keep the culture going.  
It should be made clear that Parekh does not entirely rule out the possibility that 
there might be some internal dissent or dissatisfaction with the culture as it is at 
present, there is room to try and change our culture from within, but this is tempered 
with an assertion that it is mainly up to ‘cultural’ leaders,179 and the earlier assertion 
that we have an obligation to our forerunners and successors to keep our culture as 
recognizably similar. This would seem to me to leave little room for the individual 
members of a culture to have significant impact on the culture or community in which 
they live and if there is a conflict between the interests of the two, then it would 
appear that on this view it is the community which wins out.   
This would work quite well with the previously discussed ideas of corporate group 
rights and of placing the value of a culture as something intrinsic to it. Here if we use 
this interpretation of Parekh’s view then we can see that in viewing a culture as an 
entity which has an intrinsic value which is separate from that of its members it 
allows for a corporate view of group rights where the group can overrule individual 
interests. Parekh maintains that it is to the other members of our culture that we 
have obligations toward rather than the culture itself,180 but when taken in context 
with some of the features outlined earlier this might not be so clear as that statement 
might give the impression of. If we accept that it is to our fellow members we owe 
obligation but the obligations have the culture as their subject rather than the other 
members. By which I mean that the focus of obligations which Parekh mentions aim 
at the betterment of the culture, rather than the betterment of the people in them. 
Look for example at the obligation to keep our culture in a recognizable state, even if 
we owe this obligation to the other members of our culture, it is the culture itself that 
we are to preserve, it is the culture which benefits. A counter that could be made to 
this would be to point out that the reason for wanting to preserve a culture is that it 
provides a range of benefits to its members, like the capacity to evaluate choice and 
options, formulate an idea about the good life and a sense of rootedness as we have 
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mentioned earlier. It is in the end for the benefit of the members of the culture that 
we try to preserve our culture and so we can say that when we are acting to further 
the interest of our culture we are paying the other members back for what they have 
done for us, i.e. enabling the culture which gives all these benefits. However, I do not 
think that reciprocity will necessarily get us to the type of obligations that Parekh has 
talked about. 
Or rather reciprocity alone will not get us all the way to those obligations. I think that 
one of the problems that a reciprocity based view will run into is the issue mentioned 
a while back, that of separating the culture from the individual, it is something that is 
separate from us that we can be grateful to or pay back for what it has done for us, 
while at the same time maintaining that it is actually the other members of the culture 
which we actually owe these obligations. This can become a problem if we consider 
the possibility that we could have a duty to the other members of our community to 
pay back and ensure the survival of a culture they may or may not have an interest 
in preserving. To put this in a different way, these obligations would only really be 
relevant when a member would otherwise be unwilling to do what the obligation 
demands, we rarely talk about an obligation to do what we already want to do, so 
what we might have is a situation where we are under obligation to help ensure the 
continued existence of our culture in order to pay it back for the benefits we have 
received from it, while we personally might not be overly concerned about the 
continued existence of our culture. And if it is possible for us to be disinterested in 
the fate of our culture or have preferences which are at odds with it, then it should be 
entirely possible for other members to have a similar relationship with the culture. So 
what we have then is the possibility of us owing an obligation to our fellow members 
which might go against their preferences. But even if it was not the case that 
potential other members of our culture happen to have preferences which are 
incompatible with our culture, then the separation between member and culture 
would still pose a problem, as then we would owe obligations of reciprocity to the 
other members of our culture but we pay back to this partially separate entity. 
Imagine if A loans B some money, and B then returns that money to a church, 
thinking that both are members of the church and receive benefits from the church.  
One approach to alleviating this problem is by arguing that our culture is the 
appropriate target for reciprocity as it could be argued that it would be in the 
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members’ interest to continue to have the culture available, or that the instances 
where they would be at odds with their culture are outliers and that the by far most 
common situation is that members of a culture/community want it to continue to 
survive and prosper. But this would not show that culture would have to be that 
which is best suited to be the subject of our obligations of reciprocity. If our view is 
that we have an interest in our culture surviving then reciprocity would not be the 
only source of obligation which could fit, for example, a utilitarian approach could be 
used, but this would not necessarily show that culture is the object which is best 
used in maximising our utility or interests. Similarly, if it is the fact that most would 
want to see their culture prosper then it is the preferences of the members which are 
the real subject of our obligations and we would be back at the previous problem of 
members potentially not wanting their culture to prosper or having other stronger 
preferences.  
Before moving on to the alternate view of reciprocity, we can now with a greater 
understanding of this first form of reciprocity consider how this view functions in the 
context of those factors we have already covered in the earlier chapters. Here I 
would say that the best match for this Parekh influenced view of reciprocity would be 
the corporate view of group rights and of placing the value of a culture as something 
intrinsic to it. Here if we use this interpretation of Parekh’s view then we can see that, 
as has been said repeatedly, in viewing a culture as an entity which has an intrinsic 
value which is separate from that of its members it allows for a corporate view of 
group rights where the group can overrule individual interests. 
That was one view of reciprocity which was based on Parekh, we will now consider a 
different approach to reciprocity, where our main concern is the effort people put into 
their culture. 
In the previous views of culture which we have looked at, there was a certain 
expectation that we would have a deep sympathetic connection with our culture, 
either as something to be grateful to or something which gives us a sense of 
rootedness and security.181 Under that view our culture is similar to a family, 
something which despite occasional misgivings we still have great affection towards.  
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A different way to look at a culture or a community is to think of it as a cooperative-
venture.182 And all the members are duty bound to put in as much effort into the 
culture as the other members of the culture. All other members will have had to 
make sacrifices and devote their energies to the benefit of the culture, so having 
received the benefits of cultural membership, or as it would be here, the benefits of 
other member’s sacrifices and energy. It is then incumbent on us to match this effort 
by the other members of the culture, our obligation would in essence be not to free 
ride on the efforts of the others in our culture.183 
This shift might seem a bit trivial, but what it does is shift to whom this obligation is 
owed. On the view that we have to pay back to our culture what we have gained 
from it, it is the culture itself that is the beneficiary of our efforts to live up to our 
obligations. But on this view where we have to ‘keep up our end’, it is the other 
members of our community or culture which is to benefit from our fulfilling our 
obligations. Here the aim is to stop the other members of our community having to 
put an unreasonable burden and in a sense to also repay their effort by providing our 
own effort.184 Indeed one way of looking at this using a Kantian style analysis is to 
conclude that failing to live up to this obligation is to compromise the autonomy of 
our fellow members of our community.185 This connects to the point we made in the 
earlier part of this chapter, where we mentioned that while Parekh is open to the 
possibility of obligations towards both the individuals in the culture and the culture 
itself, other thinkers, such as Kymlicka and Taylor views rights and obligations 
towards cultures in terms of the individual members of the culture. 
But the problem which we encountered earlier reappears here, how do we get from 
paying back the effort put in by others to specific obligations to maintain our culture. 
If it is free riding which is to be avoided, then this would allow for other ways of 
paying back than helping to ensure the continued existence of our culture, or any of 
the other obligations we have looked at earlier. If it is effort or burden which is the 
main concern here, could not one person then possibly try to pay other members of 
the culture to compensate for their effort? Or in a slightly glib suggestion, could 
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someone pay an outsider to somehow take on the burden of our community and in 
essence outsource our community?  
This view also requires a separation between the individual and the culture. As here 
culture is something which imposes burdens on its members which they are to carry 
their fair share of. It would then encounter trouble in those cases where some 
individuals do not want to continue to associate with the culture, as then presumably 
they would not consider the benefits which comes with a culture to be worthy of its 
cost or even worse, maybe someone would not consider what a particular culture 
offers to be a benefit, but would still be required pay in so as not to deprive other 
members of their efforts. So if someone were to find their culture to be disagreeable 
they must continue to make sacrifices to support it, as other people are also making 
sacrifices to support it. Our obligation towards our culture viewed like this would then 
take on qualities similar to either our obligation towards states and to voluntary 
associations in which we are members. The problem which we encounter here is 
that as it is the effort which our compatriots have spent on our culture that is the 
subject of our obligation of reciprocity, it is then when we fail to meet this obligation 
that we can be accused of free riding on the efforts of our fellow members of our 
culture, or to use a helpful definition by Arneson “…where the collective benefit is 
either voluntarily accepted or such that voluntary acceptance of it is impossible, 
those who contribute their assigned fair share of the costs of the scheme have a 
right, against the remaining beneficiaries, that they should also pay their fair share. A 
moral obligation to contribute attaches to all beneficiaries in these 
circumstances…”186 and when we fail to pay our fair share, then we are failing to 
meet our obligation towards our fellow members of our culture. 
This type of view has in a sense been brought up before, and as has been said, this 
type of view falls short in that this is generally speaking not how we look at our 
culture. While that may or may not be true, one of the main problems we find with 
this view of culture is that it does not help us reach any particular obligations when it 
comes to culture. If we take this view that our culture is akin to a voluntary 
association then once we have paid the other members back, what is to stop any of 
us from simply leaving the culture, leaving it with dwindling numbers. And of course 
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the fact that we generally do not evaluate our culture the same way in which we 
evaluate potential membership in any voluntary association, in terms of benefits and 
sacrifices which is why we have in this work often repeated assertion that cultures 
are not like voluntary associations.187 
This view of culture would be best suited to be combined with an instrumental view 
of its value and a collective take on group rights, as here we are looking at a culture 
like something akin to a voluntary association, without the emotional component to 
connect us to it and seemingly nothing else to give intrinsic value to our culture it 
reduces it to a scheme of mutual advantage. While this would avoid any risk to 
romanticize our relationship to our culture, it would also limit the use of it. If we for 
example remember Miller’s view of our culture’s role in making us willing to make 
sacrifices to benefit our compatriots out of our attachment to our culture.188 Miller’s 
view of the benefits of culture would be entirely incompatible with this approach to 
culture, while this in itself is not necessarily a flaw, it is an example of how reciprocity 
viewed like this reduces the usefulness of culture, which becomes problematic as 
when we view it through a reciprocal lens, what use we get out of our culture 
becomes rather important. 
What this leaves us with in regards to using reciprocity as a means for finding 
obligations towards our culture, is that reciprocity by itself is not enough to get us to 
obligations. Using the types of views we have looked at here, one where an 
emotional attachment to our culture is not the main motivator and instead it is treated 
like a voluntary association, then we do not get enough importance to culture to 
justify any special attention being paid to it. And if we take the view that it is 
something which holds special attachment for us then we would still need some 
other form of prime virtue or first principle to add to culture in order to make it work 
with reciprocity, though it should be said that this is not necessarily a fatal blow to a 
reciprocity based view of obligation, but only an indication that it needs more 
elements to be completed.  
3.4 Obligation from consent 
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Here we will look at consent or agreement as source of our obligations, as well as to 
whom these obligations would be owed, i.e. how does this manifest in terms of the 
group rights that emanates from these obligations, as well as looking at what view of 
value a consent based take on culture would need. At first we will look at some of the 
problem with using consent as the foundation for our obligation towards our culture 
when consent is seen as the act of choosing a culture, and then another view 
borrowing from Rawls to try to come up with a different way of looking at consent in 
terms of culture. 
As said before, some theorists take the view that obligations are those demands 
which are consequences of voluntary actions. Here an obligation is something which 
we commit or contract ourselves into.189 Earlier we looked at how some, like 
Feinberg, separated obligation from duty, in that obligations are things which we 
acquire through our choices and voluntary actions, while a duty is something which 
we have regardless if we have chosen it or not.190 This is a distinction which we have 
not paid much attention to, but here we will have to consider this. In this chapter we 
are considering whether we can have obligations towards our culture and how we 
would incur these obligations, this segment will examine this to try and see if it is 
possible to make a reasonable argument for these constraints to originate entirely 
with some form of contract of voluntary actions on behalf of the members of a culture 
or community. The aim here is not to make an exhaustive examination of this line of 
social contract style thinking, as that would be such an enormous topic which could 
easily occupy the entirety of this project, instead we will try to limit our focus and 
scale to how it directly relates to what we are trying to look at in this section. 
Can we then find a way to describe obligations as we have used the word up till now 
completely in terms of consent?  
There are two problems with this idea, first that we do not generally choose which 
culture we are to become part of, generally we are born into a culture without making 
any choices in this regard. And second, the capacity for choice is (in some views) 
contingent on cultural membership. 
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With the first of these two problems, I mean that generally we do not choose which 
culture we grow up in, we find ourselves in one and are socialised into it over the 
course of our lives. It is not like some voluntary association where we can evaluate 
the pros and cons of membership and then in the end make a deliberate decision.191 
And for the second, if we take for example either Kymlicka’s view that our culture 
provides us with a context of choice,192 or Taylor’s view of our linguistic community 
as enabling us to place ourselves in the moral geography and decide on worthwhile 
ends and conceptions of the good life,193 then we would not be able to make a 
choice or consent to be part of a culture before they were already part of a culture. 
We are never in a position where we stand apart from our culture with the faculties to 
evaluate and judge whether or not we wish to be part of it. Though it should be made 
clear that while Kymlicka thinks that we might want to maintain our culture, we do not 
have any duty to do so.194 
What I am trying to show with this is that the joining of a culture cannot be seen as a 
conscious decision, or at least in most cases as there are people who emigrate or 
sever their ties to their old communities and opt for new ones but most stay with the 
one they were born into,195 meaning that we would have to look somewhere else if 
we wanted to find the source of obligation towards our culture in consent. 
One place we could look to is the receipt of benefits from our culture as indicating 
our consent to that culture. This is different from the earlier point about reciprocity as 
here the aim is not to pay back what we got out of society or to return the effort put 
into our culture by others, but rather that by accepting the benefits from something 
(in our case our culture and community) we signal our consent for that thing.196  
While this argument might work in some context, it would not be as effective here 
when arguing about culture. As our culture is not like membership in a club where 
the benefits are quantifiable and identifiable, having received the ability to make 
worthwhile judgments about what constitutes the good life it is not something one 
can really give up, or if we look at this in terms of identity, it would be strange to say 
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that we have made a conscious decision to choose to continue to identify with our 
culture after we have grown up in it. To identify with our group is an emotional 
attachment rather than an intellectual commitment, making it often difficult to say that 
we have made a choice to identify with or cherish a group of people. Looking at the 
community element of this and while it becomes more possible it is still quite 
unfeasible to suggest that we have consented to our culture. As here it would seem 
that membership of a community is the benefit that the community brings, so it would 
be the case here that continued presence and membership of a community 
constitute acceptance of the conditions of said community and through that, we incur 
obligation towards the community or culture.  
To start with, this faces the same objection as the previous view, as again our culture 
is not some voluntary association which we can simply choose to quit when we no 
longer wish to be part of it. Secondly, we in our daily life generally do not think that 
being part of a culture or not leaving or disassociating from our culture, constitute 
agreement for the obligations that might be incurred from membership in a culture. 
And thirdly, this would not be fully satisfying in cases where members do not wish to 
continue their association with their culture, as then we would face problem with 
either someone being under an obligation to a culture which they no longer consent 
to being part of, or alternatively we could find ourselves in a case where a person 
could reap the benefits of cultural membership and then later opt out of the culture, 
leaving us with the sort of free riding we mentioned earlier. 
An alternative which we have looked at in a different context would be a view where 
while we do not agree to a particular culture but, agree to the idea of being part of a 
culture. Here if we start with the assumption that membership in a culture does 
provide the various benefits attributed to it and that cultural membership is the only 
thing which can provide this, and from this move to the assumption that everyone 
would want, or indeed need, to be part of a culture of some form. With this starting 
point we could shift what was being consented to, from a particular culture, to 
agreeing to an ethical system in which we have some obligations towards our 
culture.  
Here it would be helpful to consider the different type of consent that would go into 
most forms of social contract theory, to use Rawls’ thought experiment in A Theory 
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of Justice as an example, in this famous thought experiment we imagine a person 
making a decision on the principles that govern the basic structure of society while 
being unaware of their personality or their position in this society.197 This would not 
mean that we expect this hypothetical person to agree to each individual instance or 
case where the principles would come into play, but rather that they would agree to a 
system of principles which would govern the particular instances. To use an element 
of the principles Rawls thinks a person would opt for as an example. According to 
the difference principle inequalities are allowable so far as it benefits the least well-
off.198 But this does not mean that the person directly chooses their place on the 
equality scale, but rather how this scale operates. 
Looking at how Rawls’s ideas work in the context of culture, we can see that there is 
room to incorporate considerations of culture into the thought experiment of the 
original position and the veil of ignorance. One of the primary goods to be distributed 
to the benefits of the least well of, is that of self-respect, and indeed might be one of 
the most important one.199 Self-respect for Rawls “includes a person’s sense of his 
own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is 
worth carrying out”.200  And secondly it also means to have access to associations 
which provide support and enhance our self-esteem.201 If we compare this to some 
of the views of Parekh and Kymlicka, we find some areas of similarity, with Parekh, 
one of the functions of culture is to provide a sense of rootedness202 and esteem203 
which follows closely the just cited element of Rawls view of the primary good of self-
esteem, and for Kymlicka, one of the main functions of culture is to provide a context 
of choice, in which we can evaluate our plans of live and our choices.204 Which sits 
well with Rawls’ view on knowing that our life plan is worthwhile, as that is what the 
context of choice will allow us to determine.  
One important point on which they differ, is the nature of the thing that enables this. 
For Kymlicka and Parekh culture is unique in its ability to offer these benefits in 
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regards to self-esteem. But for Rawls this can be found in voluntary associations, as 
he puts it “Thus what is necessary is that there should be for each person at least 
one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his 
endeavours confirmed by his associates.”205 And further that “it normally suffices that 
for each person there is some association (one or more) to which he belongs and 
within which the activities that are rational for him are publicly affirmed by others.”206 
We see the difference between the two views on associations which serves as the 
foundation for self-esteem, for Rawls it suffices that the association is one of shared 
interest and there is the possibility for multiple associations to serve the role.207 
Further to see the difference we see that for Parekh our culture is of intrinsic value 
while the associations are only useful to Rawls as far as it provides this sense of 
worth for their members.208 
What this means is that if we wish to use the idea of original position in order to 
establish the basic structure of society, we can combine this with the idea that 
cultures are worthy of special attention, on the basis that they can provide one very 
important primary good. However as Rawls was looking for the basic structure of 
society this could be difficult to use in the precise way in which we are using it to find 
if you can have obligations towards your culture, it simply put was not the question 
he sought to answer. But appropriating his tool for our purposes here, and 
considering what a person in the original position would opt for in regards to what a 
culture or community can demand of its members. The view that a person would 
come to would be, I believe, not entirely dissimilar to the logic of the difference 
principle. The difference principle in its simplest form is that inequalities are only 
allowed so far as it is to the benefit of the least advantaged.209 And the way that the 
principle regarding obligations towards culture would be shaped is that obligations 
towards cultures can only take the shape that the least advantaged would agree to. 
To clarify, by obligation towards cultures I mean here the obligation from members to 
their specific culture. And the least advantaged here would be the one who has the 
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most onerous burden placed on them by their culture. The question we face then 
when trying to decide if a particular obligation to a culture would be permissible 
would be to ask if those who would carry the heaviest burden of that obligation would 
agree to it. Reusing the example we used in an earlier section, imagine someone 
who was gay was facing pressure from their culture to not be so. Here having an 
obligation to adhere to the precepts of one’s culture, would be such that few people, 
if any, in this situation would agree to it. This would mean that if we use this culture 
principle then this would be an obligation which the culture could not demand from its 
members. Or if the culture/community were to try and put such pressures on its 
members, they would not be guilty of free riding or ingratitude if they were to resist or 
refuse such pressures. One way to approach this is to take the view of Arneson, in a 
cooperative scheme all members receive a benefit, this benefit is greater than the 
cost of the individual’s fair contribution to this scheme.210 While Arneson’s 
description comes more easily to the more material world I would suggest that it 
applies just as well to our situation here. As he suggested that it would not be 
accurate to describe someone as a free rider if they were to refuse to pay if the cost 
of their share were to be greater than the benefit incurred. Here if the precepts of our 
culture were to be such that no reasonable person would agree to them then it would 
be as if the cost for the individual would be larger than their reasonable fair share. 
And so if someone was to refuse to pay, or in our context to keep to the precepts of 
our culture, they would not be free riding as their share would have become 
unreasonably expansive.  
What this leaves us with then is that we would agree to an ethical system which 
contains in it the possibility of obligation towards our culture, rather than specific 
obligations to specific cultures. This has implications for whether we can view a 
culture as having intrinsic or instrumental value. If we stick to the strictly Rawlsian 
view then a culture would simply be an association for the benefit of the individuals’ 
sense of self-esteem, and would be strictly instrumental in nature, they are essential 
but still only valuable as far as they provide worth for their members. And if we look 
at the slight modification we just made then the same holds true, here our focus is 
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not on the need of the culture but on the choice of the member, we are treating it as 
something which exists for their benefit rather than for its own. 
This then has the effect on what type of group rights that a culture can have, as the 
group right a culture holds is part of the manifestation of the obligations it can 
demand of its members, and the best match for what we have just looked at would 
be for cultures only to have collective group rights. If it had the corporate type of 
group rights then we could get into the type of situation mentioned earlier, where 
someone would be under obligation to act in a manner which they would not agree 
to, like hypothetically be forced not to be gay or similar.  
Though I said that collective group rights were the best suited, it would not be 
impossible for someone to argue that the corporate type of group right could be 
made to fit. One could argue that the group’s needs does outweigh the preferences 
and projects of the individual member. And those individuals that find themselves at 
odds with their culture would simply have to make the sacrifice in order to secure the 
needs of the wider community, and if one takes that view then the corporate type of 
group rights would fit quite well. It would depend on what other moral assumptions 
and commitments that a person would imagine would have to be in place. The 
issues surrounding culture does not exist in a vacuum, it is part of a wider moral 
system and should not be looked at exclusively in isolation. This is something which 
we will be looking more at in the next chapter. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter elaborated on the meaning of obligation in this context and on the 
sources of our potential obligation towards our culture and the other members of our 
culture. The first step was to consider the difference between an obligation and duty, 
then to consider Jones’s separation between corporate and collective group rights. 
Collective group rights are those rights which a group possess which it has in virtue 
of its members. While the corporate group rights are those which the group itself 
possesses. A key element to highlight being that under a scheme of corporate group 
rights the group could hold a right against the members of the group which would not 
be the case with collective group rights. 
The three sources of obligation considered were gratitude, reciprocity and consent. 
Gratitude as the source of obligation would take the position that as our culture 
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provides us with an innumerate amount of benefits, the members of a culture owes 
an obligation to be grateful towards their culture. This would entail having an 
obligation to cherish our culture and based on Walker’s account of gratitude, not act 
contrary to the culture’s interests. The shortcoming with this perspective is that this 
would put a heavy burden on individual members who disagree with some of the 
precepts of their culture or find some of their cultures interests to be disagreeable, as 
they would then have an obligation to still cherish and act according to the precepts 
of the culture. 
The second source of obligation was that of reciprocity, which was described as 
being in some respects similar to gratitude, but with the key difference that the 
emotional component of the obligation towards our culture was not present. But 
instead the way in which this was explained was that we owed an obligation towards 
our culture to pay back for what we have received from it. One of the possible 
obligations of reciprocity which was identified was an obligation to ensure that our 
culture remained in a similar and recognizable to its current form. Shortcomings of 
this perspective was identified as being the possibility of the cultures interests 
overriding the interests of the individual members, as well as a Kantian problem of 
the members of a culture being treated as a means to the cultures ends, rather than 
being treated as ends in themselves. 
The third source of obligation is the consent based approach. The flaws in this 
approach were identified as the fact that we do not choose what culture we are part 
of, and secondly that our capacity to make choices is culturally contingent. My 
attempt to resolve these problems was by the use of a heavily Rawls inspired 
approach were the obligation would only be as demanding as the least advantaged, 
or most burdened would agree to. This would avoid a situation where unreasonable 
burdens would be placed on individual members of cultures. This would shift the 
object of our consent away from agreeing to be part of specific cultures, to agreeing 
to be part of a system in which we would have obligations towards our culture. 
This chapter considered these possible sources of obligation in conjunction with the 
different types of value considered in the last chapter, as well as which form of group 
rights were compatible with the different views on the source of obligation towards 
our culture, in an effort to demonstrate the consequences of taking a position on one 
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point has on the compatibility of the other points of consideration. The next chapter 
focuses on the ontological question of the nature of the humans who occupy these 
cultures and considers whether we are atomistic or holistic in nature. This is followed 
up in the succeeding chapter with the question of advocacy and considers 
communitarianism and individualism. 
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Chapter 4. Ontology  
 
This chapter will add to our consideration of how to analyse culture by examining the 
ontological nature of the people who make up these cultures. The two ontological 
approaches we are going to consider are that of atomism and holism. Atomism 
places the individual at the centre of its attention, while holism takes the view that 
individuals must be viewed in a social context and that people are not solitary 
isolated atoms. The chapter will first define these two positions, before considering 
the consequences which opting for either view of ontology can cause. An example 
used is Taylor’s view of how the ontological positions adopted by Hobbes and Locke 
allow them to come to their conclusions on the issue of advocacy,211 this is similar to 
the point this thesis has been making about the interdependence between these 
links. I then suggest that it would be useful to consider the issue of ontology twice, 
first to establish how people actually are. And second to establish how we wish to 
use ontology.  
The chapter further demonstrates the interconnectedness of these links, in particular 
the impact that the link of ontology has on the link of advocacy, the subject of the 
next chapter, with ontology having a very clear impact on the possible positions on 
other links. This chapter also prepares us for the next chapter which focuses on the 
advocacy positions of individualism and communitarianism. 
4.1 Definition of atomism and holism 
These two approaches concern what the fundamental unit of analysis ought to be. 
With atomism focusing on the atomised individual, while holism focuses on the 
group. We will start with atomism and then move onto holism.  
The core of atomism, also referred to as methodological individualism in certain 
contexts, is that it takes the individual as its starting point. When we are considering 
questions and problems we do so from the point of view of the individual. Elster, in 
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defining this style of approach, described it as “…the doctrine that social phenomena 
(their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of 
individuals - their properties, goals, and beliefs.”212 Similarly, Goldstein, in describing 
this principle in the social sciences describes it as “…the claim that in social science 
all explanation is to be individualistic”213, or as Taylor puts it “atomism affirms the 
self-sufficiency of man alone or, if you prefer, of the individual”214. The core of this 
approach, then, is that it takes the view of the individual. 
The other approach is that of holism, where rather than imagining people as isolated 
individuals, they are social beings which need a societal context in order to operate 
and function.215 Where atomism found the individual to be the most fundamental unit 
of analysis, holism takes this social dimension into account and the social group 
would be the most fundamental unit of analysis. As Uyl and Rasmussen puts it ”in 
(a), the order of explanation, you can and ought to account for social actions, 
structures, and conditions in terms of the properties of social wholes; and in (b), the 
order of deliberation, you can and ought to account for social goods in terms of a 
social good that cannot, without remainder, be reduced to the goods of 
individuals"216.  Or to put it simply “Society is the 'whole' which is more than its 
parts”.217 The individual, therefore, is a context dependent entity rather than the 
seemingly context independent and self-sufficient individual of atomism. The holistic 
approach takes the view that relationships between people are a constituent part of 
who they are, so any analysis of people must take the social circumstances they find 
themselves in as part of it for it to be complete. 218  
 
These are the basics of the approaches of holism and atomism. We can now move 
onto what some of the consequences or opportunities are of adopting either of these 
approaches.  
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4.2 Consequences 
 
Adopting either of these positions will lead us to come to different conclusions in our 
reasoning about culture, and depending on our ontological view different avenues 
become open to us. 
 
To demonstrate this, Taylor makes use of Hobbes and Locke as examples of 
atomism,219 Taylor takes the view that the ontological positions adopted by these 
thinkers have consequences for the advocacy position they come to adopt. In this 
case, the position on advocacy that the rights of the individual takes priority over the 
rights of the community.220 Utilising these two writers as examples it is also possible 
to see that atomism is not a monolithic entity but rather contains gradients and 
nuances within it, which then allows for many different outcomes in terms of 
advocacy positions. 
 
Starting with Hobbes in our examination of the role that the ontology plays in their 
positions. Hobbes famously described the state of nature as a place where ‘life is 
nasty brutish and short’221, and to secure ourselves from the threat posed by others, 
we seek to protect ourselves by creating a political society.222 For our purposes, the 
exact nature of the society which Hobbes envisioned is not entirely relevant. Rather 
it is his view of the nature of the problem which allows us to examine some aspects 
of atomism. Two elements in particular, that society exists for the benefit of the 
individual, and the adversarial role in which he casts the individuals in the state of 
nature. First, the benefits which Hobbes ascribes to the state are benefits from the 
view of the individual,223 conforming to Taylor’s description of the atomistic outlook 
as one which concerns itself with the individual holds true.224  
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However, the second point, that of the adversarial and competitive relationship 
between the people in Hobbes’s views, demonstrates some shortcomings in the 
conception of atomism as completely context independent and isolated. As the 
impetus for creating the state is the interaction with others, the view is not that of the 
individual alone, but the individual in relation to others.225 So here the individual is 
not sufficient in itself for our analysis, it needs the setting the individual find 
themselves in.  
 
In Locke’s view of ontology, we can see further complications. Locke who is also 
described as an atomist has a different view, demonstrating that similar starting 
points can lead to different outcomes as Locke’s familiar view on the state of nature 
is ‘the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very 
unsecure’226. While this might sound like it shares Hobbes’s view of the antagonistic 
relationship between individuals, this is not quite accurate, as we see in his 
separation between the state of nature and the state of war.227 And again we see 
that a so called atomist does not create a view of the individual as a context 
independent self-sufficient creature, even if he does so more than does Hobbes.228 
What we have here then is the demonstration that while both are labelled by Taylor 
as being atomists, they come to very different outcomes despite both operating with 
the individual as their starting point. As here we have Locke opting for an even more 
pronounced role for individual rights than does Hobbes,229 and indeed ascribes rights 
to the individual even with the absence of the state.230  
 
While there are consequences to the ontological positions which we adopt, 
consequences which we will explore further in the next chapter, it must be noted that 
ontology is not by itself the sufficient determining factor in coming to decisions about 
advocacy and policy, however, it is still necessary to consider this question of 
ontology so that we know what type of entity we are applying policy and advocacy to. 
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So that the advocacy positions we adopt is compatible with our ontological position 
and so that our views have some relation to reality. 
Looking at an extreme form of atomism to emphasise this point, we can return to the 
issue from earlier, that of a context dependent or independent view of the individual. 
If we take the most extreme case of atomism imaginable, then as indicated before 
the subject will be context independent, which means that all its relevant qualities 
entirely independent of the context that the subject finds itself in, so that any 
changes in the circumstances of the subject will leave the relevant qualities intact.231 
To use Brown’s light-hearted example based on Chips, in short, Chips with gravy is 
better than chips alone, the only difference in quality is that provided by the gravy. 
Under an atomist view, the quality of gravy must be context independent, so if we 
add the same gravy to ice-cream then it must be improved to the same degree as 
where the chips by the gravy.232  
 
Clearly, this extreme position is untenable, since the same holds even if we transfer 
the approach from quality of food to the nature of people. While on the one hand we 
can say that in the strictest sense that humans can exist in a context independent 
setting, it is unlikely that this context-free isolated human would have the same 
quality of life as would one which had grown up in in a social context. But even if a 
completely context free individual would be feasible, they would not be relevant to us 
in this project, as this project is about how society should respond to pluralities of 
cultures. Those who would be affected by any of the links and considerations which 
we have examined in this project are those individuals who are found in society, and 
for that matter, in a culture. So even if context-free atomistic individuals could exist, 
they would not be the ones which we had to concern ourselves with. 
 
If we discount the entirely context-free view, we would still have issues to address. If 
we assume that the people who we are going to encounter in our deliberations are 
entities which finds themselves in some form of social context, and that this context 
has some form of effect on these individuals. This does not mean that we can 
dismiss all of atomism altogether, we could still opt for a weaker form, where we take 
a view that the existence of individuals and individual consciousness to be an 
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independent phenomenon even if people can influence each other.233 In other words, 
individuals exists as separate beings, but these separate beings can influence and 
be influenced by the similar beings around them.  
The reason for considering the ontological nature of humans is not entirely about 
determining what the reality of humanity is in actuality (although that is not to say 
that this is a complete irrelevance) but rather to find what our theories are meant to 
achieve. To explain this, we will examine some of the criticisms made about 
individualist/atomist views of ontology and show that some of these alleged short 
comings are not necessarily problems at all. 
 
Starting with Taylor, what he finds problematic with the atomistic or individualist view 
is that its ascription of rights does not conform to our (or at least his) conception of 
what it is to be human, as he put it “…our conception of the specifically human is not 
at all irrelevant to our ascription of rights to people. On the contrary, there would be 
something incoherent and incomprehensible in a position which claimed to ascribe 
rights to men but which disclaimed any conviction about the special moral status of 
any human capacities whatever and which denied that they had any value or 
worth.”234 
As it is the specifically human that makes humans deserving of rights that are not 
available to non-human entities, to ignore the facts that help to establish these 
human specific qualities would be untenable, as this would be viewing humans in a 
way which does not include the particular facets that makes humans worthy of 
special human rights.235 Or to put this simply, it is our human faculties that make us 
worthy of rights, these faculties can only develop in dialogue with others in a 
communal setting. So, to ascribe rights to people on an atomist basis would be to 
ignore what makes us worthy of rights while we are ascribing rights. 
To understand the significance of this it might be useful to remember the 
ontology/advocacy distinction which Taylor used, what we have here then would be 
the argument that when we debate on our position in terms of advocacy (for 
simplicity's sake, in this example, we can interpret this as meaning the rights that 
someone can justifiably claim) we start by looking at ontology and then move on to 
                                                             
233 Pettit, P “Social Holism and Moral Theory” 179 
234 Taylor, C Philosophy and the Human Sciences 193 
235  Ibid.  190-196 
72 
 
advocacy. So we would start by asking ourselves what is it to be a human, and then 
based on our answer to this we can move onto asking ourselves what rights those 
creatures might have. This does not mean that we must take a particular view of 
advocacy simply because we have taken one view of ontology;236 we can have 
disagreements about what particular rights humans should have. The problem with 
the atomistic view is as said earlier that it undermines the sources of the rights which 
we give to humans and so should not be employed.  
 
The way to solve this problem, I will suggest, is to do the first step twice; once where 
we take reality into account and once where we do not. Or, first where we consider 
reality and second what this will enable us to do. To explain this, it would be helpful 
to remember why we go through any of the stages or why we bother to consider the 
nature of people, in essence, what are we trying to accomplish with our theories. 
Looking at two people who are described as using an individualised/atomised view of 
people, Kant and Rawls, will help to make this point plain. 
 
One view of Kant is, as Pogge puts it, “Kant's moral agent is, like his transcendental 
subject in the KrV [Critique of Pure Reason], an essentially a-historical and solitary 
being.”237. That is to say, he does not consider the circumstances that people find 
themselves in when he is trying to find the moral fundamentals. But this does not 
mean that Kant thought that this represented the experience of actual humans, but 
rather that taking this view would allow him to solve the problem which he is working 
on, to find fundamental moral principles with only a priori reasoning.238 Taking 
people’s actual situation into account would make that impossible, as then we would 
be drawing on experience and we could not reach universal principles. Pogge further 
explains, “Kant's fiction is designed to furnish a restriction on motivation 
(determinants of the will), excluding the more specific, inconstant, and morally 
unacceptable natural inclinations, and thus a criterion for moral reasons”239.  
The question which this leaves us with is whether this aim is a worthwhile one. If it is 
then not including anything which is not part of the a priori reasoning is not a 
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problem. The objections we can make against this is that either this project is not 
worthwhile, or that the method does not help us get to the end which it is designed to 
get us to. In this case if we think that Kant’s view of the moral agent is actually a 
hindrance to finding a fundamental moral principle based on a priori reasoning, or 
alternatively that such a principle would be irrelevant and not worth pursuing. It 
would not succeed or fail because of its view of the isolated nature of the individual 
moral agent.  
 
To reinforce this, let us look again at Rawls. While his view of individuals is quite 
atomistic, it is not adversarial like it is for Hobbes, rather, the people who are in the 
original position and are considering what principles they would opt for when it 
comes to constitutional essentials are viewed as being mutually disinterested.240 The 
main point I wish to make here is to make clear that this does not mean that we 
imagine the person in the original position as necessarily being an egoist. While 
some actual persons put their own prospects and benefits as their final purpose, this 
would be the difference between ‘His dominant interests are in himself, not merely, 
as they must always be, interests of a self.’241 And it is the last part of that statement 
which is important for us. While the original position does seem to take a very 
atomist form, with individuals deliberating under the assumption that they do not care 
what others have as their final ends and makes no assumptions about the emotional 
bonds that people have towards each other, they are doing just that, making no 
assumptions on the strength of the emotional bounds between members. It is not 
assuming that people have no emotional bonds to other individuals, but rather takes 
no position on that issue, so as to make sure that the deliberations made in the 
original position is not based on strong assumptions.242 Further, as will be explored 
deeper in chapter 6, another reason for assuming that the deliberator under the veil 
of ignorance is disinterested is that this will allow us to mimic the effects of 
benevolence, and while this might seem to lead to atomism, it is actually due to 
considerations for others.243  
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What this would allow us to do is to find what principles people would opt for in a 
situation of equality.244 The important factor to consider here is not whether or not 
the situation encountered by people in the original position is anything like the 
situation as they would actually encounter in reality. What is important here is 
whether or not the thought experiment allows us to achieve this goal, that of finding 
out what principles people would opt for in a situation of equality, if that goal is of any 
worth at all, if they are then I don’t think that deviating from reality is much of a 
problem. Although this does not mean that reality is entirely unimportant. In fact it is 
the important and pressing nature of the problem which we face in reality which 
encourages us to look at ideal theory as “The reason for beginning with ideal theory 
is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for systematic grasp of these more 
pressing problems.”245 What this ideal conception of justice allows for is comparison 
“Viewing the theory of justice as a whole, the ideal part presents a conception of a 
just society that we are to achieve if we can. Existing institutions are to be judged in 
the light of this conception and held to be unjust to the extent that they depart from it 
without sufficient reason.”246 
These cases of Kant and Rawls show, that while they did not use a view of people 
that is particularly realistic, it does not have to be as their view of people is not meant 
to conform to reality but allow them to take positions which allows them to construct 
their theories. Approached in this way ontology is a question which should be looked 
at, not as something to which we want to find the correct answer, but rather the most 
useful answer. That is not to say that reality is entirely irrelevant; we must still have 
some sense of what people are actually like. But this is mainly so that we may know 
in what ways we are deviating from the reality of the situation. What this means is 
that while on the one hand we must accept the holist nature of actual people in 
reality. We can then imagine that people are atomistic.  
To elaborate, as said before, the pure atomistic position, with the view that 
individuals are completely isolated and context independent, is unsustainable. No 
one exists who is like this, and even if someone like this did exist they would be 
irrelevant for our purposes as this concerns how society should deal with culture, 
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and so any individual we consider would be a member of a culture and so not a 
context independent individual. So this is our starting point, we will assume that 
people exist in a social context and that they need this context in order to develop 
into fully functioning individuals.  
But when moving on to considering the advocacy position we might adopt, it could 
be useful to imagine that we were atomistic, as we will soon explore. So, in 
considering what a reasonable person would want or consent to, it is beneficial to 
consider people in atomistic terms.  
In effect, when examining first our ontology and then our advocacy, we benefit from 
doing the first step twice. First looking at humans as they actually are and second, as 
slightly different entities more helpful for our purposes, before moving on to the 
possible advocacy positions we might adopt.  
 
There are two main benefits to taking this approach, on the one hand, it aspires 
towards universality and on the other it allows us to keep the contingent factors in 
mind as well.  
These two elements do create a certain degree of tension, as the first part aims to 
not depend on particular circumstances, while the second is the direct opposite. The 
need for the later of the two comes from the fact that we are creatures who exist in a 
social context and we need our culture to develop into fully formed human beings. 
Simply put, we need our culture. So, any view of human nature will need to 
acknowledge this. But on a second level by looking at people atomistically we can 
avoid some of the potentially unwanted aspects of a communitarian approach might 
encounter, such as the individual being forced to sacrifices their interests for the 
sake of the culture, and so would open up more options. If we take an atomistic 
outlook in mind when considering issues of advocacy it will allow us to ask what an 
individual would find reasonable to accept, given that they will also need their culture 
(or at least access to a culture) in order to function.  
While this puts us in the position which Taylor highlighted, where “…our obligation to 
belong to or sustain a society, or to obey its authorities, is seen as derivative, as l 
said on us conditionally, through our consent, or through its being to our advantage. 
The obligation to belong is derived in certain conditions from the more fundamental 
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principle which ascribes rights”247. What this means is that our obligations towards 
our culture, is derived from our individual rights, or if we recast this to fit the 
discussion of this chapter, we acquire communitarian obligation only due to 
individualist considerations, which implies an atomistic view of the individual. What 
this approach will do for us is to allow us to guard against the interests and 
preferences of the individual being sacrificed for the benefit of the community. But by 
remembering that the individual would need a culture, and so it would be reasonable 
for them to accept the possibility of having some obligation towards their culture as it 
is something they need, but they would not accept obligation which would place a 
too stringent a burden upon them. We will return and consider this further in chapter 
6 and chapter 7. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
This chapter examined the concept of ontology as we will be using it in this project. 
This concerns the nature of the humans who make up the cultures which we are 
considering, and examines whether people ought to be viewed according to atomism 
or holism. The chapter first defines atomism and holism, with atomism being the 
position where the individual is our primary concern and any investigation of social 
phenomena must use the individual as its unit of analysis. And holism taking the 
view that people cannot be viewed as solitary atoms but must be considered in a 
social context, the structures and systems must be considered and not just 
individuals. 
The chapter then considered some of the consequences of adopting either of those 
positions can have on other positions in other areas. An example of this was Taylor’s 
comments on Hobbes and Locke, where the position adopted by these thinkers on 
ontology allowed them to reach certain conclusion in terms of advocacy. For 
Hobbes, taking an atomistic view of ontology meant that he could view the state as 
existing primarily for the benefit of individuals, and could cast people’s relationship in 
the state of nature as being primary adversarial.248 And Locke’s focus on individual 
rights is made possible due to his atomistic view of ontology.249 This however 
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highlights the differences possible in terms of ontology and consequences, as both 
are labelled as being atomists but come to very different conclusions on issues of 
advocacy. With the view that ontology does not determine advocacy, even if it 
influences it. I then suggested that when we consider ontology and advocacy, it 
would be useful to consider ontology twice. Once in terms of how humans actually 
are, and secondly how we wish to treat humans. This would have the effect of 
allowing us to acknowledge that humans are holistic in nature, but would leave the 
option to view people atomistically for the purposes of advocacy. This continues to 
demonstrate the interconnected nature of these links, where in this context, our 
conception of ontology is seen to have a dramatic effect on our position on 
advocacy. 
This chapter considered the ontological approaches of atomism and holism, the next 
chapter builds on this and investigates the issue of advocacy and examines the 
positions of individualism and communitarianism.   
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Chapter 5: Advocacy and The Ends of The State 
 
This chapter will follow on from the last chapter’s examination of ontology by 
considering advocacy. In this chapter we will consider some of the normative 
outlooks which influence our view of how the state is to treat cultures, first by 
examining the link of advocacy where we examine how we view the people who 
make up these cultures, are they to be approached in in terms of individualism or 
communitarians. The chapter then examines the question of the ends of the state 
and considers what the state is for. 
The first half of the chapter examines the link of advocacy, first it will define how we 
will be using these terms in this project, before outlining the possible combinations of 
ontology and advocacy, we will then proceed to examine how all the links in this 
project combine with this latest addition of advocacy. After having looked at the 
members of society, and how they should be approached, the next section will 
consider society itself, where we will examine the concept of the ends of the state. 
First, we will elaborate on the concept of the ends of the state, after this we will 
examine some of the views of the authors we have covered in this project, with 
particular focus given to the multicultural side as I take the view that this has been 
under explored. We then highlight the difficulties of the multiculturalist approach to 
the ends of the state, chief amongst them being the problem of internal dissent.  
This approach will help us to further illuminate the possible paths to a conclusion on 
how we are to treat cultures, as well as highlighting some of the difficulties which 
must be addressed if we want to come to a coherent and satisfactory conclusion, by 
outlining how we should approach the people who make up society and society itself. 
This prepares us for the next chapter where we will explore further one of the 
possible approaches to addressing these problems, that of contractualism. This in 
turn helps us to further come to a conclusion on how the state should treat cultures. 
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5.1 Individualism and communitarianism 
 
It is worth remembering Taylor’s comment on the difference between ontology and 
advocacy, put simply, an atomist ontology does not require that we adopt an 
individualist view on advocacy, nor indeed does holistic ontology demand 
communitarian advocacy.250 Before considering these highly contextual terms 
further, it will be useful to define them for our purposes.  
The use and meaning of the term individualism is very contextual and depends on its 
circumstance. We are going to use it as one of the links in our chain, meaning that it 
must be defined in such a way that it can be used in connection with the other links, 
but still recognizable to the ways in which it is used in other contexts. 
The advocacy position of individualism is at times confused with the ontological view 
of atomism, which we looked at in the previous chapter. This can lead to attempts to 
dismiss individualism by dismissing atomism and try to paint them as being one and 
the same and so reject both at the same time.251 But as has been repeatedly 
emphasised in these chapters, ontology and advocacy are not the same thing and if 
we want to reject individualism it is best to do so on normative grounds rather than 
factual grounds as individualism is an advocacy position concerned with normative 
issues rather than ontological matters. A look at Grant’s view of Locke makes this 
distinction between atomism and individualism plain. Grant highlights that Locke is 
clearly not viewing individuals as isolated atoms, but always in relation to others.252 
The core of the individualism as used by Locke resides in its opposition to hierarchy 
and individual consent as being the basis for obligation.253 Here we can see part of 
the core of individualism, that is, as the name implies, focuses on the individual, and 
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in the example of Locke, individual consent and the rejection of the subordination of 
the individual to authorities to which they have not consented. 
Connected to this is individualism’s focus on individual rights, which springs from its 
focus on the individual. Individualism is not the only view which has room for rights, 
but the focus is on the rights of individuals rather than those of communities, making 
one way of looking at individualism to think of it as the politics of individual rights.254 
As the view of the individuals who make up society is different from that of 
communitarianism, the view of society is different. In that individualism can view 
society as a system of co-operation for mutual benefit.255 This point demonstrates 
quite clearly that on the individualist view, even when the social nature of our 
existence is clearly acknowledged, it is still viewed through the prism of individuality. 
This does not mean that it is thought that the factual origin of society is to be found in 
these terms, but rather that this is how we should approach the issue of what the aim 
and goal of society is, which in this case would be that each individual is to be able 
to enjoy the advantages which communal existence enables. The issue of the aims 
and ends of the state will be returned to later in the chapter. 
Underlying these previous points is the view that individualism is ‘...a belief that the 
individual is an end in herself and ought to realize the self and cultivate 
judgement...’256, this is similar to the Kantian language encountered earlier in this 
project, continuing the theme of focusing on the individual as an end in themselves. 
They are not mere means for the perpetuation of a culture, but must be respected as 
individuals and as ends in themselves. 
The other concept we will be utilising is that of communitarianism. The name again 
gives us an idea of what the concept concerns, i.e. communities. But while this 
conveys the essence, it does not give us the whole picture. In the last chapter, where 
we considered holism, and established that on a holistic view, the individual is 
thought to be part of social whole and cannot develop outside a social context. Many 
communitarians would go further and suggest that this social context and the 
communal ties are valuable in themselves.257 This view would still leave questions 
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relating to the nature of this value. As was just stated, one view is that communal ties 
have value in themselves, but is this value intrinsic to the community? Or is it derived 
from the use it provides for its members? Or both, and if so are these types of values 
connected or independent of each other? This is the type of question we have 
considered earlier in this project in the chapter on types of value, and it is one which 
we will return to later in this chapter. But for now, we will take it as a feature of 
communitarianism that it considers there to be value in community and culture which 
is not only reducible to the utility it brings to the individual members.  
In contrast to individualism’s view of treating peoples as ends in themselves and not 
placing the individual under unchosen authority, two of the goals to be found in 
communitarianism are on the one hand to avoid moral chaos, and on the other hand 
is the promotion of the common good. The first point relating to moral chaos is that 
communitarianism helps to remedy the ‘...moral chaos and absence of common 
purposes...’258 which some ascribe to the more individualistic views of advocacy. The 
view on the communitarian approach to advocacy is that ‘…moral authority should 
be lodged in shared understandings and institutions, not in individual choice.’259 This 
is clearly quite different from how we described individualism earlier, where individual 
choice is central to moral authority. In communitarianism the authority does not stem 
from our choosing the moral system, but rather the authority is found in shared 
convictions and institutions. And secondly, the focus on the common good differs 
from the individualistic view, which we described as the politics of rights. Instead 
communitarianism could be said to be the politics of the common good.260 While this 
leaves questions such as to who gets to define what is the common good, that is not 
the question we will be looking at in this chapter.  
In summary, individualism, as the name implies, focuses on the individual. In one 
sense, the fairly common use of the word individualism or derivatives thereof as 
adjectives to denote when something is more focused on individuals gives us the 
essence of the concept. The main element to remember is that this is a normative 
viewpoint which puts the individual at its centre and is concerned with them as ends, 
as opposed to the ontological approach which was considered in the last chapter. 
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Communitarianism on the other hand concerns itself with communities and the 
common good. The next section will examine how the view of advocacy adopted is 
impacted by the links we examined in the earlier chapters.  
5.2 How this coheres with the previous links 
As was established in the last chapter, a person’s position on issues of advocacy is 
not determined automatically by their position on issues of ontology. But it must be 
stressed that some positions combine and coheres better than others, and this 
applies not just to the links of ontology and advocacy but to all the different links we 
have examined in this project. When adopting a position on advocacy, we will also 
have to make a number of assumptions about the earlier links. Consequently, if we 
want to fully understand and adopt a coherent position on how the state is to treat 
cultures, we will need to see how these links interact and fit together before we can 
come to any conclusions on how the state is to treat cultures. We will start by laying 
out how advocacy and ontology can be combined, before considering possible 
combinations with communitarianism and then the possible combinations with 
individualism. 
Starting with how advocacy combines with ontology, then we have four ways in 
which these can be combined. These combinations are 1) atomism-individualism, 2) 
holism-individualism, 3) holism-collectivism and 4) atomism-collectivism.261 Some of 
those are more compatible than others are. An example would be Taylor dismissing 
the fourth option as ‘atomist collectivists, as in the nightmarish programmed utopia of 
B. F. Skinner, "beyond freedom and dignity." This last category may be of interest 
only for the student of the bizarre or the monstrous’262. As here we would take the 
view that people are to be treated as parts of a social whole but at the same time 
view them as being factually isolated atoms. This helps to demonstrate that some of 
these combinations are more viable than others. An example would be, the 
combination of atomism and individualism is quite compatible, and as was said 
before, these two are even at times conflated and confused.263 On this view, the 
ontological unit of analysis is the individual and the same applies to the advocacy 
position. Similarly, on the third option, there is intuitive compatibility as on the 
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ontological view the individual must be viewed as being part of a community, and on 
advocacy the focus is on communities. And finally there is the second option, we 
acknowledge the holistic ontological nature of people, but treat them as separate 
individuals when it comes to advocacy. 
The next link to add to our chain, is the type of value which a culture can possess, 
which was considered in chapter 2. The easiest way to discover which of these links 
combines with which is to simply go through them and see how these combinations 
coheres. We will begin by considering communitarianism of the type which has been 
outlined in this chapter.  
As a reminder, when we consider the type of value that a culture can have, it can 
either be intrinsic to the culture, where the value is in the culture itself or 
instrumental, where the value of the culture is found in the services it provides for its 
members.  
The combination of communitarianism and intrinsic value of culture is quite coherent. 
One of the features highlighted in communitarianism was that it viewed 
interconnection between members as a good in itself, and from our earlier discussion 
on culture one view would be that our culture is the manifestation of this 
interconnectedness. And so, this combination becomes quite easy.  
Shifting to an instrumental view of the value of culture, we would still have a viable 
combination. If we think that communal ties are a good in themselves, and that 
culture provides access to communal ties, then there would be no contradiction or 
conflict between these two links. The culture would on this combination be valuable 
as it gives us a community.  
The next step is how these two links combine with the source of obligation to our 
culture and the nature of that obligation. The sources of obligation we considered in 
conjunction with culture were reciprocity, gratitude and consent. Beginning with 
gratitude as the source of obligation, where we are obligated to be grateful to that 
which has brought us benefits. As was said in the earlier chapter, this works ill with a 
view of culture as having instrumental value, as it would entail us to have to be 
grateful to the means or instruments to our ends and adopt its ends and projects as 
our own. As this chain of links does not cohere successfully the whole way through, 
we can rule out the combination of communitarianism with instrumental value of 
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culture and a view of obligation based on gratitude. Gratitude combined with 
communitarianism and an intrinsic view of the value of culture could work better. On 
this view, cultures have value that is independent of the individual members of the 
culture. And the members of the culture could have an obligation to be grateful to the 
culture for enabling them to have access to this valuable culture. This would avoid 
the problem of being made to adopt the ends of the means to our ends, it does face 
a different difficulty. A culture which is viewed to possess intrinsic value would be a 
culture which we do not value because of the benefits which it provides its members. 
But if we are not valuing it because of the benefits it provides us, why are we to be 
grateful? This could be ameliorated if we view the culture as being intrinsically 
valuable and we have an instrumentally valuable view of the culture at the same time 
where we are grateful to the other members of our culture for giving us access to this 
intrinsically valuable thing that is our culture. In essence, both intrinsic and 
instrumental views of the value of culture would have to be used for gratitude to work 
in combination with communitarianism. 
Reciprocity is the next source of obligation towards culture to consider in 
combination with communitarianism. This combination suits communitarianism 
better, as on this view we are to pay back to our culture for the benefits it has 
provided us, but without the emotional component where we need to adopt a certain 
attitude towards the culture. Part of the problem which occurred with gratitude also 
applies here, if the value of the culture is intrinsic and not based on what we get out 
of it, then why are we paying back to it. Again the culture would be intrinsically 
valuable and worthy of respect, as well as deserving to be paid back to for the 
benefits it has provided for us. This problem can be mitigated if we think of 
reciprocity as being owed to our fellow members of our community rather than the 
culture itself. On this combination we are paying back to our compatriots for them 
enabling us to have access to the intrinsically valuable culture, this also works quite 
well with the communitarian view of it being a good itself that we are constituted by 
our communal ties. This leaves us with a situation where we can combine 
communitarianism with intrinsic value and reciprocity. 
The final source of obligation towards our culture is that of consent, which on the 
face of it is a poor combination with communitarianism as we have established it 
here. We can see this for example in Downing and Thigpen, who describes it as 
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common institutions and understanding rather than individual choice that ought to be 
the source of morality. This is the opposite approach to having consent as the source 
of our obligations towards our culture. This can be further seen in the line from 
Parekh that cultures are not voluntary associations and should not be treated as 
such,264 showing the difference between these two approaches. On the 
communitarian view, community is not a choice and so we cannot make a chain 
which links consent and communitarianism.  
One interesting point to note is made by O’Neil, which can help us to see how one 
could have a communitarian view combined with a consent based view of the source 
of obligation, highlights that Kymlicka does not view cultures in a communitarian 
way.265 This is a result of the role which Kymlicka gives to culture, in presenting his 
view where our culture exists primarily to provide a context of choice and so to 
enable us to make decisions and experience freedom.266 As has been pointed out in 
earlier chapters, this allows for a different view of the role of the culture in our lives, 
and it is here more plausible that someone could indirectly come to consent to being 
part of a culture. By taking the position that a person needs a context of choice in 
order to be free, and to have a context of choice we need a culture and that a culture 
needs a common set of institutions and meanings in order to be viable. While this 
might not be entirely what Kymlicka had in mind, is still compatible with Kymlicka’s 
approach. By adding a few non-instrumental elements into its conception of culture, 
you could have a communitarian view of culture and combine it with a consent based 
view of the source of obligation. This would also involve treating the type of value of 
a culture as being both of intrinsic and instrumental value, with more emphasis being 
placed on the later. As we would have to treat our culture as something which had 
intrinsic value in order to help develop the circumstances which can allow them to 
develop but we are doing it entirely for instrumental reasons. So we would have to 
make sure that Kymlicka’s prohibitions on internal restrictions, the ability of our 
culture to impose restrictions against us against our will,267 would still be in place, as 
to avoid undermining the entire point of the exercise. This was meant to show one 
avenue one could take to try to make the consent based view congruent with a 
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communitarian view, but it would require some work to justify and even then there is 
still some tension, a better option would be to simply look for a different combination 
of links.  
 
As was done with communitarianism, we will now examine what combinations can 
be made with individualism. As was said at the beginning of the chapter, 
individualism is often confused with atomism. But the two are not necessarily the 
same, rather individualism is a moral outlook which has the individual as its focus 
and atomism is an ontological outlook. In individualism, an individual is viewed as 
being an end in themselves and living in a society which can be thought of as a 
scheme for mutual co-operation, with consent to the structures in which they operate 
taking a central role. As an example we can look to the language used by Rawls in 
describing a well ordered society.268 
Beginning with the type of value which a culture can have and how these views 
combines and coheres with individualism then moving onto the source of our 
obligation towards our culture. The instrumental view of the value of culture is quite 
compatible with individualism. On the instrumental view, a culture would be valuable 
as far as it is beneficial to the individual members of the culture. This would fit quite 
well with what we said about individualism, where we take the individuals point of 
view, so this combination of links is workable. The intrinsic view of the value of 
culture could be made to work with individualism depending on how we approach 
this value. A potential difficulty can appear if we hold both individuals and cultures to 
be of intrinsic value. The problem being that were there to be a conflict between the 
interests of the culture and the individuals who are in the culture, then we would 
need some way to determine which of these intrinsically valuable entities are to take 
precedence over the other. If the value of the culture is to take precedence, we can 
get into the problem which we have observed in earlier chapters, that of the member 
being subordinated by the culture and being used as a tool for the culture to further 
its own ends, contrary to the aim here of viewing individuals as ends in themselves, 
rather than merely as a tool. Meaning that individualism is compatible with an 
instrumental view of the value of culture, and can be compatible with an intrinsic 
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view, depending on how that value is conceptualised. The next step is to consider 
the source of obligation towards culture and how it links with individualism and the 
views on the value of culture. 
Starting with obligation from gratitude before moving onto reciprocity and consent. 
As was said in the section on communitarianism, gratitude is not readily compatible 
with an instrumental view of the value of culture, and so a chain cannot be 
constructed to connect the links of individualism, an instrumental view of the value of 
culture and gratitude as the source of obligation, since parts of this chain is 
incompatible with each other. Moving on to the intrinsic view of value and again the 
problem of being made subordinate to the means to our ends appears, a particular 
issue for the individualism view if we take Locke’s objection to individuals being 
made subjects to structures which we have not consented to. 
With gratitude not being compatible with individualism, this leaves reciprocity and 
consent. Proceeding with reciprocity, I would say that a combination of the links of 
individualism, instrumental view of value and reciprocity as the source of obligation 
works quite well. On this view, as our culture is to our benefit, we are to pay back for 
the benefits we have received, and here it would be done on an individual basis. 
There are two points worth examining here, to who or what reciprocity is owed, this 
is similar to the discussion we had in the earlier chapter about obligation, and 
secondly the fact that this can be conceived as being an individual obligation. 
In the chapter on the sources of obligation, in the section on reciprocity, we 
established that when we talked about having a duty of reciprocity towards our 
culture, we can mean that it is either the various people of the culture that we in fact 
have obligations towards, or the culture itself which we are duty bound to. When 
linked with reciprocity, the type of value which our culture has effects who the 
reciprocity is owed. If we view the value as being instrumental, then the reciprocity is 
directed towards the members of the culture. While if the culture is intrinsically 
valuable, it is directed against the culture itself, rather than the members. On the 
view where we owe an obligation of reciprocity to our fellow members of a culture, 
this can be thought of as being similar to a transaction. As the other members of our 
culture has provided us with a great benefit, enabling us to have a culture and 
receive the benefits associated with that, we have an obligation to pay them back for 
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what they have given us. Or this could be thought of as paying back the other 
members of our culture for the resources which they have spent giving us these 
benefits through our culture, be this in time or effort or whatever the case maybe. 
This leads to the second point, that this is an obligation that is observed by 
individuals. In an earlier chapter when exploring group rights, the difference was 
drawn between rights that are in personam and in rem, and a similar phenomenon is 
at work here, in that our duty is not in rem but rather to individuals, not the culture in 
general, it is a more personal debt.  
The final link for consideration is that of consent as the source of obligation towards 
our culture in combination with individualism. Consent is considerably easier to 
connect to individualism than it was to connect it to communitarianism. As said 
earlier one of the traits of communitarianism, as we have used the term, is that it 
considers community to be a good, not because it is the result of decisions made by 
its members, but because of the shared institutions which it consists of, which makes 
consent difficult connect to communitarianism. Individualism was described as a 
view where society is conceptualised as a scheme of cooperation for mutual 
advantage. This can fit well with the view of society as something which we would 
need to agree to be part of, rather than thinking of society as an organism which we 
do not have choice in being part of. This view based around the choices made by 
individuals would be quite compatible with an instrumental view of the value of 
culture. It is important to remember that this is not meant to be a description of 
reality, someone taking this combination of views is not suggesting that people 
weighed the pros and cons on whether to form a society, but there is still some use 
in imagining something along those lines. Indulging in this kind of exercise, while not 
nearly as developed as that used by Rawls, where we imagine that society is a 
voluntary association, this could help us see what demands could be thought to be 
reasonable to put upon an individual. Taking this approach shows how the 
instrumental view of the value of culture fits with a consent-based view of obligation, 
as we can see how the people deliberating would think about the costs and benefits 
and motivations in building a society. This would help us see where the line for what 
burdens it would be unreasonable for us to carry for our culture, by asking what 
someone would hypothetically agree to. The chain of an instrumental view of the 
value of culture and a view of our obligation towards our culture as being rooted in 
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consent and an individualist view of advocacy is quite coherent. But again, it must be 
pointed out that the consent is a hypothetical tool to be used to arrive at what a 
person could reasonably agree to rather than a description of what actual persons 
have in realty agreed to. Leaving the final link to consider, that of combining an 
intrinsic view of the value of culture with individualism in conjunction with a consent 
based view of obligation. 
This combination is less plausible than the instrumental one. The central difficulty in 
this combination is that if our culture is intrinsically valuable, then our consent should 
not be the deciding factor in our obligations towards it. If we find the source of our 
obligation towards culture in the fact that we are consenting to it, then we are not 
respecting the intrinsic value of the culture, but rather respect the value of consent. 
As we said earlier, we can say that these two factors are independent of each other. 
We could have a culture which is valuable due to its intrinsic qualities, and what 
gives us obligation to said valuable culture is that we consent to have obligations 
towards this intrinsically valuable culture, but these two factors do not reinforce each 
other. This does not make this necessarily incompatible, but we would not be 
treating the culture with the appropriate respect as we are not treating it as valuable 
due to its own intrinsic features. 
The sketch of how these links combines, coheres, strengthens and weakens each 
other helps us to see how the state is to treat culture, in that it helps us to 
understand the interplay of the assumptions we must make in order to arrive at an 
answer to this issue. In the next section we will consider how the state is envisioned 
and what the state is envisioned to be for. 
 
5.3 The Ends of the State 
In the second half of this chapter we will consider this issue of the ends of the state. 
The reason for considering this is that if we are to come to a conclusion on how the 
state is to treat cultures, we should have an idea of what the state and society is for, 
by asking the question of what the aim of society is, if it can be said to have one, will 
help us come to conclusion on how we are to treat cultures. 
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The liberal approach to the ends of the state has been examined in a multitude of 
different ways, with different liberal approaches and thinkers coming to different 
conclusion over the shape of the liberal ends of the state. Framing this and adapting 
it to suit our needs in the discussion on how we are to treat cultures, and thus 
emphasising how this relates to cultures, the liberal view of the ends of the state 
could be summarized as a view featuring state neutrality, where the state is to take 
no action regarding the view its inhabitants take on the subject of the good life. And 
as culture is a manifestation of the view of the good life, it is to take no position on 
cultures.269 The common criticism of this view is that it is impossible for the state to 
be truly neutral, and also that neutrality is not desirable. 
The multicultural view of the ends of the state has not been as frequently examined, 
this project attempts to add reflections on a multicultural view of the ends of the state 
and be part of remedying this shortfall. Amongst the possible ends of the state 
considered are liberty and well-being. 
First we will define the issue a bit further, before the next section sets out and frames 
the multicultural view of the ends of the state by considering some of the different 
thinkers we have encountered throughout this project. The chapter will also highlight 
some of the issues and criticisms related to multiculturalism’s approach to the ends 
of the state, chief amongst them being the problem of internal dissent, which occurs 
when a culture is divided on an issue. The difficulty which this creates is that, I 
argue, multiculturalism as normally understood will inevitably end up in a situation 
where it has to marginalise some parts of a culture. The chapter demonstrates this 
by exploring a few ways in which multiculturalism could attempt to resolve this 
difficulty. 
5.4 What we mean by ‘ends of the state’  
When we are considering the ends of the state, we are considering what the state is 
for. This is to find what we expect the state to do, as when we are considering how 
society and the state is to treat cultures, we are basing these deliberations in part on 
what we think the state exists for. 
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The ends of the state can be approached in many different ways, an example would 
be Rawls’s description of society as being well ordered when it is designed for the 
benefits of its members and is guided by a public conception of justice.270 But even 
this quite thin description can help us see the importance of considering the ends of 
the state, as on this description the state does not exists to foster any particular trait 
or virtue in its people, nor does it exist to pursue particular ends. Rather it exists for 
the benefits of its members and its action is in accordance with the public conception 
of justice. This view of the ends of the state is not about the contents of a society but 
rather with the form of society. 
This topic has been mentioned earlier in this project but we will consider it in greater 
depth here. When we are considering the ends of the state, it is not about the factual 
circumstances which lead to the establishment of the state which we are concerned 
about. But rather what reasons we could imagine someone might have for wanting to 
be part of the state. To explain the difference, if we take a constructivist approach to 
this topic, then the justification for the state and its power lies in us having in some 
manner consented to it. This does not suggest that we think that people have had an 
opportunity to deliberately make the choice to consent to be part of society, but we 
wonder why someone would consent to be part of society if they could and use that 
to determine how the situation which we find in reality is compared to the ideal which 
we imagined, or in Rawls’s description ‘Viewing the theory of justice as a whole, the 
ideal part presents a conception of a just society that we are to achieve if we can. 
Existing institutions are to be judged in light of this conception and held to be unjust 
to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient reason.‘271 
We are looking for the first principles of the state, and if we can discern these we can 
consider if they are likely to lead to an amicable coexistence between cultures. 
We will consider in the coming section multicultural views of the ends of the state.  
5.5 Multiculturalism and the ends of the state 
While there are too many strands of multiculturalism to do a comprehensive and 
exhaustive examination of the different ways multiculturalism could be thought to 
view the ends of the state. In this section we will consider core features of 
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multiculturalism and see what views of the ends of the state they lend themselves to 
by considering some of the multicultural theorists we have examined earlier in this 
project. 
The multiculturalist view of the ends of the state has not been explored as much as 
the liberal alternative. Often the general features of contemporary society are 
assumed and then arguments provided for improvements in certain areas. Some 
examples of improvements would be wider space for minorities to practice their 
culture, or greater willingness to engage in intercultural dialog, but this does not give 
us the entire picture of how multiculturalism envisions the ends of the state. Part of 
this absence can be explained by multiculturalism often being committed to a 
political project, that is, trying to improve the conditions for marginalised groups. 
Indeed, Kymlicka describes multiculturalism as having developed in an ad hoc way, 
but he views this as a strength,272 while I take the view that this is a shortcoming. 
This has meant that the focus for many multicultural thinkers have been on concrete 
problems in the real world, and attempts to find solutions to these real shortcomings 
and problems. This is not to suggest that multiculturalism is devoid of theory, far from 
it. But rather that as the focus has been on actual difficulties faced by actual people, 
the question of what the ends of the state is has not been as pressing as it should 
have been. But here we have the room to focus on the more theoretical dimensions 
rather than the concrete practicalities, so the question before us in this section is, 
what are the general features and needs of a multiculturalist view of the ends of the 
state? 
As the ends of the state is not often explicit in these writings, we are forced to make 
deductions and inferences as to what some of these authors consider the ends of 
the state to be. To make a start with Taylor, who seems to be using a form of 
wellbeing as an end of society. If we consider how Taylor uses misrecognition, we 
can see wellbeing being a factor in his reasoning. Misrecognition was said to be 
when a person is made to suffer as an effect of the dialogical process of identity 
formation leading to a negative self-view.273 As our self-view is in part a response to 
how others see us, and if we are not given the form of recognition we need we will 
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respond with a diminished self-view. Modood comes to a similar view and takes the 
position that the state is to act to help assist and preserve cultures in order to 
prevent harm to the sense of self of the people in these cultures. As an example, 
Modood talks about the possibility of the need to protect young Muslims from 
irreverent literature and so it might be for the best for the state to place limits on 
people’s freedom of speech.274 The views expressed by these thinkers would imply 
that they consider wellbeing to be one of the ends of the state. 
A different way to approach this question can be seen with Kymlicka, who seems to 
put liberty as one of the ends of the state. As has been said before, Kymlicka puts at 
the core of his view the idea of the context of choice. We need the context of choice 
which our culture provides in order to be able to make evaluations and make choices 
and to have freedom.275 Further we can see the focus on liberty with Kymlicka’s 
distinction between external protections and internal restrictions. External 
protections, where a culture is provided the means to protect itself from external 
pressures are allowed. But internal restrictions, where the culture applies restrictions 
to the individuals in the culture, are disallowed. As Kymlicka’s view is that being part 
of a culture is necessary for us to have freedom, it would be counterproductive to 
allow cultures to restrict our freedom. On this point there is some similarity to the 
position taken by Parekh, in that he also thinks that we need our culture in order to 
make evaluations and to be able to assign value and meaning to choices, indeed he 
refers to culture as a ‘system of meaning’ 276 it creates and shapes the good for its 
members. However, Parekh stresses that personal autonomy and choice are not 
necessarily universal values.277 For Parekh the value of a culture is not instrumental 
but intrinsic, once again, his view is that ‘culture is not a voluntary association’,278 but 
a culture has intrinsic value on its own. We can then perhaps assume that he takes 
the view that this means that the state has as one of its ends the protection of this 
kind of intrinsic value, but this raises the question of why the state is to concern itself 
with things which can be thought of as intrinsically valuable, a question we will return 
to in the next chapter.  
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To use Kukathas as a contrast to the other thinkers we have considered until now, 
as while he does propose a system which would allow for a great amount of power to 
cultural groups, he is not a multiculturalist in the same ways as the other thinkers we 
have covered. 
For Kukathas, it is not for the state to ensure or promote any particular group,279 or to 
ensure the autonomy or happiness of the members of society.280 Rather the end of 
society is to make possible the peaceful coexistence amongst groups.281 
If we consider how Kukathas views political community, we will have an easier time 
understanding his views of its ends. He describes the political community as “an 
association who share an understanding of what is public and what is private within 
that polity”282 and also crucially “Membership of such a community is thus not 
constitutive of an individual’s identity because political community is only one of the 
communities to which an individual may belong”283, for Kukathas the political 
community while not unimportant and some might take it to be an important part of 
who they are, for many other communities are of far greater importance to our 
identity. The political community for Kukathas just one of the many different groups 
which people are members of, and we should be careful to not give too much 
prominence to the political group. One reason for this worry is that if we promote the 
political community over other groups, then these other groups will be marginalised, 
and those aspects of our identity will be denigrated.284 A reason for this is that 
Kukathas takes the view that all groups are partial, even the political community, as 
he says ‘Few, if any, communities can constitute an individual’s identity because few, 
if any, individuals are locked in a single community which leaves no room for other 
attachments to which the group is indifferent. In this sense, (almost) all communities 
are partial communities.’285 And that the state should not decide for people which of 
these partial groups they are to prioritise over others. 
The goal for Kukathas is a tolerant society where members can live according to 
their conscience. And the way to achieve this goal is to allow a great amount of 
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freedom for each group, and to let them do as they wish, provided that the members 
of that group consent to them. Resulting in a system which on the one hand could be 
viewed as being very communitarian due to the power and focus given to groups. 
But on the other hand it does this based on consent of individual members for the 
gain of individual members, and is in many way an incredibly individualistic outlook. 
While I see the appeal in the view of the liberal state as one which does not dictate 
for its citizens what ends or even types of ends are acceptable or laudable, but 
rather one which leaves those decisions to the various members of society to make 
for themselves, this view faces two immediate problems which we are going to focus 
on, first, why use conscience as the primary end of society? And second, this would 
seem to encounter a contradiction in its reasoning as it relates to different types of 
groups. On the first point, if we take it as starting point that the state is not 
responsible for its members happiness or autonomy or any other end, then why is 
conscience acceptable when the other ends are not? If the view is that the state is to 
take a hands off approach with minimal interference aiming for toleration, as this is 
the approach which Kukathas believes will be most likely to lead to a society where 
individuals are able to live as their conscience dictates,286 then why is conscience 
specifically better suited as a fundamental principle than any other principle? 
The second point follows from the objection made by Okin and others, that for the 
state to take this hands off approach would underestimate the effects of socialisation 
and the power which groups can exercise over its members.287 And continuing on 
from this line of argument, if the reason for having the state not interfere in the affairs 
of groups is to not determine or influence which types of identity are considered 
important or which views of the good life are promoted, for fear of marginalising or 
putting undue pressure on individuals, why would this type of pressure be acceptable 
from other types of groups such as culture? For Kukathas the state is just another 
group, so if the state is to take a non-interference approach why should not the same 
restriction be placed on cultures or other groups? The reason Kukathas gives groups 
the amount of power is that the groups will allow people to live according to their 
conscience, provided they are free to leave the group if they wish. But this rests on 
an assumption that there will be both, other groups to join after we leave our initial 
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one, and that the other groups would actually be able to help you to live as your 
conscience dictates. This problem could be exacerbated by Kukathas’s view that the 
state is to take no part in ensuring that groups or cultures survive, but is open to the 
possibility that groups will cease to exist as people leave it.288  
This point also encounters the objection, if we allow groups to interfere with 
individuals as long as they consent to be part of the group, why can’t the same be 
true for political groups and the state? On a contractualist approach we could make 
the argument that people have consented to be part of political society and as the 
political group is to be thought of as being the same as the other groups, then why 
wouldn’t the same rules apply here and we could say that the state is free to interfere 
with groups as long as people have consented to be part of society and the state 
leaves emigration as an option. Particularly as Kukathas is explicit in his view that 
costs of exit do not constitute bars to exit. As Kukathas puts it ‘The reply to this 
objection, however, is not to deny that exit can be extremely costly. It is simply to 
acknowledge that exit may, indeed, be costly; but the individual may still be free to 
decide whether or not to bear the cost.’289 A different way of approaching Kukathas 
might be to take the view that the role of the state is not to ensure that people can 
live according to their conscience but rather that the state is not to be in the way of 
people living according to their consciences. And so, the limited role there would be 
left for the state would be to keep the peace between groups and to foster the most 
tolerant society. 
In these examples of approaches to the ends of the state, we can see that some 
authors are quite explicit and clear on what they consider the ends of the state to be, 
with Kukathas being an example, while the multicultural authors required us to work 
out their positions. Another reason for multiculturalism’s lack of attention to the ends 
of the state, is that multiculturalism is not a comprehensive theory, nor is it a 
complete political theory for lack of a better term, it is specific and sectional rather 
than general approach. To elaborate on this, what I mean is that multiculturalism 
tends to focus on a specific set of issues relating to culture, and not on providing 
answers to every question which a theory of justice might be faced with. This it must 
be stressed is not a deficiency or a problem and should not be thought of in that way. 
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Some authors’s work is meant to be read in the context of other works or should be 
thought of adding to a pre-existing theory and develop it further. An example would 
be Kymlicka, whose Liberalism, Community and Culture is written in the context of 
Rawls and Dworkin and demonstrates how their theories would support his view of 
minority rights.290 And some thinkers are addressing situations and issues where it 
would be redundant to write about what society is for and it might be more effective 
to focus on more specific issues rather then begin at the more abstract level of the 
ends of the state. This focus on culture has meant that there has not been a need to 
focus on the ends of the state, as would have been necessary in a more broad 
reaching approach, but rather it has been sufficient to examine the parts of society 
which concerns issues relating to culture, and to consider reasons why the state is to 
concern itself with issues relating to culture. A later chapter is going to develop this 
line further, but in the last portion of this chapter we will consider one of the 
challenges which a multiculturalist approach to the ends of the state will, I suggest 
inevitably, encounter, the problem of internal dissent. 
As we have been using it, internal dissent is when there is disagreement in a culture 
in regard to some issue, with the issues which would be of interest to us in this 
project being those which relate to views of the good life or points on which the 
culture is receiving aid from the state. The difficulty for the state is that there would 
appear to only be unsatisfying answers to how the state is to act in these 
circumstances. The view commonly found in multiculturalism is that cultures deserve 
or require special protections and considerations, the difficulty appears when the 
culture has disagreements on a topic where they are the recipient of these 
considerations. If a minority within the culture dissents from the majority or dominant 
view, then no matter how the state reacts, it would end up undermining some section 
of the culture. This is a problem as one of the goals which we have recognised in 
multiculturalism is to promote and assist cultures. The problem being that if the state 
sides with the majority or dominant section of the culture against the minority, then it 
goes against this goal of multiculturalism, as it is marginalising and undermining a 
cultural minority group. But if it sides with the internal minority against the internal 
                                                             
290 Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community, and Culture 5  
98 
 
majority, it will still be undermining a part of a cultural group, but this time the 
dominant part, again the very opposite of the aim of multiculturalism.  
It is important to remember that cultures are not fixed and immutable, but rather 
change overtime. But this raises the issue of how a culture is going to develop. One 
view is that put forward by Parekh, that the culture will decide for itself, guided by the 
community leaders.291 But the states’s actions, or inaction, in regard to these 
changes will benefit or disadvantage some of the people in the culture. In addition to 
this we have the issues which Okin highlighted, that the view where community 
leaders guide the development, will benefit the most powerful segments of the 
culture, and usually to the detriment of women in the culture,292 which would in a 
sense mirror the criticism which multiculturalism has levied against liberalism, that 
the more powerful section or culture in society marginalises the less powerful 
minority cultures, but it would here be happening in the cultures, rather than society 
at large. 
To make this problem of the state not having any real options clear, it might be 
helpful to consider the possible ways the state could try to act so as not to 
marginalise cultures or parts of cultures, in relation to their views of the good life. To 
avoid the situation where the state would be favouring one part of the culture’s views 
over another part of the culture, the state could take the position that all views of the 
good life are valid and actively affirm them all equally. This approach would have 
unsatisfactory aspects, one of which would be that there is every possibility of some 
of these views of the good life being incompatible with each other, undermining the 
feasibility of the state to support all sides if there is conflict between the views, 
however, this is only a possibility and would not necessarily occur and would depend 
on the actual circumstances of any given society. Another difficulty is 
aforementioned issue of internal dissent. If there is a division within a culture relating 
to how they view the good life, and if the state is to give support to the dominant 
group endorsed by the community leaders, then the minorities in that culture could 
say that they are being undermined and marginalised by the state as it is siding with 
the part of the culture they are dissenting from. But if the state sides with the internal 
minority, the internal majority could say that they are being undermined by the state 
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and that the culture is being unjustifiably interfered with. As said before, whichever 
way the state acts, it will result in it acting against the interest of some culture, which 
is the opposite of what multiculturalism is trying to achieve. The problem remains 
even if the state decides to take no action and try not to take a side, as then the 
internal minority of a culture could argue that the state is by its inaction assisting the 
internal majority, and so even in inaction it would be affecting how a culture 
develops. 
An alternative to validating and supporting all views of the good life would be to 
instead take the view that the state is to take no view of the good life and affirm or 
support none of the possible alternatives. This on this face of it would seem quite 
similar to how we have described the liberal approach to how cultures should be 
treated, with the idea being that the state is to have no view of the good life and 
leave it up to its members to decide for themselves. But one of the differences 
between the view of many multicultural thinkers and those who argue for versions of 
liberal neutrality on the part of the state, is the difference on whether the state is to 
take an active or a passive role in regard to cultures. As we have seen throughout 
this project, part of the multicultural view is that the state is to take an active role in 
the promotion of cultures. Combining this active component of multiculturalism with 
the view that the state is to support no particular view of the good would translate to 
the state actively promoting cultures but taking no position on the substance of the 
culture, or its view of the good life. This would seem quite compatible with Kymlicka’s 
view of culture and multiculturalism, with his focus on the context of choice which a 
culture can provide.293 This would result in the end position where multiculturalism 
must support every view of the good but cannot comment or take a position on any 
of them, so as not to give favour to any specific culture or part of culture. A liberal 
view which also remains uncommitted to any view of the good life and also seeks to 
not favour any culture, by not actively supporting any of them. 
The reason for this dilemma is that it becomes imperative that the state not favour 
some cultures over others, one of the crucial weaknesses identified in liberal 
neutrality is that it is not really equal but favours certain cultures over others, 
Kukathas summarises this point as, ‘…the defenders of the original politics of 
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universal dignity claim to be neutral on this issue, the charge they then meet is that 
their so-called neutral, difference-blind principles, in fact, are hardly neutral at all; 
they are, indeed, reflective of the standards of the dominant culture. In short, the 
politics of difference accuses "liberalism" of being nothing more than another 
instance of the particular masquerading as the universal.294 So any form of 
multiculturalism to avoid falling into the same shortcoming as the liberal neutrality 
view must also adapt some form of principle of neutrality. This means that there is a 
certain overlap in liberalism and multiculturalism in that both require some 
conception of neutrality, with the difference between them being that liberalism 
approaches this negatively and multiculturalism views it positively.  
Part of the reason for this difference can be found in their differing focus, with 
liberalism often focusing on neutrality of justification and multiculturalism on the 
neutrality of outcomes. Multiculturalism highlights that the neutral justifications which 
the liberal outlook favours still have unequal outcomes and result in non-neutral 
effects. This would be quite compatible with Wall’s view that the state is to be 
responsible for the consequences of its actions,295 even if the state acted on neutral 
justifications. The essence of this objection is that, the view where the ideal order is, 
as Dworkin describes it "political decisions must be, so far as is possible, 
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to 
life.”296, this could not be done. Balint’s view is that this is unfeasible but even if it 
would be possible for the state to be neutral, it would not be desirable.297 The 
unfeasibility is in that the state must opt for some action, or inaction, which will 
inevitably favour some groups more than others. As for desirability, the argument is 
that it would be preferable to have a system where everybody is given equal 
recognition and is supported in a positive and active way, rather than the liberal view, 
where no one is given active recognition and is treated in a manner of speaking with 
indifference.298 
Again this speaks to the different views which multiculturalism and liberalism have 
concerning the subject of state neutrality. As Schaller puts it “Most defenders of 
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"liberal neutrality" argue the state ought to be neutral only in the justification of its 
institutions, laws, and policies; they deny that the rationale for neutrality requires 
neutrality of effect.”299 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter sought to establish the necessary background on advocacy and the 
ends of the state in preparation for the later chapters and the conclusion of our 
deliberations on how the state is to treat cultures. The first part of the chapter 
considered the advocacy positions of individualism and communitarianism, and 
second part considered the ends of the state.  
The first half sought to explore the link of advocacy and to see how it combines with 
the other links which we have explored earlier in this project. This was done by first 
establishing as definition of individualism and communitarianism, the essence of 
individualism is the focus on individuals rather than communities and collectives, with 
a predilection for the view that individuals ought not be placed under an authority to 
which they did not consent. We also ascribed it the Kantian view that individuals 
must be viewed as ends in themselves and not merely as means to a culture’s ends. 
That was how individualism approached the individual, while it also approaches 
society as being a system of cooperation for the mutual benefit of the individual 
member of society.  
Communitarianism was defined as being focused on the avoidance of moral chaos 
and the promotion of the common good. The point was a response to the perceived 
lack of common purpose in individualism and puts the moral authority in common 
understanding and shared institutions rather than in individual choice. A further 
contrast with individualism can be seen in that where individualism was described as 
the politics of right, communitarianism was described as a politics of the common 
good.  
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The chapter then proceeded to map the different ways in which the advocacy can be 
combined with the other links which we have examined in this project. We found that 
communitarianism could be combined with both an intrinsic and, depending on how it 
is conceived, an instrumental view of the value. And that communitarianism 
combines with reciprocity depending on how we conceptualise this reciprocity, if this 
reciprocity is directed against the other members of the culture rather than the 
culture itself. But that communitarianism does not combine well with either gratitude 
or consent as the source of obligation towards our culture. And we established that 
individualism can be combined with reciprocity as the source of obligation and an 
instrumental view of the value of culture, with the view that we are repaying our 
fellow members for the effort they have put into the culture which has been for our 
benefit. We also saw that individualism combines well with an instrumental view of 
the value of culture and a consent based view of the source of obligation towards our 
culture, even though this does not correspond to circumstances as we find them in 
reality, in theoretical terms, we can describe it this way. But we also established that 
individualism does not combine well with gratitude as the source of obligation 
towards our culture, nor with consent if it is paired an intrinsic view of the value of 
culture. 
The chapter then goes on to consider the questions of the ends of the state. First it 
sought to clarify what we meant by ends of the state, that it is about what we think 
the state exists for. It contended that the multicultural view of the ends of the state 
has been underexplored and then tried to suggest a few possible multicultural ends 
of the state by examining the authors previously examined in this project as well as 
using Kukathas as a contrast to bring the concept into sharper focus. 
It then considered some of the difficulties for multiculturalism in this context, 
principally the issue of internal dissent. The problem being that if the culture is 
divided on an issue, then no matter which side the state comes down to it will 
alienate one side while supporting another, in direct opposition to what 
multiculturalism seeks to do. The suggested way to try and mitigate this was to either 
take the view that the state is to support all views of the good life, or that the state is 
to take no view of the good life. With both approaches having their weaknesses. 
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The next chapter will focus on contractualism and consider how that approach will 
help us come to a decision on how we are to treat cultures. Before developing our 
own view based on this and the other topics covered in this project in the final 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6. Contractualism 
The preceding chapters leading up to this one has focused on the links of value, 
obligation, ontology and advocacy. This chapter will prepare for the next chapter 
where we will use what we have explored in the earlier chapters and construct our 
answer to the question of how the state is to treat cultures. To do this, this chapter 
will outline and consider some of the features of contractualism. We will focus the 
discussion around the links which we have used in this project. The aim of this 
chapter will be on the one hand to elaborate and establish what contractualism is in 
the context of this project, and on the other hand to demonstrate the benefits of this 
approach in answering how the state is to treat culture, as well as show that 
contractualism is not dependent on an excessively atomistic ontology.  
The first part of the chapter will examine some of the meta-ethical issues relating to 
contractualism by outlining the meta-ethical position of constructivism. The next 
section will sketch out the basic features of contractualism as it relates to our project. 
One prominent feature is the idea that moral permissibility hinges on a contract being 
agreed to by a set of neutral idealised hypothetical deliberators, the idealised 
deliberators as we will refer to them. We will also highlight some of the criticisms of 
contractualism. This will enable us to see some of its potential for this project and 
some of its shortcomings. Then the chapter will consider contractualism in 
conjunction with the links framework we have used in the project. This will further 
outline the potential and drawbacks of contractualism, as well as showing which 
positions on these links are most compatible with contractualism. We will also be 
defending contractualism from the accusation of being excessively atomistic, as well 
as further describing the previously mentioned approach of using both a holistic and 
an atomistic ontology at the same time and the benefits which this can bring to our 
project.  
6.1 Constructivism 
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In the second chapter which focused on the value of culture, we broached the issue 
of moral standing. With contractualism the question would become, why would 
agreeing to something, in the form of a hypothetical contracts, endows moral 
authority. Contractualism takes the view that things are permissible if they would be 
agreed to under suitable circumstances of deliberation.300 This makes a number of 
assumptions which we will consider in this section, one of which is that on this view 
moral facts are only facts if people in the appropriate situation of deliberation would 
agree to those facts. 
Describing an alternative approach helps to explain constructivism by way of 
contrast. On the moral realist view moral truths are ‘..these truths are part of the 
fabric of wholly mind- or judgment-independent reality, waiting ‘out there’ to be 
discovered by us.’301 Or as Street approaches it, the question becomes, are things 
valuable because we find them to be valuable, or are objects valuable independent 
of us and possess value whether we acknowledge it or not.302 In the simplest terms, 
moral realism takes the view that moral facts are like other facts. They are true or 
false regardless of our views on them. If moral realism is true then the idealised 
deliberators in the appropriate situation could not determine if something is true or 
not, they could decide if it was agreeable but not if it is accurate. 
By contrast then, the constructivist method would have moral facts be dependent on 
the view of the idealised deliberators. One element of this which Milo points out, is 
that the idealised deliberators are not deliberating on what the true moral facts are, 
but rather that the facts they chose are true, by virtue of them being the ones which 
would be chosen.303 This is a very different way to approach truth and objectivity. As 
Milo describes it ‘This is to conceive of moral truths as practical truths rather than 
theoretical truths that we are justified in accepting because of the explanatory 
necessity of positing them. Practical truths are truths about what there is reason, for 
some individual or group of individuals, to prefer, choose, or do, from some point of 
view’.304 That is not to say that constructivism represents a complete rejection of 
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objectivity, as Schafer suggests, constructivism like realism believes that there are 
moral facts.305 The difference is how they arrive at those facts. 
Similar to Milo’s description of moral truths as practical, Scanlon also uses a similar 
approach, the question of moral truths is a question of practicality rather than 
metaphysics. Judgement about moral truths would on this view not be a judgment 
about the world, but ‘The point of such judgments is, rather, a practical one: they 
make claims about what we have reason to do.’306 This does not necessarily mean 
that metaphysics and questions of ontology are entirely irrelevant, but that on this 
view that the question of how we can use a moral fact are more important than the 
ontological questions. A similar attitude can be seen in chapter 4, which focused on 
ontology, where I suggested that there is a value in considering not only the accurate 
ontological nature of people, but also the most useful ontological view, depending on 
what we are trying to achieve.  
Continuing this approach we can see with Scanlon ‘In order to show that questions 
of right and wrong have correct answers, it is enough to show that we have good 
grounds for taking certain conclusions that actions are right or are wrong to be 
correct, understood as conclusions about morality, and that we therefore have good 
grounds for giving these conclusions the particular importance that we normally 
attach to moral judgments.’307 Again this demonstrates the focus on the usefulness 
of the moral facts, we are not only interested in the truth of the moral judgements we 
make, but also the persuasiveness and the usefulness of these judgements. 
However, taking this view blurs the line between the meta-ethical and the normative, 
which we will move onto now. 
6.2 Contractualism 
Depending on the word’s context, constructivism, contractarianism, and 
contractualism are used by different writers to signify widely different concepts and 
indeed are sometimes even used as synonyms. In this project I will for simplicity use 
contractarianism and contractualism as synonyms to each other, and will use 
constructivism to refer to the meta-ethical approach we just looked at. The core 
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concept of contractualism, which we will be exploring and expanding upon in this 
section, begins with the idea of asking what idealised deliberators would choose in 
the appropriate setting of deliberation.308 In this section we will sketch the outline of 
contractualism by considering some of its features and some of the critics of it. We 
will consider how the deliberators are envisioned to be mutually disinterested and 
how they should be designed to be as neutral as possible, keeping in mind the 
guiding principle that of people being governed by principles they could reasonably 
agree to. 
There are different contractarian devices used by different authors in service of their 
theories. And while there are differences, there are some core features which we can 
identify. As Vallentyne puts it ‘A contractarian moral theory states that an action 
(practice, social structure, etc.) is morally permissible if and only if it (or rules to 
which if conforms) would be agreed to by the members of society under certain 
circumstances.’309. There are features of this which can be unpacked, starting with 
the idea that it is dependent on the agreement by the members. 
This shows the centrality of some form of consent to the contractualist approaches. 
This is in contrast to, for example, the view we saw in the previous chapters where 
we outlined communitarianism. Where it was shared institutions and understandings 
rather than consent which was the foundation for moral authority.310 On the 
contractarian view we do not accord any special standing to traditional practices or 
shared understandings, unless those are the ones which would be accepted by the 
members of society. Of course, this is not to suggest that people have at some point 
actually assembled to draft a contract for the organisation of society, but it is a 
helpful device for discovering what people would agree to in the appropriate 
circumstance. The last chapter discussed the ends of the state, and the approach of 
contractualism would suit that framework quite readily. As the contractualist account 
is concerned with finding what people would commit themselves to in terms of the 
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foundation of society, we would be able to see what they determine to be the ends of 
the state as it could be seen in the principles which they agree to. 
A second aspect of Vallentyne’s comments is that this is focused on principles which 
would be agreed upon under specific circumstances. While there are many different 
aspects to this which could be unpacked, the aspect we are going to focus on here is 
the assumptions made about the people who are making these decisions, the people 
in the deliberative devices, the ideal deliberators as we are going to refer to them. 
Different authors take different views about the nature of ideal people, for example, 
Rawls’s famous method using the veil of ignorance assumes that people are rational, 
have certain basic level of knowledge about the world and that they are mutually 
disinterested.311 
This point about the idealised deliberators being mutually disinterested is an 
interesting one, as in reality we are, generally speaking, not disinterested in others. 
We are often quite interested in the projects of those close to us and others, but 
there are reasons for taking the view that the idealised deliberators are mutually 
disinterested, even when they might not be so in real life. A reason is that we do not 
know what views a deliberator might actually have, and in designing the situation for 
the deliberators we would not want to model it on specific people with specific views. 
The aim is to find the constraints on conduct and principles which would apply no 
matter what preferences and views which the individuals might happen to have.312 
And further, the assumptions which we make about the idealised deliberators must 
be, as far as possible, such as to not prejudge the outcome of the deliberations 
before they begin. If we make assumptions about the desires and temperaments or 
substantive ends of the deliberators, we would be pre-empting and biasing the 
outcome, this would lead to the procedures losing both its ability to persuade and its 
validity due to how the outcome was partisan. As an example, if we were to design a 
procedure where hypothetical idealised deliberators are to agree the foundations for 
society, and we deliberately ensure that all the deliberators are by design broadly 
speaking liberal, and the outcome of their deliberations resulted in principles which 
are decisively liberal, we have not really proved anything useful. Bias does not need 
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to take this obvious and overt form. It could also take a more indirect and subtle 
form, as an example, the type of ontology which we use when envisioning the 
deliberators could have an impact on the deliberations. This is one of the critiques 
which Taylor makes. In particular, he argues that the atomised view of the individual 
in contractualism of the type seen in Rawls and Kymlicka biases the deliberations in 
favour of specific outcomes.313 This topic of contractualism and atomism will be 
returned to later in the chapter, but in chapter four we made the point that the 
accusation of atomism has often been overstated, and of course if we accept the 
criticism that atomistic ontology biases deliberations in one direction then the 
opposite would also be true, that assuming a holistic ontology would also bias the 
deliberation in another direction. One way to try and counter this objection is to once 
again remember that ontology is not the same as advocacy, as pointed out by 
Abbey, adopting a position on ontology does not commit us to a position on 
advocacy.314 But at the same time there are certain combinations which are more 
logically compatible than others. We will return to these combinations later in the 
chapter and see which positions on these links are most compatible with a 
contractualist framework.  
That is one of the reasons why the conception of the idealised deliberators are to be 
as neutral as we can make them. If we have a procedure which does not depend on 
any substantive normative view or specific preferences on the part of the 
deliberators, then the procedure ought to be able to produce a result which could be 
acceptable to people with different substantive normative views. We will return to this 
issue in the next chapter which outlines a suggestion for a contractualist approach to 
how we are to treat cultures.  
The core of the points which we have seen so far is concerned with the principles 
which we employ are those which people could agree to, potentially making use a 
hypothetical procedure where idealised deliberators are to decide on these 
principles. We also take a view of the truth of the moral judgements which these 
deliberations deliver ought not only be judged in terms of how accurate they are, but 
also how useful they are. As Galvin puts it, contractualism is agnostic about the truth, 
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‘The agnostic view, guided by the need for ethics to be practical, neither asserts nor 
denies the existence of an independent moral order, maintaining that the principles 
and judgements which emerge from the constructive procedure are objective 
whether any independent moral order exists …’.315 
If we take Milo’s suggestion that we do not use contractualism and constructivism to 
find the ‘true’ moral facts, but rather ‘practical truths’, that is, truths which we would 
have reasons for believing.316 This would assist us in getting to Scanlon’s aim of 
principles which nobody could reasonably reject. The reason this aspect of 
contractualism is particularly useful for us in this project, is its relevance in societies 
marked by substantive pluralism and diversity. The assumption of this project is that 
society is marked by a diversity, both in terms of individuals and in terms of cultures. 
In this diversity an outlook based on principles which nobody could reasonably 
reject, or some other contractualist framing which is not based on a substantive view 
of the good, and could so be accepted by a wide variety of peoples, would be of use 
, as it would allow it to be agreed to even when there is disagreement on many 
substantive issues. If we instead take a different perspective and decide that the 
ends of the state should be based around a particular conception of the good or the 
advancement of a particular virtue, then society will favour those cultures who are 
more compatible with those particular aims. A comparable goal can be seen in 
Kukathas’s view that the state is to be a minimal one and one of its chief priorities 
keeping the peace between the groups.317 While the aim has some similarities it has 
significant differences, one being that the contractualist view of the state would be 
one based on the outcome of the deliberations, while for Kukathas it is based on a 
complete theory of justice. Further this also assumes that the idealised deliberators 
desire a pluralist society containing within it a multitude of cultures, rather than an 
explicitly and actively assimilationist society dedicated to a particular conception of 
the good, a topic we will return to later in the next chapter. 
The aim of this section was to outline some features and criticisms of contractualism. 
Of course, there are different forms of contractualism with different ideas of how the 
idealised deliberators are to operate, but the aim in this section was not to highlight 
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and examine all possible versions but to highlight some features of what 
contractualism aims to do.  
The core precept which was highlighted in the beginning of the section was that the 
principles adopted should be those which people could be said to consent to, with 
the device of idealised deliberators choosing the principles to be adopted. We also 
highlighted how contractualism seeks to define the idealised deliberators and their 
setting in such a way as to not bias the outcome of the deliberations before they had 
begun. The benefit of this view was that it could aim for universality and towards 
principles which would be acceptable for different sections of society. 
In the next section we are going to examine how contractualism works with the links 
we have examined in this project, that being the value of culture, the source of our 
obligation to our culture, ontology and advocacy. This will allow us to further see the 
shape and form of contractualism by considering how it interacts with these links, as 
well as highlighting some of the difficulties and issues which a contractualist outlook 
will help us to mitigate, while also showing us which positions on the links are difficult 
to occupy if we make use of a contractualist framework. This will help us in the next 
chapter when we will be constructing our answer to how the state is to treat culture, 
by outlining how the links interact with contractualism, we can see what assumptions 
most easily lends themselves to contractualism.  
6.3 The Links 
 
The difference in considering contractualism in conjunction with the different links 
which this project has already covered ought to be highlighted at the outset. 
Contractualism is an approach for arriving at normative positions, whereas the links 
we have examined in this project are the constituent parts of a normative position. 
However, as Scanlon pointed out, the underlying assumptions we have going into 
our deliberations effect what we get out of the deliberations.318 In this section we will 
consider how these different assumptions and position on the links combine with 
contractualism, this will allow us to further outline the features of the contractualist 
outlook, while also seeing which assumptions sits ill with contractualism and in 
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certain cases see if they would be positions chosen under idealised deliberative 
circumstances. This will also allow us to see how contractualism can help us to solve 
some of the difficulties which we have encountered in this project and prepares us 
for the next chapter where we will construct a contractualist answer to how the state 
is to treat cultures. 
Beginning with the link of what type of value a culture can possess will help to 
demonstrate some of the challenges in combining these links with contractualism, 
specifically the intrinsic view of the value of culture. 
The first position on the link of which value a culture can have is that cultures have 
instrumental value. This position is quite easy to combine with a contractual 
approach to culture. On this position, we could imagine for example that the 
idealised deliberators would take the view that culture and the access to culture 
should be treated as a primary good, as Kymlicka suggest they should.319 There 
would be no incongruity or difficulty of combining this position with an instrumental 
view of the value of culture as this could mean that the view is that the benefits which 
the culture brings, are such that the idealised deliberators would want these benefits 
and the culture is the instrument to receiving them. This shows that the 
instrumentalist view of the value of culture can be made to work with contractualism. 
The other position which we can take on the view of the value of culture is that it has 
intrinsic value. On the face of it, it would seem as though this position sits ill with 
contractarianism. As was mentioned in the chapter on the source of obligation 
towards our culture where the intrinsic view was combined with consent as the basis 
for our obligation towards our culture, if it is our consent which gives culture its value 
then it is not intrinsically valuable but rather it is our act of consenting which confers 
the value. Part of the solution, as was suggested back in the chapter on the value of 
culture, is that contractualism could be used to solve this difficulty of how intrinsically 
valuable objects gain their value. One of the suggestions in that chapter, was that we 
take the view that the idealised deliberators decide on a set of principles or a system. 
This system would contain as part of it the stipulation that the intrinsic value of 
culture would entail specific obligation towards the culture. 
                                                             
319 Kymlicka, Will. Liberalism, Community and Culture. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 165 
113 
 
There would, however, still be a difficulty with this approach, if the idealised 
deliberators decided on this system, it would still not explain where the intrinsic value 
originates from. If it is the deliberators who chose that cultures have intrinsic value, 
then the value is not truly intrinsic but contingent. But if we take the view that the 
deliberators would chose a system which contains within it the view of cultures as 
being intrinsically valuable, then where does this value come from? In addition, if the 
idealised deliberators are faced with cultures which are viewed to be intrinsically 
valuable pre-deliberation, that is that cultures are not thought to be dependent on the 
views of the deliberators to have value, then they could decide that this pre-
deliberational value does not command any specific obligation or notice, in effect 
rendering this value useless. This would leave us with the conclusion, that the view 
of the intrinsic value of culture would be incompatible with a contractarian outlook, or 
to try and address this difficulty. The second option is well worth exploring, 
particularly as the problem of where objects of intrinsic value would gain their value 
from is one which is not limited to its being used together with contractualism, but is 
a difficulty in any setting. In the second chapter concerning the value of culture, it 
was suggested that a contractualist approach could be used to try and mitigate this 
issue. The idea was to take the view that those objects which an idealised 
deliberator agree to label as intrinsically valuable, would therefore be intrinsically 
valuable. This would have some similarities to Raz’s concept of conventional value, 
where those objects which people typically value, are those objects which are to be 
considered valuable.320 One difference between the two is that conventional value 
refers to objects which actual people find to be valuable, whilst this other view would 
depend on idealised deliberators. But they both would encounter the problem which 
we have already highlighted, that this would be contingent on the deliberators choice 
and so not truly intrinsic. There are I would suggest, two ways to solve this. One 
would be to consider the perspective of the members of society which live with the 
decisions which the idealised deliberators construct, the other is to consider the 
meta-ethical position of constructivism and use that to redefine what we mean with 
intrinsically valuable. 
The first of these two approaches would be to take the view of the people in the 
society created by the idealised deliberators. This would entail expanding on the type 
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of thought experiment often used with contractualism. We could, for example use 
Rawls and the original position as an example, while of course no one would actually 
be able to make use of a veil of ignorance to choose the Constitutional essentials of 
society. But if we play this experiment out and assume that society were to be 
structured as the idealised deliberators had imagined, how would objects of intrinsic 
value appear to the people in that society? If we imagine that the idealised 
deliberators take the view that cultures were intrinsically valuable, for someone in the 
society constructed according to that principle, the culture would appear to them as 
though it had intrinsic value. With this view we could use the contractualist device to 
suggest one solution as to how to imbue objects with intrinsic value, but it would 
have meant that we would have redefined it into a form of hypothetical intrinsic 
value. The other way of approaching this is to follow Milo’s view of constructivism 
which as we saw earlier, where a constructivist statement was true not because it 
was what was chosen by the idealised deliberators, but because it is what they 
would have chosen. It is not the act of choosing the principles which would make 
them true, it is the fact that they are the ones which would have been chosen, or in 
our case, the objects which would have intrinsic value.321  
For the link of the value of culture, then, the instrumental view is entirely compatible 
with contractualism, and indeed has been used, for example by Kymlicka to argue 
for special rights for cultures.322 But the intrinsic view of the value of culture requires 
more work to be made compatible with contractualism, as we saw. This is due to the 
nature of the intrinsic view of the value of culture not being based on people 
consenting to objects possessing value, However, as we have seen, contractualism 
does present us with a possible way to solve the problem of how to imbue objects of 
intrinsic value, but it would require us to change how we think about objects of 
intrinsic value.  
The next link was that of the potential source of our obligation towards our culture. 
The possibilities outlined were obligations based on gratitude, reciprocity and on 
consent. These different views on the source of our obligation presents a much 
smaller difficulty than did intrinsic value in the last link. Beginning this link with 
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gratitude as the source of our obligation towards our culture in conjunction with 
contractualism.  
Contractualism and gratitude can be made compatible with each other, depending 
on how we view gratitude. It would be entirely possible for the idealised deliberators 
to take the view that we would be obligated to act in a particular way towards our 
culture, that is not to say that this is necessarily what an idealised deliberator would 
agree to, but it is not incoherent to suppose that they would. As was highlighted in 
the chapter on the source of our obligation, when we use gratitude in this manner, 
we are using the word in two different ways at the same time. That is, we are 
obligated to act in a certain manner, because we feel grateful. And we are also 
obligated to feel grateful. With gratitude the idea was that as our culture has done a 
lot for us, we have an obligation to adopt a positive emotional attitude towards it, 
otherwise we are falling to live up our obligations. Here again contractualism can 
help us with one of the links, as the combination of gratitude as the source of our 
obligation towards our culture and contractualism gives us a way to anchor our 
reason for why failing to feel grateful would be to fail to live up to our obligations. The 
reason being that the idealised deliberators decided that we are obligated to feel 
gratitude towards our culture. Of course, this does not only apply to culture but could 
be applied more broadly,323 but it shows how contractualism can help us with how 
the links interact with culture, which is the concern for us in this project. 
The second position on this link was that of reciprocity as the source of obligation 
towards our culture. Which can also be readily combined with contractualism, as it is 
not impossible, nor would it be incoherent for the idealised deliberators to chose a 
system which would entail as part of it that we are to pay back to our culture for what 
it has given us. Unlike with gratitude it does not obligate us to have any particular 
feelings towards our culture, but would require us not to free ride on our culture. It is 
quite possible to imagine that the idealised deliberators would come to the position 
that as our culture is valuable, or as some have argued essential, for individuals to 
have access to, and as the maintenance of our culture is something which could take 
up resources, be it money or time or energy, then we would owe it to our benefactor 
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to payback for the benefits and resources which we have received by doing our part 
or carrying our share of the burden. 
Contractualism can also help to alleviate a difficulty which many have tried to 
remedy, that of how we can have special or particular obligations to fellow members 
of our society, in our case, our culture.324 In simple terms, why would we have 
special obligations to the other members of our community, which we do not have to 
those outside the community. Why would compatriots have better claims on us than 
strangers? One way to solve this problem is to frame it in a contractarian way, where 
the solution would be that the idealised deliberators would chose a system where we 
have to pay back for what we have gained, and our community would be one of the 
parties to be paid back to. Or simply, if we remember the point made in our look at 
advocacy, where it was suggested that our society could be viewed as a scheme for 
mutual benefit, we could argue that a deliberator would agree to be part of this 
scheme, and it would entail special obligations to the others also in that scheme. 
The final sources of obligation in this project is that of consent. Consent is 
compatible with our form of contractualism in two senses. One is to treat the choice 
of the idealised deliberators as constituting consent to have an obligation towards 
our culture, and a different way is to take the view that the deliberators would decide 
that we would only have the obligation which we have specifically agreed to. The first 
of these two options is relatively simple. If the view is that we should only have the 
obligations that are the results of our agreeing to them, and contractualism as we 
understand it centres around the moral principles which we live according to are 
those which suitably idealised people would agree to. Then if the hypothetical 
agreement made by the idealised deliberators could constitute consent, then we 
could say that obligations arising from the hypothetical agreement by the idealised 
deliberators constitute consent for those obligations. In the chapter addressing our 
obligation towards our culture, it was suggested that we could consent to a system 
which, as part of it would contain obligations towards our culture, and the 
hypothetical agreement could fill this role. This could also be part of a system of 
balancing the needs of the culture and the needs of the members of the culture. 
When considering if we have a specific obligation towards our culture, we could think 
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of whether an idealised deliberator would agree to a system which would have this 
particular obligation as part of it, with the result that it would be likely that obligations 
which were too onerous and placed undue burdens on individuals were to be 
rejected.  
The other way to approach this was to say that consent to obligations towards our 
culture did not rest on a hypothetical agreement by idealised deliberators, but rather 
consent would be found in our actual choices, Steinberger describes this as where 
obligations are those things which we deliberately agree to.325 This might involve 
obtaining obligation upon receiving benefits, or some other way if defining our 
agreeing to incur obligation towards our culture. But for our purposes, the most 
important point is that this would not be incoherent or an impossible combination with 
contractualism. The deliberator could decide on a system where we would be 
required to consent to incur obligation towards his or her culture. The difference 
between these two approaches to consent would be in what qualifies as consent, on 
one view it is enough that the idealised deliberators agree to it, and in the other it 
must be the specific individuals themselves who agree to it.  
The next link is that of ontology, which was divided into atomism and holism. On the 
atomist view, people are viewed as isolated atoms, and on the holistic view people 
are thought to require a social context.326 The accusation has been that the 
contractarian view is inherently far too atomistic and ignores the realities which 
people find themselves in.327 One of the examples of this would be the accusation 
that the idealised deliberators as presented by Rawls are abstractions without 
histories or personal ties.328 This, as we have pointed out earlier, is something of an 
oversimplification, but it is compatible with contractualism. The difficulty would be if it 
were to turn out that contractualism requires some form of atomism and if we decide 
that atomism is an untenable ontological position, the question then is, can we 
combine a holist ontology together with a contractualist framework? Contrary to what 
one might naturally assume, I suggest that contractualism is compatible with holism, 
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and I also suggest that we can make use of the process suggested in the chapter on 
ontology, that of doing the link of ontology twice. 
As an example of the charge of atomism, we can look at the criticism that Rawls’s 
contractualist thought experiment, which is accused of being too atomistic and treats 
the idealised deliberators as isolated atoms.329 But as we shall see this is not really 
an accurate description of Rawls’s contractualism, which will help us to see how 
contractualism could be made compatible with a holist ontology. In a sense, the 
criticism that the original position is too atomistic is countered by a different criticism 
or shortfall of this perspective. This would be the issue that Okin highlighted, that by 
making the idealised deliberators in the original position heads of the family, and as 
the head of the family is often assumed to be male, it will help to disadvantage 
women.330 Further, by assuming that the family is a just institution, the Rawlsian 
thought experiment helps to hide the injustices in the family.331 These are points 
which Rawls acknowledged and changed in his later writing.332 However, this 
assumption does show that this view of the idealised deliberator is not a completely 
isolated atom, but is very much compatible with a type of social context, particularly 
that of the family. That is, it shows that there is nothing inherent in the contractualist 
position which prohibits acknowledging that people are creatures which are found in 
a social setting. Another example would be Scanlon’s form of contractualism, which 
eschews the device of the original position and instead formulates the aim of 
contractualism as ‘…foremost is the aim of finding principles that others who share 
this aim could not reasonably reject.’333 Built into this aim is an acknowledgement not 
only about the processes of others but also the importance and standing of others. 
Scanlon takes the view that we all wish for our reasons to be accepted by others and 
to be validated by them, and indeed we need to take others’ reasons into 
consideration for them not to reject our reasons. 
When we think of those to whom justification is owed, we generally think first of the 
specific individuals who are affected by specific actions. But when we are deciding 
whether a given principle is one that could reasonably be rejected we must take a 
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broader and more abstract perspective.334 Further to this, we can see that the role 
which Scanlon gives to reasonableness, means that it must take others into account, 
as he puts it ‘Given this aim, for example, it would be unreasonable to give the 
interests of others no weight in deciding which principles to accept. For why should 
they accept principles arrived at in this way? This then leads to further, more 
complicated questions about how, more exactly, we can be asked to “take others’ 
interests into account” in various situations.’335 What these points aim to demonstrate 
is that, far from being a method which relies on atoms making decisions in isolation 
thinking only about themselves, it is in fact a method which has concern for the views 
of others built into its very core. Reasoning and deliberation requires us to make our 
views mutually responsive. In short, Scanlon assumes that we will want to consider 
the positions and views of others, we will return to some of these points in the later 
section about the possible combinations of contractualism and advocacy. 
Even Rawls’s theory is not as atomistic as it has at times been claimed. As we saw 
with Scanlon, we can also see that Rawls does not consider people to actually be 
atomistic, but as being part of a social context, as he says when correcting the view 
that his conception requires that people be disinterested egoists ‘For the fact that in 
the original position the parties are characterized as mutually disinterested does not 
entail that persons in ordinary life, or in a well-ordered society, who hold the 
principles that would be agreed to are similarly disinterested in one another. Clearly 
the two principles of justice and the principles of obligation and natural duty require 
us to consider the rights and claims of others.’336 This description demonstrates that 
the people in the original position are disinterested in others not because they 
egotistically do not care about them, but rather the reverse, it is to approximate the 
effect of benevolence.337 As he says ‘For this combination of conditions forces each 
person in the original position to take the good of others into account.’338 In effect this 
means that while the person in the original position might appear to be an isolated 
and ahistorical entity, as Schwarzenbach thinks it is,339 the design is such that the 
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deliberator in the original position must consider others in the social context which 
they are choosing principles for. 
The point of this consideration of the ontological positions compatible with Rawls’s 
and Scanlon’s contractualism, is to show that they are not in their ontology assuming 
atomistic and isolated individuals. But rather creatures who take others into account. 
In the case of Rawls, where initially seen as being heads of families, necessitating a 
social context, as well as the designing of the original position being such that it 
forces the deliberator to take others and their projects into consideration. And with 
Scanlon the presence of others is constant, and the choice of deliberative device can 
almost be described as a social activity as it forces the individual to frame their 
argument in forms which others can accept, or at least not reasonably reject.  
The next and final link which we have covered in this project is that of advocacy, and 
we will now see how that combines with contractualism. The two perspectives on 
advocacy were communitarianism and individualism. As has been mentioned before, 
contractualism has been accused of being atomistic and individualistic.340 In earlier 
sections we have established that contractualism is not necessarily atomistic and in 
this section we will see how it combines with individualism, before sketching out how 
contractualism could be compatible with communitarianism. 
On the face of it, the individualistic position on advocacy fits quite well with 
contractualism. The basic concept of contractualism as we have seen is in what 
individual idealised deliberators would choose in the appropriate setting. As we have 
seen, some such as Sandel have accused this of encouraging selfishness.341 As 
Sandel also thought, that it cannot properly account for communal goods, as it is 
focused on what the individual would choose.342 As we saw in the section on 
ontology, this is something of a simplification which misses some of the dimensions 
of contractualism, we will explore this further when we examine communitarianism. 
But contractarianism does tend to make use of individuals as the idealised 
deliberators, and thanks to this approach it becomes quite compatible with the 
individualist view of advocacy. As we said in the chapter on advocacy, some of the 
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defining traits of individualism are a focus on individual rights, that individuals should 
not be made subjects of hierarchies to which they do not consent,343 and the view 
that individuals are to be thought of as ends in themselves.344 These are all positions 
which are quite compatible with a contractualist framework, there is nothing amongst 
these which would be impossible or incoherent for an idealised deliberator to agree 
to. And even stronger, an individual idealised deliberator is unlikely to opt for a 
scheme of rights which does not treat them as ends in themselves or place them 
under arbitrary hierarchies. The next chapter, where we will construct a contractualist 
answer to how the state is to treat cultures, will go further into the specifics of what 
an idealised deliberator could agree to in the context of how the state is to treat 
cultures. 
This section is going to show that communitarianism is compatible with 
contractualism and that contractualism does not require an individualist position on 
advocacy. While we did this earlier with the ontological position of holism, to 
demonstrate that it was compatible with contractualism, there is a difference 
between these two in how much work is needed to make them compatible. There are 
a number of points which would indicate that communitarianism is entirely 
compatible with contractualism. To show why we will again consider some of the 
facets of Scanlon’s and Rawls’s work and show how they lend themselves to 
compatibility with communitarianism as well as more general points.  
As we saw with Scanlon in the last section, the role played by others is a key one, 
not only in that it shows that Scanlon does not imagine our deliberators as isolated 
atoms, but also that there is a possibility for communitarian elements and 
conclusions arising out of those deliberations. The aim for Scanlon was that the 
principles decided upon were those which others could not reasonably reject. We 
can see this with his view that ‘we have reason to consider whether there are 
standpoints other than our own present standpoint from which the principles we are 
considering could reasonably be rejected.’ And also “Others” figure twice in this 
schema: as those to whom justification is owed, and as those who might or might not 
be able reasonably to reject certain principles.’345 This shows that Scanlon does 
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imagine that his idealised deliberators are conscious of their social context. If we 
were to take the view that communitarianism is the position on advocacy which best 
served people, we could then argue that the communitarian advocacy position is the 
only one which the other idealised deliberators would not reject. Although that is not 
an avenue which we will pursue in this project, it is merely to point out that this could 
be a way to arrive at a communitarian advocacy position with the use of 
contractualism. 
If we remember the qualities we assigned communitarianism in the last chapter, 
amongst the attributes we ascribed it was a desire to avoid moral chaos, a view of 
communal connections as valuable in themselves, and a focus on the common 
good.346 The position that communal ties are valuable is quite readily compatible with 
contractarianism as we have used it. It would seem to be possible to combine this 
view of advocacy and contractarianism as we have used it in this chapter. On the 
Scanlonian approach for example, where the idealised deliberators are not only 
being used to establish basic political principles but moral principles in general,347 it 
is not impossible that the deliberators would take the view that communal ties which 
we have are goods in themselves. If we remember the earlier discussion on the 
difficulty of where objects of intrinsic value gain their value, one of the suggested 
solutions was that we use a contractualist device to imbue objects with value. Then 
the combination of these two would make it easy to see how the contractualist and 
communitarian position could be made to work together. In other words, the 
suggestion was that if those objects which people could agree to as being 
intrinsically valuable were to be the ones to be considered intrinsically valuable, if our 
cultures would be considered to be intrinsically valuable by the people who make up 
the cultures, then they would in effect be of intrinsic value. If the idealised 
deliberators were faced with the situation where people found their cultures to be of 
intrinsic value, then it is not impossible that they would take the view that communal 
ties being viewed as being intrinsically valuable would be a position which could not 
be reasonably rejected. As well as being capable of determining that cultures should 
be thought of as being intrinsically valuable, the same process could lead to the 
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deliberators to decide that the focus ought to be on the common good, though it 
does raise more issues than does the issue of the value of the culture. 
It would not be impossible to argue that the idealised deliberators could take the view 
that the common good is to have considerable standing, and that this would be a 
view that this on its own could not be reasonably rejected. The difficulty appears 
when the possibility of a clash between the common good and the good of the 
individual good is considered, a familiar issue in discussions between individualist 
and communitarian takes on advocacy. As the ideal deliberator would be unlikely to 
take the view that their own good could be overruled by the common good, or even if 
some did, others could reasonably reject this position. This does not necessarily 
mean that communitarianism and contractualism are entirely incompatible with each 
other, as the advocacy positions are best thought of not as absolutes, but rather like 
a spectrum. Our choice is not between two caricatures, on the one side, the solitary 
individual that exists unencumbered by, and oblivious to, the existence of others. On 
the other side a view where the individual’s needs and wishes are completely 
subsumed by the collective and they merely the present a vessel for our cultures 
propagation with little interest in their wellbeing whatsoever. The question would 
rather be, where should the balance be, how much could the community demand or 
expect from its members? With this outlook it should not be impossible to envision a 
contractarian communitarianism. If we consider Kymlicka and use elements of his 
theory, we can see a starting point of how this could be done. As we saw with 
Kymlicka, he suggested that we should add access to our community to our list of 
primary goods.348 While Kymlicka is quite clear on the relationship between 
individual and community and the potential for conflict between the two, in that he 
sets up the prohibition on internal restrictions, it does show the that there is room for 
a contractual view which does have room for community. While the balance with 
Kymlicka rests more on the side of the individual than it does on the side of the 
culture, someone could argue that as the culture is essential for the individual, 
putting the individual in a position where they are to make sacrifices for their culture 
would be coherent, as then the argument could be that the sacrifices would still be 
worth it compared to the damage of losing the culture, and so, could argue that the 
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ideal deliberator would make some sacrifices in order to ensure that their culture 
would survive. 
The bigger challenge for the combination of communitarianism and contractualism is 
the position that it is in shared understandings, and not in choice, where moral 
authority rests. But of course, these were not ironclad exhaustive definitions of 
individualism and communitarianism but rather outlines to help guide our 
discussions.  
The difficulty with this issue is that on the communitarian view, the choices of 
idealised deliberators does not provide moral authority, as rather this is to be found 
in shared institutions and understanding. This objection would encounter the problem 
we mentioned before, exemplified by Mill’s view that first principles admit no 
evidence.349 As, if we take this position that it is shared institutions and shared 
understandings which grant moral authority, as we saw in Thigpen and Downing, 
then the question becomes how intrinsic objects become valuable, how do shared 
institutions gain the competency to confer moral authority? One view we could adopt 
is that without widely shared substantive moral ends, the result would necessarily be 
moral chaos where principles are in effect arbitrary and only represent the 
preferences of those professing them.350 But the same problem would present itself 
with a widely shared view of substantive ends, as the same critique could be made, 
with the modification that principles simply turn on the preferences of the most 
numerous in society. 
Similar to the situation with intrinsic value, we could use a constructivist methodology 
to solve this problem. We could say the shared institutions which people believe 
have the ability to provide moral authority, have this authority. The fact that people 
give these institutions authority is the act of consenting to them and so they would 
have the moral authority ascribed to them. An objection to this from someone who 
did believe that it is the institutions and understanding and not choice which creates 
moral authority, could be that we are here using choice and consent to justify a 
system built around rejection of choice and consent as the basis for moral authority, 
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such as perhaps Simons description of communitarianism which rejects liberalism as 
it relies on choice rather than authority and certainty.351 
A variant of this could be the Rawlsian form of contractualism rather than Scanlon’s, 
in that Scanlon has a much broader range of application than does the Rawlsian 
form, as Scanlon’s contractualism is meant for a variety of moral principles.352 While 
Rawls restricts his theory to the basic institutions, it is not meant to cover every 
general moral issue.353 If we take Rawls’s device, we could take the position that the 
idealised deliberators would choose a system which in part supports the view that 
moral authority should be vested in shared institutions and understanding and not in 
further acts of consent. We encounter the same potential objection as we saw in the 
last section, that this ultimately still places consent at the root of moral authority, 
even though it is later placed in institutions. Though it might not be entirely what 
some communitarians would have wanted, we can use the contractarian device to 
solve the problem of how and why shared understandings would have moral 
authority, as they were what would be chosen by the idealised deliberators.  
These considerations present a challenge to a combination of contractarianism and 
communitarianism, but with the suggested modifications from above, it would, I think, 
be possible to combine the two. This might not be the preferred interpretation for a 
communitarian, but it would be a possible approach to take which would help to 
solve some of the issues which we found with the communitarian view of the 
importance of shared understanding. 
This section aimed at demonstrating that contractualism and communitarianism are 
compatible and that contractualism is not reliant on an individualist advocacy. Part of 
this entailed examining the role of others in Scanlon’s form of contractualism, and 
showing that contractualism could be used to arrive at a communitarian outcome. 
We highlighted how one of the most difficult areas for the combination of 
contractualism and communitarianism was in the communitarian position that moral 
authority rests in shared institutions rather than consent, we also considered how 
contractualism could be used to solve the issue of how the shared institutions gain 
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the competency to bestow this moral authority. The next section considers the idea 
of doing the link of ontology twice. 
6.4 Ontology twice 
Returning to the earlier suggested method of doing ontology twice, this is an 
approach which would be suited to the contractualist framework which we have been 
considering. The impetus for this can be seen in critiques and comments such as 
that by Walzer, where he takes the view that individual rights were ‘a bad sociology. 
They do not provide either a rich or a realistic understanding of social cohesion; nor 
do they make sense of the lives individuals actually live, and the rights they actually 
enjoy, within the framework of on-going institutions.’354 The essence of complaints 
like this is that the individualist perspective does not match with reality as we find it, 
people are not individualistic, but require a social context.355 This echoes the 
comments we found in the chapter on ontology, where the objection was that 
atomism as often presented is untenable.356 One way to address this problem would 
be to again stress the distinction between ontology and advocacy, that the 
sustainability of atomism does not necessarily impact the sustainability of 
individualism, that as we have said, while positions on one can limit positions on the 
other, one does not determine the other.357 This tactic of separating ontology and 
advocacy can be seen for example in Rawls’s claim that the behaviour and attitudes 
of the people in the original position do not behave the same as they do in society in 
general.358 The people in society in general do not have to be mutually disinterested 
or similar as the people under the vail of ignorance were, as we saw earlier. An 
alternative would be to consider ontology not only to describe how things are, but 
also take into account how we want to make use of the link of ontology. On this view, 
we are not only considering how things actually are, we would for example have 
great difficulty finding any idealised deliberators, but we might be able to make better 
use of the link of ontology if we make use of both a holistic and an atomistic 
approach. 
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As was said in the chapter on ontology, we would first adopt a holistic approach to 
ontology, as that would be how we find reality to be, or at least the people we would 
be concerned with, and then we consider what type of ontology would be most useful 
to us. If we accept the earlier point about individualism being bad sociology, then the 
response would be that this is not endeavouring to be sociology at all, good or bad. 
While we do need to, to an extent, acknowledge reality, if only to ensure that we do 
not make impossible demands on ourselves, we might want to consider the benefits 
we could gain if we could make use of an atomist ontology. As an example, if we 
consider the charge made against Rawls’s conception of the person, where it was 
accused of being excessively atomistic and treating people as a historical entity 
devoid of connections.359 While, as was pointed out earlier, this is something of a 
mischaracterisation of Rawls’s position, but an alternative tactic would be to take the 
position that if the tool which Rawls is trying to use is reliant on a questionable view 
of ontology, then we can either abandon that tool, as the critics suggest, or change 
our approach to ontology. If we take the view that at first, we acknowledge that in 
reality, people need their social context, we can then move on to consider the 
hypothetical ontology, with the aim of the tool is to find what the idealised deliberator 
would choose. Then using the ontology which would allow us to construct this 
idealised deliberator can help us achieve this goal, as the idealised deliberator is not 
a real person, the sociology around them is not that important, as it is not describing 
a real person.  
This way of approaching ontology and advocacy does arguably blur the line between 
advocacy and ontology which has been stressed repeatedly. As here we are in effect 
treating ontology as an extension of advocacy, this as we are looking at what type of 
advocacy we are interested in constructing and then based on that modify the 
approach to ontology by using both of the possible positions but for different 
purposes. In this project, it allows us to develop an alternative way for how to view 
ontology. Using the critique of Rawls mentioned earlier, if we accept the position that 
his outlook is too atomistic to be acceptable in reality, although that is not strictly an 
accurate characterisation. On this model we would first assume that people are 
holistic, but if the idealised deliberator is unreal in its isolation, then that is still 
acceptable as we are not after what real people would have chosen but the idealised 
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person. And if that involves the treating them atomistically then that would be 
acceptable if we found that the aim of finding the principles of justice which idealised 
deliberators would choose to be a worthwhile one. We can also benefit from this 
method in using a communitarian view of advocacy together with contractualism.  
Consideration of some of Sandel’s criticisms of Rawls will allow us to further see the 
benefit of utilising both forms of ontology. One of Sandel’s critiques of Rawls is that 
the Rawlsian subject is necessarily an individual stood apart from its ends, ‘But a self 
so thoroughly independent as this rules out any conception of the good (or of the 
bad) bound up with possession in the constitutive sense. It rules out the possibility of 
any attachment (or obsession) able to reach beyond our value and sentiments to 
engage our identity itself.’360 The view is that the subject as Rawls describe it, cannot 
engage with its ends which are not chosen, and so cannot engage with ends which 
are discovered or make up part of the person’s identity.  
While the contractarian account together with this method of doing ontology twice 
does not necessarily help to solve this problem, if we were to think of this as a 
problem. Part of the reasoning for this can be found in the before mentioned aim to 
not base the view of the person on strong assumptions.361 If we assume that a 
person will be constituted by a particular end we will be forced to take particular ends 
and people into account rather than the idealised persons we have been using. What 
the method talked about in this section would allow for this to be considered by the 
idealised deliberators. As this project is concerned about how the state should treat 
cultures, and adapting the objections brought by those such as Sandel into our 
framework, this would be to suggest that if the state were to be operating according 
to an individualistic view of advocacy, it would not be biased against those 
conceptions of the good which are constituent parts of our identity, such as our 
culture, for the benefit of those types of ends which are not central to our self-view 
and could be described as chosen. What this method would do is allow us to, while 
supposedly treating the individual as an atomised individual distinct from their ends, 
the idealised deliberator would also be aware of the other way of approaching 
ontology as both are being used, they could choose principles which would be such 
as to allow the state to aid in the pursuits of culture and so address this issue. The 
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objection is that the ontology does not reflect the reality of individuals and so misses 
what the real individuals would find valuable, i.e. their culture. But by considering 
both the forms of ontology an idealised deliberator could take into account what an 
ontologically holistic person would require.  
A point we saw earlier from Sandel, was that of the true community, or community as 
a site where justice is not the main virtue, but other virtues are in play, and we 
pointed to Okin’s criticism about the potential for injustice in the family. But again, 
this method could be useful if suitably applied in trying to mitigate the potential for 
abuse. If we take the aim of the objection which we have used Sandel to exemplify to 
be that the community is to be understood as the site in which rights are not only not 
needed but might actually be a hindrance and lead to a individualising and isolating 
society.362 The way to approach this would be, as in our earlier suggestions, to 
consider the individual both as a part of a holistic whole and as isolated individual. 
What we ask ourselves is, on the one hand, what would a person who is viewed as 
being constituted, in part by their community, as for example Sandel suggested 
agree to?363 And secondly, what would a person viewed atomistically agree to? In 
this situation where benevolence and fraternity are what some have suggested are 
the primary virtues for a community could find a lot of sympathy with someone who 
takes the view that they require their community in order to have their identity be 
complete. But by also having the perspective of what the isolated individual could 
agree to, we can see that they would not want to be put into the situation where their 
desires are made secondary or through a process of socialisation are made to 
believe that the view of the community is the one they must adopt, and so would not 
want to have a situation where we do not consider the community or similar units to 
be beyond the scope of justice and would insist on individual rights. Further, we have 
Caney’s point, that individual rights are not a hindrance to the communal feeling 
which those such as Sandel wishes to attribute to communities and families.364 The 
individual rights might take the form of oppositional rights, that is rights which we 
have against other people and other groups, and so in a sense puts us in conflict 
with those against whom we have these rights. 365 But having these rights does not 
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mean that we necessarily will exercise or make use of these rights.366 The true 
community of the kind which Sandel describes would still be possible, assuming that 
the members did indeed have an attitude of benevolence towards it and identified 
with it, but it would have a safeguard against abuses, and so could arguably be said 
to be the stronger for it, that the members could exercise their rights against the 
community but decide not to, demonstrating their connection to the community. This 
shows one way in which this approach could be used to have a combination of 
contractarianism and communitarianism. 
This section sought to sketch out further what I meant by doing the ontological step 
twice, once holistically and then atomistically. This gives us the benefit of allowing us 
to acknowledge reality as people experience it, as well as allowing us to consider 
what an idealised isolated individual would want. This approach is going to be used 
again in the next chapter when we construct our answer to how the state is to treat 
cultures. 
6.5 Summary  
 
This chapter was concerned with outlining contractualism and preparing for the next 
chapter where we will construct a contractualist answer to the question of how the 
state is to treat cultures. The chapter aimed at establishing the basic outlines of 
contractualism, demonstrate some of the benefits which contractualism brings to this 
project and defending contractualism from the accusation of being dependent on an 
atomistic ontology.  
The chapter started by considering meta-ethics and outlining the position which we 
called constructivism, with the conclusion that constructivism took the view of moral 
truths as being those things which we had reasons for believing, and we described 
them as practical truths.  
While there are several different forms and approaches to contractualism, we 
highlighted some common features which are useful for us in this project. We 
identified the idealised deliberators as being part of the core of contractualism, be it 
in a Rawlsian form where the deliberators are operating behind the veil of ignorance, 
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or the Scanlonian where they are similar to how they are in reality, but motivated to 
find the principles which nobody could reasonably reject. We then considered the 
nature of these deliberators and established them as needing to be as neutral as 
possible. This for two reasons, firstly that a partisan conception of the idealised 
deliberator would mean that the whole contractualist endeavour would be pointless, 
as we would not have shown what the position which they arrived at would be a 
reasonable one, but at most that it is what those who agree with that partisan 
position would agree to. And secondly, if it is based on neutral deliberators, it would 
make it more possible for a variety of people who hold different views to agree to the 
principles. 
The chapter then considered contractualism in conjunction with the different links 
which we have already explored in the chapter to see which are most compatible. 
We saw that on the link of the value of culture, that the instrumental view of the value 
of culture was very compatible with the contractualist approach. And on the position 
of culture having intrinsic value contractualism can help us to solve the problem of 
how objects of intrinsic value gain their value. Here the idea was that the objects 
which the idealised deliberators could agree to as being valuable are thus valuable.  
The next link was the source of obligation towards our culture.  On this link all were 
compatible with the contractualist outlook, and beginning with the position of 
gratitude, then contractualism could be used to solve problems brought up in earlier 
chapters, such as using the idealised deliberators to determine that we ought to be 
grateful to our culture. The second position on this link, that of reciprocity was also 
said to be compatible with contractualism, and again said to be able to solve a 
difficulty, this time the problem of why we would have particular obligations towards 
our compatriots, as we and our compatriots would be part of the scheme, with the 
responsibilities towards others in the same scheme outlined by the idealised 
deliberators. The final position was that of consent, which was described as being 
compatible with contractualism, in both senses of the word highlighted. Both if we 
view the consent as consisting in the agreement by the hypothetical deliberators, or 
by actual people. 
The next link was that of ontology, on this point we wanted to defend contractualism 
from the charge of being dependant on an excessively atomistic ontology, and show 
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that it can be made to work with a holistic view of ontology. This was done by 
highlighting the ways in which contractualism is compatible with a view which 
focuses on our social context and acknowledges the presence of others, with the 
examples of this being the contractualism of Rawls and Scanlon. The final link was 
that of advocacy, where we again wanted to show that contractualism, while 
compatible with the individualist position, is not only compatible with that position but 
could be made to work with the communitarian view. One option was to suggest that 
it would not be impossible for the idealised deliberators to take the position the 
communitarian advocacy position is one which could not be reasonably rejected, and 
we pointed to the theories of Kymlicka, who while not necessarily an example of this, 
would be a promising place to start. One of the main challenges to the combination 
of communitarianism and contractualism was the communitarian view that it is 
shared institutions and understandings rather than consent which is to be foundation 
for moral authority. The question this led to was what it is about shared institutions 
which grants it the competence to bestow moral authority. It was suggested that we 
could use the contractualist device of the idealised deliberators to solve this problem 
by taking the view that it is the idealised deliberators who bestow this capability on 
the shared intuitions.  
We then considered the idea of using both forms of ontology and how this could help 
in this project, in particular in conjunction with contractualism. 
This approach was based around the idea of first using the holistic ontology, to 
match reality as we find it, but then adding the perspective of the atomist outlook. By 
doing this we can account for the reality of the people in the culture we are 
considering, as well as considering what an individual in isolation would want or 
agree to. A benefit of this approach is that it would allow us to see both the need of 
the social context which the individual finds themselves in, as well as safeguarding 
the well-being of that individual from undue pressure from that context. 
This chapter outlined the basics of contractualism and showed through the possible 
position on the links how versatile a tool it can be, being capable of being combined 
with most positions, even if there was some work that needed to be done to make it 
completely compatible. The next chapter will utilise this tool to find an answer to the 
question of how the state is to treat cultures, by an examination of our view of the 
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ends of the state, our position on the links in the context of a contractualist 
framework based around what the most burdened in a culture would reasonably 
agree to. 
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Chapter 7. How the state is to treat 
cultures 
 
In this the final chapter we will attempt to construct a contractualist answer to the 
question of how the state is to treat cultures. This will draw on the various topics we 
have covered in this project in order to arrive at an outcome. Our position at the 
outset of this project in the introduction, was described with the plain language 
description that we did not wish for people to be unjustifiably disadvantaged because 
of their culture, nor did we want people to be unjustifiably disadvantaged by their 
culture. That has been our starting point, and from here we will try to come up with 
an answer to the question of how the state is to treat cultures. 
My suggested contractualist device in summary, is that we are to take the view that 
the state is to treat cultures and take the actions, which those most burdened could 
reasonably be expected to agree with.  
We will consider what view of the ends of the state we are operating under, which we 
designate as plurality. Then we will consider the positions on the links which we have 
been exploring throughout this project, as well as the distinction between the private 
and the public sphere, ending with four examples taken from the literature on 
multiculturalism to demonstrate how this contractualist device can be used. 
  
7.1 The Ends of the State 
In earlier chapters I addressed the concept of the ends of the state, and showed how 
a position on this question greatly affects how we view the answer to the question of 
how the state is to treat cultures. As we are attempting to answer a question of how 
the state is to act, we ought to first have an idea of what the state is for. We 
previously outlined a number of examples, such as liberty which we ascribed to 
Kymlicka. In the case of Kukathas, invoked here as a helpful contrast for other 
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positions, the view that the state is to have a very limited role and mainly concern 
itself with keeping the peace.367 
In these views of the ends of the state there is an often unarticulated assumption in 
addition to what is being discussed, namely that there is a measure of stability for the 
state or that the state will continue into the future. The state cannot keep the peace 
between cultures if it no longer functions, nor could it continue to provide liberty or 
wellbeing or whichever other view of the ends of the state could opt for. This 
assumption, while perhaps obvious, ought to be acknowledged, though as Rawls 
points out this does not mean that we assume that institutions do not change, rather, 
they will change due to the diverse nature of society.368 In arriving at our view of the 
ends of the state for the purposes of this project, we will return to what we said in the 
introduction to this project. There we looked at Rawls’s comment in Political 
Liberalism that the society which he is addressing is characterised by plurality. In his 
words:  
‘A modern democratic society is characterised not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is 
affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future 
one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly 
all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the 
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime.’369 
I also said in the introduction that I take this account of society to be not only 
descriptive, but also a desirable state of affairs, and one which is foundational to our 
view of the ends of the state. This has implications for our views of what position on 
the links which are available to us, which we will examine in the next section.  
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The ends of the state is not the entirety of how the state is to treat cultures, it is our 
starting point. When we are going to deciding how the state is to act, it obviously 
helps to have an idea of what the state is for. In this section we are going to highlight 
some of the problems with other views of the ends of the state, which will make it 
clearer why we take the ends of the state to be plurality. I mentioned Kukathas as a 
starting point in an earlier chapter and I referred to the appeal of his conception. He 
started with freedom of conscience and proceeded to develop his views of how the 
state is to treat cultures. This focus on the freedom of conscience has its appeal 
given the amount of freedom it ascribes the members of society.370 But as we saw in 
comments by for example Kymlicka, this fell short in that it did not take culture 
appropriately into account.371 But as we shall see in the next section where we 
consider the positions on the links, the background assumptions we have made their 
will lead us towards a individualistic advocacy conception, but one which takes 
culture into account.  
And as we will see with Kymlicka, the problem of internal dissent made that 
conception not be viable for us. In the quote from Rawls from the beginning of this 
chapter, pluralism of different conceptions of the good life was the natural outcome 
of people living together exercising their free reason. This speaks to the same issue 
as does internal dissent. To put simply, people are very different and will come to 
different conclusions on issues, including their views about the good life. That does 
not suggest that people do not need their cultures, but rather that cultures are not 
homogeneous, and a culture will have divisions within it. The problem highlighted by 
this preoccupation on my part with internal dissent is that state action which does not 
account for this lack of homogeneity will do wrong by those who are made to modify 
their behaviour for the benefit of the rest of the culture. If we did not take the view 
that some being to a degree marginalised due to their membership of a culture as 
being a problem then internal dissent would not be a problem, it would merely be a 
factual description of events. This then assumes that people have an interest in 
developing their own reasonable view of the good. This assumption has the benefit 
of being able to fit within the criteria we have set ourselves. It fits with the general 
aim of not disenfranchising people because of their culture or due to their culture, 
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and it would I think, be acceptable to the idealised deliberators. After all who would 
be unlikely to accept a view of the ends of the state which held within it the possibility 
of being made to follow the decrees of their culture against their will, on the basis on 
their relative power position within the culture. 
This view of the ends of the state makes a further assumption which needs to be 
acknowledged, that of equal dignity or standing of each member of society. 
Otherwise it wouldn’t be a problem in cases where there is internal dissent if one 
section of the culture is denigrated or disenfranchised. This could be seen as an 
extension of the multicultural argument against minority cultures, as we saw for 
example with Parekh, who used equality as the basis for his argument for group 
differentiated rights.372 But we also apply the logic of not marginalising minority 
cultures to the internal workings of a culture and ask why an internal minority of a 
culture can be permissibly marginalised when the culture cannot. But drawing on 
several of the authors we have encountered throughout this project, we are taking on 
the Rawlsian view of society as containing a plurality of reasonable views of the 
good life, and from other authors such as Kymlicka and Parekh we are taking the 
view that our culture is a necessary component of formulating our view of the good. 
This is in some way similar to Kymlicka who for similar reasons added culture to the 
Rawlsian primary goods,373 but our big break with Kymlicka is in trying to mitigate the 
problem of internal dissent.  
In that quote from Rawls we see the acknowledgment of the need for the 
comprehensive doctrines to not be incompatible with a democratic regime. While we 
will return to what we mean by what constitutes ‘reasonable’ later, this does speak to 
the assumption that whichever positions which we expect the state to adopt, that this 
requires that the doctrines in society are compatible with the continuation of society. 
Kukathas also assumes that society will consist of people with a wide variety of 
consciences and ends, and takes the view that the state is not to interfere with these 
people’s freedom of conscience.374 The starting position of these two positions are in 
a sense similar, in that they both assume a very varied society. This helps to 
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highlight that the assumptions which lead up to our view of the ends of the state, do 
not necessarily determine what our take on the ends of the state will be. To take a 
position on the ends of the state does bring with it the issue which we brought up 
before, that difficulty which Mill highlighted in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, that 
first principles do not admit of evidence.375 We can only argue why one is more 
suitable than another, but not demonstrate that one end of the state is the only 
possible one or the only true one. We will therefore need to show why plurality is a 
suitable view of the end of the state.  
As we established in the last chapter, what constitutes proof or evidence differs 
depending on our meta-ethical position. For us in our consideration of the ends of 
the state that would mean that what we would consider as argument for one set of 
ends to be preferable to others would depend on which view of meta-ethics we 
adopt. And as we outlined in the last chapter, we will be using a constructivist 
approach in this project. A simplified view of the realist position would be that there 
are objective arguments for the true and proper view of the ends of the state, and we 
have to discover them.376 But on the constructivist take it is about which arguments 
about the end of society which could be acceptable to the idealised deliberators.377 
While I used the words ‘proof’ and ‘evidence’ to describe the arguments for the ends 
of society, we are also using the term ‘facts’ which, as we outlined in the previous 
chapter, we take them to be practical facts. That is, those which we have good 
reason to believe rather than those which we can prove.378 In short, a view of the 
ends of the state which an idealised deliberator could accept would be a view which 
we have good reason to believe to be a valid view. 
The approach we are going to use is that our deliberators are those who are the 
most burdened and we are concerned with what they could reasonably accept. So 
far, the constraint on our view of the ends of the state is that it must be such that 
idealised deliberators could accept it, and that it is in accordance with what we 
outlined as being part of our original goal of people’s not being disenfranchised 
because of, or at the hands of, their culture, as well as being compatible with a 
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pluralistic society. A contrast with Kukathas help us highlight some of the difficulties 
and challenges before us. His theory does allow for a wide array of different views 
and cultures, and so meet part of our requirements, in that it allows for a pluralistic 
society. But it could be reasonably rejected because of the powers which it grants 
the various groups that make up society. As we saw in the earlier chapter, Kukathas 
would entrust the groups with a considerable amount of power, as long as the 
members of the groups had the option to leave the group, and any cost associated 
with leaving, regardless of how steep, would not constitute a barrier to exit.379 While 
the idealised deliberators might be open to Kukathas’s view about the ends of 
society being found in ensuring the freedom of conscience, they could reasonably 
reject it on the grounds of the power entrusted to the groups and its unrealistic view 
of the cost of exit. To say that the possibility of exit from a group is sufficient to 
ensure freedom of conscience has a variety of disadvantages, some of which were 
pointed out in the earlier in chapter 5 where Kukathas was discussed. One of the 
criticisms of this view could be seen in Okin’s comments that this does not take 
socialisation into account, or at the least it underestimates the effect of this 
phenomena.380 Okin highlights how there are situations where the expectations and 
constraints placed on certain members of the culture makes it more difficult for those 
members to leave the culture, with the result being that the option of leaving the 
culture is not always realistically open to the members of the culture. An example 
which Okin uses is of girls having pressures put upon them which the boys of the 
family do not, in terms of expected behaviour aimed at continuing the culture.381 
These girls expressed a reluctance to follow with these expectations but did not see 
any realistic alternatives.382 Kukathas approach offers no protections from this, as for 
him the theoretical capacity to exit is protection enough.383 This would mean that the 
most burdened in this type of situation could reasonably say that they could not 
accept the view of the end of the state which Kukathas envisions as his view would 
place on them a considerable burden. 
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Although it should be said that there is an alternative argument in relation to Okin’s 
examples, made by Spinner-Halev, who takes the view that because these girls said 
that they planned to allow their own children greater freedom than they had 
themselves experienced, the problem will rectify itself in a few generations.384 This 
line of argument has difficulties. One is that, as Spinner-Halev himself seems to 
acknowledge that this can be seen as a problem,385 the solution of waiting for the 
problem to solve itself would seem to be a bit callous to the intervening generations 
in allowing the situation we have judged to be unsatisfactory to persist. Connected to 
this is another reason for why this line of argument is not entirely satisfactory, in that 
the idealised deliberators would be unlikely to accept the argument that they are to 
discontinue the pursuit of their ends on the premise that the culturally imposed 
obstacle would be solved for future generations. That is not to say that it is 
inconceivable that we could take the view that we are willing to make sacrifices for 
the sake of our descendants, but in this situation the ‘problem’ to be overcome would 
be solved, if those structures of the culture imposing upon the members were to 
desist. 
Amongst the concerns for us in this project is that this does not necessarily help us 
with either of the aims which we have laid out as being part of our original motivation, 
that of people not being disadvantaged by their culture, either because of, or due to 
their culture. On the one hand, Kukathas does not set out any provisions to protect 
groups from any difficulties or challenges which would result from the relative 
strengths of different cultures. An example of this could be Kymlicka’s point about 
Canadian aborigine, who needs to spend more resources on merely continuing to 
exist, while the dominant or more secure cultures do not have to spend resources in 
this way.386 Giving those cultures which are more secure in a stronger position than 
the more marginalised ones who need to spend resources on survival. 
The other way in which Kukathas falls short for our purposes is that while he does 
expect the state to help keep the peace between cultures, he does not concern 
himself with the continuation of the group or culture if it is in danger due to its 
members leaving it for other groups. As will become apparent throughout this 
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chapter, this particular point is extremely tricky since, while it, falls short in that it 
extends no real protection to cultures, at the same time there would be considerable 
danger in going too far in the other direction by lending protection to cultures in a 
way which would prevent those who wish to disengage from their culture from doing 
so. Still, if we take the view of those who stress the importance of our culture to our 
self-view and our ability to form our view of the good, then to extend no protections 
to cultures could potentially do the members of that culture a tremendous harm, 
colliding with our aim of people not being disadvantaged unjustifiably by their culture.  
This shows that we cannot use Kukathas’s view of the ends of the state in this 
project. However, if we consider Kymlicka’s views, we see that here too we 
encounter difficulties. The main element of Kymlicka’s view is his allowing for 
external protections, but placing a prohibition on internal restrictions. As was said in 
an earlier chapter this comes as a result of his view of the ends of the state, and in 
particular his view that liberty is one of the aims which the state is responsible for. If 
we again consider the example from Okin which was used in relation to Kukathas, 
then we see that Kymlicka’s rule against internal restrictions would seem to solve 
this problem. But the difficulty with this position is that the situation which Okin 
describes is one which is not based on any official rules or regulation. The state is 
not deliberately acting or intervening in order to limit the range of options available to 
these young people, but the effects of the expectations and informal prohibitions are 
such that limitations have been set. The difficulty, therefore, would be in ensuring 
that internal restrictions would not be created by stealth, or that external protections 
do not become internal restrictions. If the state is to take no action and each 
generation allows the following generation more freedom, then the other members of 
the culture could argue that this inaction is a form of stealth assimilation, that their 
culture is being hollowed out. But if the state take any action to support the more 
restrictive elements of the culture, then the other members could argue that this 
would break the rule against internal restrictions or that their view of what would 
constitute a hollowing out or being assimilated differs from that of the restrictive part 
of the culture.  
This is an example of the problem of internal dissent which we examined earlier, 
where no matter what the state does, it will end up favouring some sides of a culture 
over others. Our approach to how the state is to treat cultures needs to be aware of 
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this problem and try to mitigate its effects, even it cannot solve it in its entirety. We 
are then not able to simply use Kymlicka’s views of the ends of the state and the 
conclusions he draws from that assumption, as it does not do enough to mitigate the 
problems of the issues of internal dissent. This is a particular problem for Kymlicka’s 
view since according to that conception of the ends of the state could be found in 
liberty while through state action or inaction, some part of the culture will have their 
liberty diminished. That is, any action on behalf of the state would go against the 
very point of the state. When we decide upon our view of the ends of the state we 
need to keep this issue of internal dissent in mind and consider its implication on 
what we see as the end. 
Again as we said earlier, the ends of the state is not the only thing which we need to 
establish to find how the state is to treat cultures, an example would be Kymlicka’s 
description of internal restrictions and external protections, which are not a 
description by themselves of the ends of the state but builds on it and provides 
guiding principles for how the state is to treat cultures. This chapter will build on the 
ends of the state and the position on the links which we will examine in the next 
section and establish a principle of our own to guide how the state is to treat 
cultures. Our aim will be to find principles which take culture more into account than 
do Kukathas’s and Barry. Barry for example takes the view that if a rule or principle 
is strong enough to be enacted then it is strong enough to override cultural 
consideration, or if it is weak enough not to override cultural considerations then it is 
probably too weak to be a law anyway.387 And at the same time does not fall into the 
problem we saw with thinkers such as Parekh, Modood and Kymlicka, where internal 
dissent becomes a problem. This formulation which we will outline further in the third 
section of this chapter, will take the view that when it comes to how the state is to 
treat cultures, only those actions which those most burdened could reasonably 
accept are those that are allowable. 
This section sought to establish how we are going to approach the ends of the state 
for this chapter. By establishing what we take to be the view of the ends of the state, 
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that of plurality, and then examining some of the issues with some other conceptions 
to see why we cannot use those views of the ends of the state. 
 
7.2 Our positions on the links 
In this section we will consider which positions we will adopt on these links and see 
how this interplay with our view of the ends of the state and the restrictions we have 
placed upon ourselves in terms of the aims and goals of the project. This will also 
prepare for the final section where we will use these factors and construct an answer 
to how the state should treat cultures. The aim of this section is to outline a coherent 
chain through the links, and so see that our assumptions about culture are 
compatible. We will then use these links to design our contractualist answer to how 
the state is to treat cultures, which will take the form of considering how the most 
burdened could reasonably accept the state action. 
We will take the view that the value of our culture is instrumental, that the basis for 
our obligation towards our culture is grounded in consent, and that we are going to 
use both approaches to ontology in the manner which we outlined in the last chapter 
and we take an individualistic view of advocacy. 
As we have outlined how the links work several times in the project already, we don’t 
have to outline as many details as has been done previously. 
We will again begin with the type of value which a culture can possess, and see how 
this link helps us. As was said in the last chapter, both the instrumental and the 
intrinsic could be made to work within the contractualist framework we are using. I 
will be suggesting that the instrumental view is the view of the value of culture which 
we should be utilising, this of course will need to be justified.  
There are two factors to keep in mind when deciding on what position on the links 
which we adopt, these two are accuracy and usefulness. As we said in the last 
chapter, moral facts under constructivism are those which we have reason to believe 
and those which the idealised deliberators could accept. Again it is not that those are 
the moral facts which the deliberators accept which is what makes them viable, but 
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that they are the ones which could be accepted.388 And as these are moral facts 
about how we perceive the value of culture, on this point it becomes an issue of if we 
believe that the most burdened could accept a view of their culture as possessing 
instrumental value. And the second consideration, which is connected to this, we 
have also in several places emphasised that these assumptions on the positions on 
these links allows us more easily to take certain positions. Which brings the 
consideration of whether these positions on these links are coherent and compatible 
with our aims. That is, are the positions which we have adopted on these links 
compatible with the aim which we set out in the introduction to this project, that 
people not be marginalised due to or by their cultures, and is it compatible with our 
view of the ends of the state, which we said was plurality. 
In our case I suggest that the instrumental view of the value of culture is usable in 
light of these constrictions. The view that the value of the culture is instrumental does 
not conflict with our view of the end of the state which was that of pluralism, as we 
said this was about members of society having a range of different possible views of 
the good life. The position that cultures have instrumental value is also compatible 
with the aim which we set out in the introduction to this project, that of not wanting 
people marginalised either due to their culture or by their culture. And adopting the 
instrumental view avoids situations where the intrinsic value of the culture could 
come into conflict with the personal interest of the individual members of the culture. 
Moral facts then being those which we have reason to believe, and I would suggest 
that these would be reasons for believing in the instrumental view of the value of 
culture. 
That is the position we will adopt in this chapter, that the value of the culture is 
instrumental in nature. The next link we are going to consider in relation to our 
constructing an answer to how the state is to treat cultures is that of the source of 
obligation towards our culture, with the possible positions being gratitude, reciprocity 
and consent. 
On this link the position which we will be adopting is that of consent. Again, the issue 
of accuracy and usability come to the fore. As we are using a contractualist approach 
to find the answer to how the state is to treat cultures, the consent based view works 
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quite well with it, as both are concerned with what would be consented to, as we 
mentioned in the chapter on contractualism. Further to that, it would not be suitable 
to employ the view where gratitude is the source of our obligations towards our 
culture as that sits ill with the instrumental view of the value of culture which we have 
just opted for, and so that position on this link would not be as usable to us. 
Reciprocity could be made to work, that is that as we need our culture to formulate 
our view of the good life, it could be argued that we would have an obligation to pay 
back to our culture for this essential service which it has provided for us. The 
shortfall with this link for us is that it does not help us with that particular problem 
which is that of internal dissent. If we imagine that we are to pay back to our culture 
for what it has done for us, then the question becomes who gets to determine what it 
means to pay back to our culture. This again comes back to the problem that what 
some members of a culture consider to be payback could hypothetically be argued 
by some other member to be a threat to a culture. Or possibly that what some 
members of the culture would consider to be fair repayment, some would consider to 
be an almost intolerable burden. While this is not the necessary outcome of the 
combination of links, there is no protection or mitigation built into these positions. In 
the next section we will return to this point and highlight how this position fits with our 
contractualist view of focusing on the view of the most burdened. 
The next link is that of ontology. As outlined in earlier chapters, this link has some 
complications. In particular, we have already discussed the idea of doing ontology 
twice, and so in effect using both atomism and holism, which is the approach which 
we are going to use. This allows us to on the one hand acknowledge the need for 
our culture, as we have said, I am operating under the assumption that we need our 
culture to shape our views of what the good life consist of and to shape our views of 
the good life. And on the other hand, this will allow us to make use of the atomistic 
perspective which is helpful for us in our goals with this project. The holistic part of 
the ontology is seen in the assumptions built into all our stated goals for the project, 
the aim to have people not be disadvantaged due to, or by, their culture. The 
atomistic view of ontology will be helpful in the next section where we outline the 
view that it is the perspective of the most burdened which we are focusing on.  
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This two-fold view of ontology also helps us to more easily see the effects of internal 
dissent, in that while we see the individuals’s need for their culture, we can also see 
them apart from their culture and see where one section of the culture is being 
marginalised by another section of the culture. By contrast, if we had relied entirely 
on a holistic view, this could have potentially masked these internal divisions, as we 
would be focused more on the group than on its individual members.  
The next and final link is that of advocacy. Where the two positions were that of 
communitarianism and individualism, and our position will be that of an individualistic 
view of advocacy. The reason for this can be found in the difficulty for the 
communitarian view to fit into our stated aims, that of not being marginalised due to 
our culture and the ends of the state being plurality, and the difficulties being again 
the problems of internal dissent. 
This as the communitarian view focuses on shared understandings and institutions 
rather than what a set of individuals in the culture would think. This again leads to 
the difficulty of that ever-present issue of internal dissent. If there is an issue upon 
which the culture is divided to some extent, let us say that the division is between 
those who would be burdened and those who would benefit from a particular policy 
position, then on the shared understandings view we would either say that the 
dissenters are a small minority and have their views overruled, or that this dissent 
shows that there is no ‘shared’ understanding. But as there is always likely to be 
some manner of disagreement, even within a culture, this later conception is not 
going to be sustainable. Particularly since, as was outlined in earlier chapters, the 
communitarian approach is not as concerned with the consent,389 which our view is, 
means that the communitarian conception is not suitable for our purposes. The 
individualist view then is something which would be compatible with our view of the 
ends of the state as it would not lead to individuals having their possible views of the 
good life limited by other section of their culture and would help to avoid the problem 
of internal dissent. This will also be relevant in the next section where we consider 
the position of the most burdened. 
In summary, then, what we have is the position that on the links which we have 
opted for is the instrumental view of the value of culture, a view that the source of 
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obligation is found in consent, we are combining both views on ontology and using 
an individualist advocacy. These will help us see the assumptions which have gone 
into the position which we will elaborate upon in the next section. It will also help us 
to see where we can avoid some of the difficulties which other writers have found 
themselves in, particularly as it relates to internal dissent. 
7.3 How the state should treat cultures  
In this section we are going to try and answer how the state is to treat cultures, 
building on what we have done before. This is not the only possible answer to the 
question of how the state is to treat cultures, but it is one which is coherent and one 
which will try to avoid the problems associated with internal dissent. First in this 
section we will outline how our positions on the links leads to the particular 
formulation of contractualism which we will be using, then we will consider the issue 
of internal dissent, and then compare it to some other forms of contractualism and 
other approaches to how cultures should be treated. 
This will be done in the context of our general overall aim, that people should not be 
made to suffer unjustifiably due to their culture, either by those outside it or those 
inside it. We said that the end of the state is that of plurality, and that the positions on 
the links we have adopted is that of an instrumental view of the value of culture, a 
view of our obligation towards our culture that is rooted in consent, we will be utilising 
both forms of ontology and an individualist view of advocacy. We also highlighted 
internal dissent as one of the main difficulties to mitigate. 
In the last chapter we listed some of the benefits of the contractualist methodology, 
amongst these were the possibility that this could help us to mitigate internal dissent, 
and to solve the issues we saw with the ontological positions which we wished to 
occupy. And this is the methodology which we will adopt to use in answering how the 
state is to treat cultures, and as has been said, the answer I will suggest is that the 
state should treat cultures in such a way that the most burdened could reasonably 
accept.  
The approach of using the most burdened is arrived at in part from our position on 
the links, and in part due to our view of the ends of the state and our initial aim of 
people not being marginalised on the grounds of, or by, their culture. 
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Our aim is that people not be marginalised on the grounds of their culture and that 
the state is to be pluralistic, the question for this section then is how do we formulate 
a contractualist approach which conforms to those aims, and fits into our position on 
the links. The suggested view of using the most burdened as our idealised 
deliberators would fulfil these criteria.  
As this would entail evaluating state action from the perspective of what the most 
burdened could reasonably accept, we can see first that this would be compatible 
with the link of consent as the source of obligation, as the obligation placed on the 
members of cultures would be those which those most burdened would agree to. 
The focus on the individuals most burdened fits with our position on advocacy, that 
of individualism. And as we said in the preceding section, the instrumental view of 
the value of culture would mean that we could avoid situations where the culture’s 
intrinsic value was put at odds with the interests of the individual members of the 
culture.  
When we consider the ways in which these links interact and form chains. The 
connection between our position on the link of ontology and our approach to 
contractualism becomes clearer. As was said in the last section, we are utilising both 
forms of ontology which we have identified, atomism and holism. As was also said, 
one of our assumptions is that we do require our culture, but at the same time we do 
not wish to be put into a position where our culture can make unreasonable 
demands of us, as we outlined in our goal at the beginning. The formulation for our 
form of contractualism must then be capable of meeting both these needs. In taking 
the most burdened to be the idealised deliberators we can fulfil this as we can on the 
one hand allow for the possibility that the members of cultures would need their 
culture and would make some sacrifices for their culture. But would also prevent 
unreasonable burdens being placed on the individual members of the culture. 
By using both of the types of ontology we can on the one hand acknowledge the 
need for culture in that we can make use of the holistic view of ontology, but we can 
also look at the individual apart from their culture. In looking at the most burdened 
we can accommodate both of these as this view can accommodate a need for the 
culture, but has protection from unreasonable demands on behalf of cultures. When 
this is combined with the individualist view of advocacy, our view of the value of 
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culture being instrumental, and our view of obligation which was rooted in consent, 
we can with this formulation of contractualism have a view where it would be 
possible for us to take the view that the idealised deliberator would agree to some 
sacrifices for their culture, as we do have an instrumental need for our culture. But 
preclude the culture placing unreasonable demands on the individual member of the 
culture. 
The reason for the focus on the most burdened is that it allows us to address that 
problem which we mentioned at the very start of the project, of members of cultures 
being marginalised by their culture. But by considering the position of those who 
would be the most burdened by an action we can see the line at which it would 
become unreasonable for the culture to demand more of its members. Here the 
position that we are to take an individualist view of advocacy shapes our approach, 
as if we had used a communitarian view then the difficulty would be that 
communitarianism as we have used it is dependent on shared understandings rather 
than choice.390 If then we had used a communitarian view of advocacy, there had 
been a risk of the individual becoming lost in the collective, or the individual having 
their positions and preferences overruled by the rest of their culture resulting in their 
range of option being limited, which is the opposite of what we are trying to achieve. 
We will return to this later in this section when we examine how this formulation 
helps us to mitigate the effects of internal dissent. 
This approach will allow us to mitigate the issue of internal dissent as when we 
consider state action, our focus will be on those most burdened by the action. In the 
last chapter we identified the idealised deliberator primarily in the terms of being 
reasonable, while our current view also contains within it a conception of 
reasonableness, there are more dimensions of it that needs to be unpacked. As we 
said in the last chapter, if we over define our version of the idealised deliberator, we 
injure the ability of this tool to help us. Returning to Rawls’s and Scanlon’s form of 
contractualism helps to provide more context for our view of contractualism and the 
idealised deliberators. As we have already outlined, Rawls’s version of 
contractualism entails the idealised deliberator being substantially modified by the 
veil of ignorance,391 while Scanlon’s version assumes a reasonableness and a desire 
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to come to an agreement.392 In this case our conception is closer to that of Scanlon, 
in that we do not assume that our deliberator is substantially modified, but we do 
take the view that they act reasonably. Further to this, when it comes to the 
ontological design of these deliberators we are assuming both a holistic and an 
atomistic viewpoint, for the reasons we outlined earlier. Meaning that we can both 
consider what they would want as entities which are dependent on their social 
context and what as individuals they could reasonably be expected to accept in the 
terms of bearing burdens.  
This form of contractualism has its differences from those which we have looked at 
previously in terms of scope and applicability. Rawls applies his contractualism 
specifically to the basic structure of society,393 rather than specific policy or actions, 
while Scanlon is much broader in his application, and considers general moral 
principles to be the appropriate site to use his form of contractualism,394 as we saw 
in the last chapter. We, by contrast, are only intending to use it for the sectional 
question of how the state is to treat cultures, that is not to suggest that it is inherently 
unsuitable to be used in other contexts, but that our use of it will be limited. A further 
difference between this and the other forms of contractualism we looked at is in how 
it views the idealised deliberators. This has clear similarities to Rawls’s idea of the 
difference principle and considering the least advantaged.395 Amongst the 
differences, however, is that for Rawls the idealised deliberator is not characterised 
as being the least well off, the focus on them is a result of the deliberators, the 
person behind the veil of ignorance, choosing to focus on them.396 Our version of the 
deliberator is, as was said earlier, not modified by a veil of ignorance. And in contrast 
with Scanlon we are actively looking for the perspective of the most burdened, as his 
view of contractualism being more general in application does not have this type of 
focus. A reason for focusing on the most burdened, is to have a way to mitigate the 
problem of internal dissent. This by it preventing situations where the most burdened 
would be placed in a position where they are marginalised by the more powerful 
section of the culture in overly burdensome situations. Similar to Scanlon we are 
assuming that our idealised deliberators are also reasonable, as we said in the last 
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chapter, has benefits over that of the rational deliberator, one such reason is that the 
rational subject could find reason to freeride on the efforts of the rest of their culture.  
397 Further, following on from Scanlon’s comments regarding the issue of utilising 
rationality as our defining trait in our deliberators not only raises the issue of 
individuals and groups maximising their own interests, it also runs into potential 
problems in terms of our aims of plurality. In that reasonableness, in borrowing again 
from Scanlon, also considers what others could accept.398 It is a conception which 
would help us avoid accepting principles where one party tries to benefit from the 
excessive burden being placed on others.  
In our definition of reasonable must also make further assumptions. Where Rawls 
highlighted that the reasonable views need to be compatible with democratic 
governance,399 we must take a similar view that the reasonable position is one which 
is compatible with democratic governance as we have imagined it, that is, being 
defined by plurality. Additionally we add a view that the reasonable person is not 
malicious, by which I mean that they are not supremacists who takes the view that 
their particular culture is the only one which should be allowed to be practiced, and 
would use the force of the state to ensure this.  
Another perspective to consider is that of Kymlicka. A reason for considering 
Kymlicka here is that both our positions encounter a difficulty in the informal aspects 
of culture. As we have seen before, internal restrictions are where the culture limits 
what options are available to their members, as Kymlicka says ‘Internal restrictions 
involve intra-group relations the ethnic or national group may seek the use of state 
power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the name of group solidarity. This 
raises the danger of individual oppression.’400 The specification that this concept 
concerns the use of state power is not a single occurrence, as he later defines it like 
this ‘'internal restrictions' that is, the demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic 
civil or political liberties of its own members.401 This will be considered later in 
relation to an example brought forward by Okin, this could be where a section of a 
culture has its options limited by other sections of the culture by use of informal 
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means rather than formal rules and oppression.402 At this point we should note that 
this would seem to fit Kymlicka’s comments on internal restrictions as ‘Internal 
restrictions are intended to force people to maintain their traditional way of life, even 
if they would not voluntarily choose to do so because they find some other way of life 
more attractive.’403 However if we consider these types of cases, then it would seem 
that Kymlicka offers few solutions to this situation, as here the sections of the culture 
is not using the power of the state to limit or curtail this sections civil or political 
liberties.  
My approach of looking to the most burdened for what state action is allowable, is 
also limited in these type of cases. For the same reason for the difficulty which 
Kymlicka finds himself in, in that it too concerns state action. The difference, I 
contend is that my process is more sensitive to these situations than Kymlicka’s is. 
For Kymlicka this problem would not really be visible, as there is no state action 
involved necessarily in the type of cases which this example is meant to 
represent.404 Kymlicka himself admits that this type of situation presents a challenge 
for his theory, but maintains that the idea at the core is still sound.405 
By looking to the most burdened, this way of approaching things could be more open 
to the cumulative effect of the power which the culture has, meaning that we could 
be more open to indirect consequences of state action. We can then consider how 
the culmination will result in pressures being put onto members of the culture, and if 
those burdened by those pressures could agree to the actions which lead to those 
pressures being applied.   
7.4 Private and public spheres 
In this section we are going to consider the separation between the public and the 
private sphere and the difficulties which this brings in relation to culture. The difficulty 
can be seen with the example of Okin’s critique of Kymlicka which we just saw, 
regarding the differential treatment of men and women in some cultures.406 The 
issue being how to determine the reach of the state. Of we draw the line between the 
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public sphere, where we expect the state to frequently interfere, and the private 
where we expect it to interfere much less frequently. 
While we do not have the space to outline a complete view of the nature of the 
separation between the public and private sphere, some consideration will allow us 
to better understand the difficulties in deciding how we think the state is to respond in 
these cases. Any line of demarcation between these spheres is bound to be 
controversial, with different authors taking drastically different views on where the 
line is, and even the definition of what these spheres are. As an example, take 
Habermas’s description of the public sphere ‘By "the public sphere" we mean first of 
all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes 
into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a 
public body.’407 This description of the public sphere, while possibly helpful in some 
setting does not help us to decide when it is appropriate for the state to interfere. 
Further to this, a different interpretation of the Habermasian public sphere is that it is 
the site where matters which concerns everyone are to be discussed.408 Fraser, in 
further demonstrating how the definition and use of these spheres are controversial, 
objects to this on the grounds that this can obscure relations of domination because 
they have been judged to be private, arguing that what belongs in the public sphere 
should be subject to fierce debate.409  
The reason for us to consider is to see where we can expect the state to act. As 
we’ve seen, it is a controversial act to assign something to the private or public 
sphere. Our reason for considering this is found in Charney’s description of the 
private sphere ‘What I mean by the private sphere is simply the familiar liberal 
concept of a realm of thought and action that is protected from the coercive power of 
the state…’410 And if we further look to Walsh’s description of Locke’s treatment of 
the private and public sphere where she describes it as ‘In doing this, Locke creates 
a paradigm which discourages tyranny and maximizes individual liberty. In 
establishing and protecting the family as private, Locke disarms political, tyrannical 
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intrusions in that sphere.’411 Here, then, is a key reason for not discarding the 
concept of a private sphere with less intervention than the public sphere, this also 
ties into the earlier elements which we have talked about in this project. In particular, 
it refers back to our view of the position on the links as well as our position on the 
ends of the state. Plurality we said was about taking the view of the state as a mix of 
differing views of the good life. This can lead us to take the view that the state is to 
have an extensive role in the maintenance and development of this plurality, or we 
can take the view of the state as a comparatively limited one when it comes to 
culture. The position I suggest that we would be committed to would be one closer to 
the limited rather than, extensive view, this is due to our positions on the advocacy 
link, the nature of the value of culture, and the stated aim of avoiding the problems of 
internal dissent. These interlink in such a way as to create the image whereby the 
main object of concern for us is that of the individual who needs occasional 
assistance from the state, rather than the idea of the state taking an extensive role in 
maintaining cultures.  
One view we could take is Modood’s description of what he calls the plural state, 
which entails a view of the citizen as being composed of the different groups which 
they are members of and requiring formal representation of the various cultures with 
the state taking an active role in both the private and the public sphere.412 There are 
reasons why we cannot make use of this conception of the relation between the 
state and culture, with internal dissent being a main one. Part of this view is that 
individuals and their groups need to be ‘provided for in the formal and informal 
distribution of powers, not just in law, but in representation in the offices of the state, 
public committees, consultative exercises and access to public forums.’413 While it 
does acknowledge the need for some baseline protections in the form of basic 
individual rights, by putting our cultures into such prominent positions, we again incur 
the problem of what happens to the individuals who are in the minorities in their 
culture. Take the ‘consultative exercises’ Modood mentions for example. How, one 
might ask, would they take into account the internal diversity of any given culture, as 
the problem which we have been highlighting is that favouring different sections of a 
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culture could marginalise other sections of that culture. So, by giving this prominence 
to the culture as a group it can help to obscure the internal minorities which would 
exist in any culture. 
Further, as we said earlier our view of advocacy is that we start from the individual’s 
perspective, which was part of our use of the most burdened, and that we took an 
instrumental view of the value of culture. This would sit ill with a view which has as 
part of it the representation of the culture rather than the individual members of the 
culture, we would run the danger of the instrument, our culture, becoming a 
hindrance to the individual. Similarly, this potential of the individuals being limited by 
their culture would be counter to our view of the ends of the state, that of plurality. If 
then the representation would include the culture as a group and the actions of the 
state based on this leads to an individual within the culture having their options 
limited, it would go against the very point of the state. 
The question remains of how to determine whether the state ought to intervene in 
areas which have traditionally been considered the private sphere. What belongs in 
the private sphere then is as we have seen controversial, from Sales’s analysis of 
Habermas view of these spheres ’On the one hand, the core of the private sphere is 
the nuclear family, which continues to play its socialization role…’414 and the family is 
an area which is often taken to be the core of the private sphere according to 
Okin.415 This can be seen in our earlier look at Okin’s criticism of Rawls’s assumption 
that the family is not a site which is suitable for the discussion of justice. This is 
similar to the problem which we see in this example from Okin of the women who 
through pressures have their options limited, and the state not intervening in this 
private sphere where this pressure is applied. As we have already seen, several 
feminist theorists have commented that this division between private and public 
helps to mask injustices and empower the abusers.416 How then are we to know 
when to intervene in these affairs. As we saw with the comments on Locke, who took 
the view of the state invading the private sphere as representing tyranny, for a 
similar reason, but perhaps not as forcefully stated, we do not want to have the state 
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interfere in decisions in the private sphere extensively, and again internal dissent is 
the reason for us wanting to have a line of demarcation.  
Okin’s point about socialisation is well made and worth keeping in mind, echoed in 
comments by, for example, Soper who comments on our cultures capability to make 
things seem natural to us.417 If we take the view that as the culture has a tremendous 
amount of power in the private sphere, both to apply pressure and to socialise us 
into accepting situations which we would otherwise not accept, then the inevitable 
question becomes about how we can say which decisions are to be thought of as 
valid and which are to be thought of as being the result of undue pressures or 
socialisation which has resulted in unacceptable outcomes. This would put the state 
into the position of having to decide what decisions are to be thought of as valid, with 
the problems of internal dissent, this would be an impossible position for the state to 
resolve. However, Okin’s point is persuasive, what our contractualist position could 
do is consider state action not only in isolation but in terms of its cumulative effect. 
This means that while it is not necessarily predisposed to intervene in the private 
sphere, if state action to support or hinder an aspect of culture would be such as to 
create a situation which the most burdened could not reasonably accept. This would 
warrant rejecting that action as the most burdened would not accept it. This would be 
so even if it would be mainly manifest in the private sphere rather than the public 
sphere. 
We have now outlined our view on the ends of the state, we have established our 
position on the links, and we have an idea of how the contractualist method can help 
us to avoid some of the problems which would otherwise cause us to stumble. We 
will now consider how we can use this to formulate of our contractualist tool of 
considering what would be acceptable to the most burdened by considering some 
examples where this approach will help us to arrive at conclusions to how the state is 
to treat cultures, and also to show its limits where we are only able to try and mitigate 
the problems rather than solve them.  
7.5 Examples  
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The question before us then is how is the state to treat cultures, and as we have 
said, our answer is that it should treat cultures in a way which the most burdened 
could reasonably accept. In this section we will use some of the examples found in 
the literature which concerns multiculturalism and see how our approach responds in 
those types of situations. We will consider the examples of Sikh helmet exemptions, 
the case of the gay cake row connected to the Asher’s bakery, Modood’s comments 
on irreverent literature, and to demonstrate the limits of this, and indeed any 
approach, we will again return to the case cited by Okin about women in America 
who felt limited by their culture. The point in considering these examples is not 
necessarily in the details of the particular cases on which they are based, but rather 
the type of situation which they represent. As such we will not over elaborate on the 
particularities but focus on the essential components. 
Let us begin with Modood and his comments regarding irreverent literature. In this 
case it was suggested that to prevent damage to people’s self-view, the state might 
need to intervene to protect certain cultures from being exposed to irreverent 
literature.418 The premise on his view is that it falls to the state to help to protect 
peoples self-view and prevent harm coming to them, the state would have reason to 
overrule the ordinary rules concerning free speech and try to protect a culture.419 The 
precise method this would entail, which if this was considered as a genuine state 
policy would matter quite considerably, is not the most important consideration for us 
at the present juncture, but rather it is the basic principle we are concerned with right 
now. 
The recurring issue of internal dissent plays an important role here, and will be 
significant in most of our examples. The way in which it matters in this example is 
that it is unlikely that the entirety of the culture would be in agreement as to what 
constitutes irreverent literature and to what extent it would represent harm to have it 
available and freely read. What this means is that it is always going to be the case 
that there would be literature which some in a culture find irreverent and some did 
not. Consequently, whichever side the state takes in this, some section of the culture 
would end up feeling marginalised. Here we can see the effect of our position on the 
links of ontology and advocacy as well as the type of value which the culture has, in 
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that we use both holism and atomism, and that we take an individualist position. In 
this example, we can see that the argument of the type which Modood advanced, 
that it would harm our self-view to be exposed to irreverent literature denigrating our 
culture,420 would be reliant on a holistic view of the person, in that the assumption 
would be that our connection to our culture is such that we need it for our self-view. 
But as we also view this from the atomistic perspective, we can consider what the 
atomist individual would want. And as we also take an individualist position as well 
as the view that our culture is instrumentally valuable to us, we would see that the 
most burdened would not accept having their individual options limited by their 
membership in their culture, which would be an instrument for their ends. And 
although it is not the focus of our deliberations, depending on the method used to 
protect members of cultures from these types of cases, it would also add a burden to 
those outside the culture who might be denied this literature.  
Simplified for our purposes, the main two parties which we would be concerned with 
would be those in the culture who wishes to be protected from a certain type of 
literature, and those in the culture who do not wish to have this protection. While 
there may indeed be other parties who have interests in this case, but it is the 
minority cultures which we are interested in. Our solution to these problems is to 
consider what the most burdened could agree to, the difficulty of course being that it 
is not always clear who could be said to be the most burdened party, indeed it would 
not be unlikely that in most disputes that all sides would consider themselves to be 
the most burdened if the decision did not go their way. In this example I suggest that 
those who would be most burdened if the decision went against them would be the 
part of the culture which did not wish to have this protection. The reasoning being 
that while those who do wish to be protected would receive some burden from being 
exposed to this literature, they could achieve this by not reading it, or if this case was 
expanded beyond only concerning itself with literature, not taking part in whatever 
activity is viewed to be harmful to their self-respect. While those who do not wish the 
protection would not have the same option would the case be reversed. This case 
might illuminate, as will some later ones, the utility of the ‘rule and exemption’ 
approach, while Barry objected to it,421 as long as the implementation of exemption 
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remained voluntary, in accordance with our position on the link of obligation towards 
our culture, would allow us to help make it so that the internal minority would not be 
marginalised due to their membership in a particular culture. And the state could 
extend some assistance to the culture. At the same time the cost in this case to other 
parties and the state, would seem to not be egregious. 
To move onto a different example to further illuminate this aspect of our approach, if 
we look to the discussion about exemptions for Sikh motorcyclists from requirements 
of wearing helmets while riding motorcycles. We again have the situation where it 
does not have a substantial impact on any third parties, since the fact that someone 
is riding a motorcycle without a helmet does not directly affect anyone else. While 
the cases have some similarities, the outcome is different. As in the previous 
example it was suggested that the state ought to do nothing, as taking any action 
would be to someone’s detriment. In this case the state would actively chose to take 
the view that the culture would be an acceptable reason to give an exemption. In this 
case the effect of internal dissent would playout differently, and not be as 
pronounced, in that, if the ban on riding motorcycles was to be upheld without 
exemption, the impact would only be felt on those who took helmet wearing to be 
particularly problematic. Those in the culture who did not think that wearing a helmet 
to be a problem could continue to ride without difficulty, but those who took this to be 
an important part of their culture could not. The most burdened would then be those 
who took the view that they cannot wear the helmet, if the law was implemented 
without exception. However, as Jones points out in his description of these events, 
on the balance of considerations, as all the cost of the exemption would be borne by 
the motorcyclist, the state has good reason for exempting the Sikh motorcyclists 
from this regulation.422 
An argument could then be made that, in this particular example, that it would not do 
any perceivable harm to those outside the culture, or to the others in the culture to 
allow for this exemption, with the similar condition as in the other example, that the 
exercise is one which is entirely voluntary and that the state does nothing to try and 
influence people one way or another. If they do, then the issues of internal dissent 
again become an issue. Here we can see the influence of our positions on the link 
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regarding obligation towards our culture, in that we took the view that our obligations 
towards our culture is to be based in consent. Only if it was voluntary to make use of 
this exemption could we consider it. If it would create an obligation to those in this 
culture who would prefer to use a helmet which was not based on their consenting to 
it, then we not be able to support it. We also see the influence of our position on the 
value of culture and our individualist view of advocacy, in the insistence that the 
exercise of the exemption for using a motorcycle helmet be left to the decision of the 
individual. The party which is to decide if they are to make use of the exemption is 
the individual and not the community, and similar to how we said in the example of 
Modood, that as we view the culture to be of instrumental value, we would want to 
avoid situations where the individuals options where limited by their culture.  
There is an additional issue which could in some circumstances be worth 
considering. That is the symbolic act of granting an exemption, with this turning it into 
a question of whether the state by allowing for this exemption is providing a signal to 
the other members of the culture, to those who did not care as much about the 
helmet law, that the exemption is the expected behaviour from the members of that 
particular culture. Barry’s approach to this issue is that there is no basis in justice to 
call for an exemption to the rule regarding motorcycle helmets, rather he maintains 
that if we have a reason for creating a law regarding motorcycle helmets, and this 
has as a consequence that members of certain cultures would have a difficulty in 
using a motorcycle, then provided the law is applied equally to everyone in society 
then there is no grounds for any exemptions for the Sikh.423 We might want to 
consider granting this exemption based on other grounds, such as practicality, but 
then take the view that if practicality is sufficient to allow certain cultures to be 
exempted, there would be no reason to limit this to only cultures and this excuse 
should be available to those who want it in general, meaning that the law might as 
well not be enacted in the first place.424 This point approach shows our difference 
again as we take the view that it is dependant on the perspective of the most 
burdened, and so in the appropriate circumstances it could be grounds to allow for 
exemptions to certain rules. 
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The next example is that of the Ashers bakery who were involved in what was 
termed the Gay cake row.425 This row concerned a bakery that wished to break an 
agreement to make a cake when it was discovered that the cake was meant for a 
group campaigning for the legislation of equal marriage in Northern Ireland. The 
argument from the bakery was that as they were a specifically Christian bakery and 
that the demands this placed on them meant they could not support or endorse 
equal marriage.426 Part of the customer’s counter-argument was that they were from 
the same religious background but did not object to equal marriage.427 While there 
are other dimensions to this case, but what it allows us to exemplify is that of a type 
of case where internal dissent plays an important role, and that will be our focus in 
this example.  
Internal dissent effects this case in that not all the employees at this bakery were as 
dedicated in their opposition to equal marriage, and some were willing to make the 
cake until convinced otherwise by the other members of staff. In this example it is 
one part of the community which has opposition to equal marriage as an important 
part of its view of itself, while we have another part of the community which is not as 
devout or eager for this specific element of the community. The danger in 
empowering one side in this dilemma is that if we side with the side which does not 
want to make the cake, we marginalise those in the community who would have no 
problem with the baking of the cake. But if we side with the other side we risk the 
section of the community who feel that they could not bake this cake be put into 
difficulty. If we consider the positions we adopted on the links, then in this case we 
can again see that the value which we ascribe culture is of importance, in that 
depending on which section we side with, it could create difficulties for the other side 
due to their community. And as we will consider later, if we also consider the position 
of the third party in this case, the customer, then we would see that the section of the 
community which does not wish to bake this cake would be to add a burden to the 
customer due to the communal view of the bakers, which we take to be of 
instrumental value, and so the customers would be discriminated against on the 
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grounds of the baker’s instrumentally valuable views being valued above the burden 
being placed on them.  
In this case it would be a matter of deciding if the most burdened are reasonable in 
thinking that their burden is unacceptable. I take the solution here to be that we 
ought to side with the customers against that of the bakers who wished to break the 
agreement to produce this cake. This case is a bit different than the others 
considered so far in that in this case as it is not only those in the community who are 
affected but also a party outside of it. If we side with the part of the community which 
does not want to complete this assigned job, then we would make it more difficult for 
those in the community who are of the alternate point of view and do not object to 
equal marriage. It would mean that those members who did not object to the cake 
are being pressured by the community and the state. And they could say that this 
pressure is unacceptable as it would only serve to limit their options.  
Further, if we side with the side which did not want to act in such a way as to support 
equal marriage, we would establish the principle that a group could discriminate 
against other groups if it was something which they considered to be an important 
part of their community. This is a position which they themselves would not want to 
be the victim of, and so it is plausible to say that their rejection of this potential 
burden would not be reasonable.  
Connected to this, this would create problems with our view of the ends of the state, 
in that this does not seem to be compatible with the aim of plurality. It would mean 
that the state would take actions which would lead to circumstances unfavourable to 
a plurality of reasonable views coexisting, in that the state is acting in such a way as 
to support making it easier for marginalised groups to be discriminated against. 
In this case we would have to assess who we considered to be the most burdened 
depending on which side of the culture we sided with and consider if any of these 
could be said to be reasonable in wanting either the state to intervene or not to 
intervene.  
We end these examples by borrowing from Okin. Looking again at the examples 
from Okin which we mentioned earlier, which showed that there are limitations and 
that there is a delicate balance to draw in terms or the private and the public. In 
Okin’s example, we had a study which showed that a group of young women felt that 
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pressure was being put on them by their culture which was not being put on their 
brothers, that their options were being limited by the expectations of their culture.428 
As we said earlier, Spinner-Halev’s suggestion that we simply wait generations for 
this to solve itself is, in the form that he presents it an unsatisfactory conclusion. He 
agrees that this is less than desirable but takes the view that we should just let this 
uncomfortable position continue, and that time will deal with this for us.  
The difficulty as we said earlier is that this is not the result of any official rules or 
similar formal pressures but the result of informal pressures. If we were to use 
Kukathas’s approach, this would not constitute much of a problem, we could just say 
that as long as these women are free to leave their groups, then the onus is on them 
to leave if they think remaining in the group is worse than leaving it.429 Another view 
is that of Barry, and his metaphor of a group of sailors caught in a storm who refuses 
to enter a safe port due to cultural reasons. His suggestion is that because there is 
nothing stopping them from entering but themselves, there is no reason for 
Interference.430 This attitude misses the importance of our culture in shaping what 
we find to be acceptable or possible, to continue this metaphor, it is our culture which 
allows us to not only understand what a port is, but also a storm or for that matter 
what sailing is. This again brings up Okin’s point that our culture socialises us and 
effects what we think of as possible options.431 Our solution to this has been to 
consider what the most burdened would reasonably accept, but complicating this for 
us is that this has concerned state action. If these pressures are more informal and 
not the result of state action this would put a limit on what this approach could do.  
What we would be left with is the position that the state ought not do anything which 
would add to the ability of the culture to limit the options of its members. Here we see 
a similarity with the problem faced by Kymlicka’s device of internal protections and 
internal restrictions, in that both have difficulty in dealing with the informal elements 
to the power which a culture possesses. The way in which my device differs on this 
point is that it is capable of trying not to add further cumulative burden with its action 
in a way which Kymlicka’s position does not. In the type of cases which Okin brings 
us, it would involve that when we are considering an action or an exemption for any 
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of the cultures which these women are part of, one of the elements which would be 
to consider if this placed additional barriers for them and if these limitations would be 
such as to make it unreasonable for them to accept these new circumstances. And if 
we concluded that it did, we would not commit to that hypothetical action.  
On this point we again see some of the links having clear influence on the position 
which we have ended up on. Here we see the position we adopted on the value of 
culture, it being instrumentally valuable. As Okin has pointed out, this type of 
treatment which has limited the options of these women has been defended on the 
grounds that it is vital for the continuation of the culture.432 And if we had adopted the 
view that the culture had intrinsic value then we could have considered if the culture 
could demand of these members that their options be limited. But as we are taking 
an instrumental view, we are open to the possibility that the state might have to 
intervene at some point in order to assist them. We also see the impact of us using 
ontology in the way in which we have outlined, as we acknowledge the members 
need for the culture, and so are hesitant to interfere in the private sphere, but we 
also consider them automictically and ask how they would want to treated as 
individuals not only as members of the culture.  
This in the end amounts to a position where what the constructivist view we have 
outlined is that we aim to give special rights or take action based on cultural 
belonging when doing so would lead to the options for that individual being 
increased, and rejected in those situations where giving culture’s special rights or 
exemptions from existing regulation would be such as to put the most burdened in 
such a position which they could not reasonably accept. An example of this would be 
the exemption for Sikh motorcyclists from the requirement to wear helmets, as Jones 
points out, the cost in this situation is not substantial to those involved,433 on the 
additional condition that this would be genuinely voluntary and that this would not 
create pressure on those Sikhs who wold prefer to wear helmets to not do so. And 
another example would be the gay cake case, where giving a particular culture 
support would create a burden on third parties and would make it more difficult for 
certain sections of the culture to act on all their options. This would be compatible 
with our view of the ends of the state which was concerned with plurality, with the 
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individual members of the different cultures being able to pursue their view of the 
good life. It is also compatible with our position on the links, in that it uses both views 
on ontology, acknowledging that while we need our culture and so we might need 
the state to take some actions which benefit our culture, but we also keep in mind 
the atomist perspective to allow us to consider what the individual person could be 
expected to accept. This is again seen in the advocacy position being an 
individualised one, as our contractualist device is based around what the most 
burdened individuals could reasonably accept. This does not mean that we expect 
individuals to accept no burdens for the benefit of our culture, but that we take the 
view that these obligations would be the ones which they could consent to, hence 
our view of them being reasonably acceptable. And we take an instrumental view of 
the value of the culture and when evaluating state action does so on whether 
assisting the culture helps or hinders the members in the culture, rather than 
considering if this helps the culture in isolation. 
7.6 Summary 
In this chapter we outlined what our view of the answer to how the state is to treat 
cultures. With the position that we would only allow those state actions which those 
most burdened could reasonably accept.  
We began by considering our view of the ends of the state, where we opted for what 
we called plurality, the view that society is to be composed of a plurality of different 
views of the good life. We then outlined some of the drawbacks of Kymlicka’s and 
Kukathas’s views and argued that internal dissent and our contractual device of 
considering the position of the most burdened would preclude us from utilising their 
views. 
We then considered which positions on the links we would adopt in this project and 
decided on a view of the value of culture as being instrumental, our obligation 
towards our culture being based in consent, an approach to advocacy which is 
individualistic, and we are using both views on ontology.  
The chapter then further outlined the contractualist tool of focusing on the most 
burdened, and considered what reasonable in this context entails. We said that they 
are reasonable rather than only rational, and that they are not malicious. We 
highlighted the issue with Kymlicka’s approach to cultures, specifically his distinction 
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between internal restrictions and external protections, with internal dissent being the 
main problem.  
The chapter highlighted some of the difficulties which theorists such as Okin brings 
up in relation to the distinction between the private and the public sphere. We saw 
that the decision of what we included in our definition of the public and private 
sphere is itself a controversial act. We looked at Okin’s comments that women are 
frequently subject to pressures in the private sphere which are rendered invisible by 
the focus on the public sphere, an example of this was Kymlicka and his focus on 
political rights and actions in the public sphere. Reasons for maintaining the 
distinction between these two spheres was Locke’s argument about avoiding 
tyranny, and that again internal dissent means that there would never be agreement 
on what the state would enforce in terms of cultures, and so a private sphere is 
necessary. We also took the view that the focus on group representation in the 
public sphere presents problems with internal dissent and we therefore suggested 
that representation ought to be done on an individual basis in accordance with our 
view of the link of advocacy.  
The chapter finished with a set of examples to demonstrate how our contractualist 
view would work in those type of cases. Our examples were Modood’s point about 
cultures being protected from irreverent literature, the example of Sikh motorcyclists 
being exempt from helmet laws on cultural grounds, the case of the Ashers bakery, 
and the previously cited example from Okin about cultures applying pressures on 
women which are not placed on the men in the cultures. As with several of these 
cases, internal dissent is a considerable problem. If the position is that members of a 
culture needs to be protected from a certain type of literature for fear of it causing 
harm to their self-view and their self-respect, there will always be potential for there 
to be dissent in the culture as to what literature is to be considered irreverent, and 
even if there was agreement on which literature, this would not mean that there was 
agreement to this meaning that the members of the culture would need to be 
protected from it. If we considered the most burdened, in this case then if certain 
literature was to be banned, then those in the culture who did not take irreverence to 
be sufficient grounds for overriding ordinary rules concerning freedom of speech 
would be burdened in that a certain set of options would be denied them and the 
section of the culture which would want this literature banned would be 
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strengthened. On those grounds I suggested that they could reasonably say that the 
state should not assist in protecting the culture from this type of literature as the most 
burdened could reject it.  
The next example we considered was that of exemptions for Sikh motorcyclists from 
wearing helmets in certain jurisdictions. In this example we suggested that the state 
could exempt Sikh motorcyclists from this helmet requirements. The reason for this 
was that the most burdened could accept this state act. This was based on the 
assumption that the adoptions and exercise of the exemption is entirely voluntary on 
the part of those who are to use it, with reference to our view of the source of 
obligation towards our culture. In this case we can see that the state is well placed to 
act when it leads to the members of the culture gaining options rather than situations 
where state actions lead to members have their options diminished. 
The next example we used was of the events relating to the Ashers bakery, where 
the owners of a bakery wished to break their agreement to make a cake when they 
realised that the cake was meant for an event relating to the campaign for the 
legalisation of equal marriage in Northern Ireland. In this circumstance we suggested 
that the state should not side with the bakers but with the customers, this again due 
to the issues relating to internal dissent and how this would affect the most 
burdened, internal dissent in that not all of the employees of this bakery agreed that 
their view of their community demanded that this cake not be done. The point here is 
there is no unanimity on this point and so strengthening the hand of those in the 
community who wishes to not make this cake would be against those who would 
have no problem with it. The most burdened in this situation could be seen to be 
either those in the community who would have their options limited due to their group 
membership if the state were to side with those bakers who did not want to sell the 
cake, or the customers who would be put into a position where they could be 
discriminated against if the group or community has significant antipathy towards 
them.  
The final example we used concerned those situations that Okin highlighted, where a 
study had found that in some cultures women had pressures put on them which the 
men in the culture did not in terms of regulating their behaviour in order to ensure the 
continuance of the culture. This example demonstrated the difficulty in deciding how 
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the state is to act in situations which takes place primary in the private sphere. The 
difficulty is found in that there have been no rules broken or any state action which is 
putting these women in an undesirable position but rather it is informal pressures 
which are the cause. This is a problem shared with Kymlicka and his view of the 
difference between internal restrictions and external protections. The difference for 
us is that we can more easily consider the cumulative effects of state actions and in 
the future evaluate whether addental action or lack of action would be such as to put 
these women in a position which they could at that point reasonably accept. 
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Thesis Summary  
 
 
This project adds to the debate about how the state is to treat cultures by using a 
different approach to how we reach our positions on the nature of culture, and by 
using a different type of contractualism to arrive at how the state is to treat cultures. 
First the project broke down the assumptions into links and the chains which these 
links form when combined, and examined how these links interacted. The goal of this 
is to allow us to see if our positions can be constructed in such a manner as to be 
fully coherent and connects all the necessary links into a chain, which helps us to 
reach our conclusion, we then based on these links formed our view of how the state 
is to treat cultures. This adds to our understanding of how our underlying 
assumptions shape our deliberations about culture, which can be used to test the 
coherence of our assumptions in regards to culture. The project also added one way 
of answering the question of how the state is to treat culture, that is by focusing on 
what the most burdened would agree to. This is not the only possible answer which 
could be constructed, but it is one which fulfils our goals from the start of the project 
and which minimises the effects of internal dissent while meeting the test of 
coherence. 
The project began by outlining some of the background of the debate regarding 
multiculturalism and liberalism, by emphasising the work of a number of authors 
covering topics relating to the definition of culture, and highlighting some of the 
assumptions which we then examined more closely throughout this project. After we 
had considered the background, the type of value which cultures might possess was 
evaluated and classified in terms of intrinsic value and instrumental value. 
Instrumental value was defined as those objects which possessed their value by 
virtue of their relationship to an external object. And intrinsic value as objects which 
possessed value by themselves without reference to external objects. A key 
distinction between the two types of value was said to be the dependence on context 
on the instrumental account, as an object of instrumental value only has value in the 
appropriate context, while objects of intrinsic value are valuable independent of 
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context. One difficulty highlighted in this chapter was in explaining the origin of 
intrinsic value, in that it does not explain why objects of intrinsic value can be said to 
be valuable. My suggestion was to employ a form of constructivism where those 
objects which reasonable people could describe as intrinsically valuable were to be 
considered to be intrinsically valuable. A shortcoming of this view is that this view is 
not truly context independent, as objects would need the appropriate context to be 
considered valuable, that of potentially being considered valuable by reasonable 
people. However, this is the closest usable approximation of intrinsic value which the 
scope of this project allows for. 
In the third chapter, we can begin to see the impact of combinations of links. The 
chapter elaborated upon the sources of our obligation towards our culture, with the 
possible sources being gratitude, reciprocity and consent. Gratitude entailed paying 
our culture back for all the benefits it provides us. Reciprocity also entailed paying 
back to our culture, but did not require the same emotional response as gratitude 
did. The final source was consent, which entailed agreeing to incur obligations 
towards our culture. The shortcoming of this view was that people do not as a 
general rule choose which culture we are part of. Additionally, several theorists 
attribute the capacity to make choice to cultural membership, making pre-cultural 
consent to incur obligation towards our culture impossible. My attempt at a solution 
to this problem was to apply a Rawls based approach where rather than consenting 
to be part of a particular culture, members of cultures would consent to a system 
which involved obligation towards their culture. This approach also entailed not 
imposing heavier burdens of obligation than a reasonable person would agree to 
impose upon themselves. At this stage, it was possible to see the effect that these 
links can have upon each other, this became even more clear when the chapter 
added considerations of types of group rights, where, for example, the corporate 
view of group rights was shown to be incompatible with an instrumental view of the 
value of culture.  
Chapters 4 and 5 were concerned with ontology and advocacy, and demonstrated 
further the interconnectivity and interdependence of these links. Ontology in this 
context concerned how we envisioned the nature of the people who make up 
cultures. Are they to be viewed as solitary and isolated, as with atomism, or as part 
of a social context as in holism, the chapter dedicated to advocacy and the ends of 
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the state examined the normative perspectives of individualism and 
communitarianism, as they relate to culture, and the concept of the ends of the state 
and asked what we think the state is for. Chapter 5 described individualism as being 
primarily concerned with individual rights and approached society as a system for 
cooperation with a view of the individual as an end in themselves. In contrast, the 
communitarian view was described as considering communal ties and social context 
as goods in themselves and as a view which seeks to avoid moral chaos and 
promotes the common good. The links of ontology and advocacy are closely related, 
but still distinct. An example of this is that if we take an atomist view of ontology, it is 
easier to come to a position on advocacy which favours individualism. While the 
thesis demonstrates how all the links are interdependent and connected, this 
connection has often been acknowledged on the topics of ontology and advocacy, 
indeed as Villa pointed out, the two have at times been conflated as being one and 
the same.434 While connected, the two are distinct, ontology concerns how we view 
people while advocacy concerns how we should treat people. The approach I 
suggested of considering ontology twice further complicates the matter as then we 
are first considering ontology in terms of how people actually are, and on the second 
turn we take into account how we wish to utilise ontology. This aims at allowing us to 
both acknowledge ontology as we truly perceive it, while at the same time allow us to 
adopt advocacy positions which would otherwise be ill-fitting with our ontological 
views. The chapter then considered the ends of the state, first by outlining features 
of the concept, then it took the view that this has been an underexplored issue in 
relation to multiculturalism. The chapter also considered the problem of internal 
dissent, the problem being that if the culture is divided on an issue, then no matter 
which side the state assists, it will be to the detriment of some other aspect of the 
culture, the very opposite of what multiculturalism seeks to do. 
Chapter 6 considered the features of contractualism and how it can help us in this 
project with devising a way to come to terms with how the state is to treat cultures. 
The chapter was concerned with establishing the assumptions underpinning 
contractualism in terms of the links which we have made use of throughout the 
project, as well as defend contractualism from the charge that it is reliant to an 
excessive degree on an atomistic view of ontology and an individualistic view of 
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advocacy. It considered the meta-ethical positions of realism and constructivism, 
with constructivism being the view of moral truths as practical truths which are those 
which we have a reason for believing, further we described the role of the idealised 
deliberators in relation to constructivism. The chapter then identified some of the 
core features of contractualism. Such as the use of the idealised deliberators, be it in 
the Rawlsian form where the deliberator is operating behind a veil of ignorance, or 
the Scanlonian form which does not assume any significant change be done to the 
deliberator, only that they are reasonable and wish to come to an agreement. We 
highlighted the need for the conception of the deliberator to be as neutral as 
possible, as if they are biased the whole exercise becomes pointless. It considered 
the links which the project has outlined in conjunction with contractualsim, and found 
that contractualism is far more compatible with a much wider range of positions and 
options than is normally thought. The chapter specifically showed that far from 
relying on an atomistic view of ontology, forms of contractualism do in actuality have 
at its foundation a view and acknowledgement of others built into it. Far from the 
characterisation of it as being dependent on a view of deliberators as isolated atoms. 
Additionally it sought to show that contractualism is not necessarily individualistic on 
its view of advocacy, and that it could be used to arrive at communitarian viewpoints, 
in contradiction to accusations to the contrary. While there are some difficulties with 
this combination, it is quite possible to accomplish. The chapter also highlighted how 
contractualism could be used to solve difficulties found in the previous examinations 
of the links, with examples being that it can be used to imbue objects of intrinsic 
value with their value, and to the problem of how shared institutions gain the 
competency to bestow moral standing in the way it is used in communitarianism. We 
then further elaborated on the idea of using both forms of ontology together, both 
atomism and holism. The benefit to this approach was that it would allow us to 
acknowledge the individuals need for their social context, but also consider what the 
individual could accept when taken apart from this context.  
Building on what the sixth chapter had established, the seventh chapter outlines our 
view of how to answer the question of how the state is to treat cultures. The core of 
the answer being that we should only allow those actions related to culture by the 
state which the most burdened could reasonably accept.  
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This required a view of the ends of the state, where we decided to take plurality as 
the ends of the state. This was done in contrast to the views and assumptions of 
Kukathas and Kymlicka and concluded that the problems related to internal dissent 
would prevent us from using their views on these issues. 
We then outlined our positions on the links, where we said that the project will use an 
individualist view of advocacy, both views on ontology in the manner which we 
outlined in earlier chapter, the view of the source of obligation was that of consent, 
and the value of culture was that of instrumental value.  
We considered further the contractualist tool we were using, the main features of this 
conception was that it took the perspective of the most burdened, this form of the  
idealised deliberator was further described as being reasonable rather than rational 
following from Scanlon, we also took the view that they were not malicious. We also 
highlighted the issues with internal dissent relating to Kymlicka’s distinction between 
internal restrictions and external protections. 
The chapter then highlighted some of the difficulties which this conception can 
encounter, as was seen with the division between the private and the public sphere. 
Before moving onto four examples of issues related to multiculturalism which we 
then applied our device to in order to see how it helped to come to a decision on how 
to treat cultures. Starting with Modood’s comments on the need to protect members 
of cultures from irreverent literature, where we used our contractualism to come to 
the view that the state ought not act to protect members of cultures from irreverent 
literature, this was based in combination of our view of the links, and the difficulty of 
internal dissent. As the state taking the side that wished there to be protection from 
certain literature would mean that those who are on the other side of the culture 
could reasonably say that they did not agree to this. As this would limit their options 
due to their membership of the culture. 
The second example was that of the exemption from wearing motorcycle helmets for 
Sikhs on cultural grounds. Here we argued that the state ought to act to give an 
exemption to Sikhs, on the condition that the use of this exemption was entirely 
voluntary. This again tied back to our view of the links and in this case the state 
acting to give this exemption would lead to an increase in the options for the 
members of that culture. The third example was that of the ‘gay cake row’, where we 
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took the view that the most burdened would not accept the position of the state 
siding with the bakers and allowing them to break the agreement to bake a cake for 
an event which was in support of equal marriage in Northern Ireland. This as it would 
mean that the most burdened could be thought to be either those in the bakers’ 
community who did not object to equal marriage, who would have their position 
weakened by this position, or the most burdened would be the costumers who could 
be discriminated against as long as the culture doing so had enough antipathy 
towards them. Additionally, if we took the view that the most burdened was the 
bakers if they were not to be allowed to break this agreement, then it would not be 
reasonable for them to not accept, as they would not wish to be in the position of 
being discriminated. 
The final example was that issue which Okin had brought up, where studies had 
showed certain cultures had put pressures upon the women in certain cultures which 
were not placed on the men in the culture. This example showed the difficulty which 
this view can encounter when the issues involved mainly concerns actions and 
pressures being applied in the private sphere, as in this type of situations the political 
and civil rights are not being limited, but these women still felt their options to be 
limited. Our attempted solution was to suggest that we can take into account the 
cumulative effects of state actions, and consider if additional actions or exemptions 
would add to the pressure and limiting of their options, and if so we could ask if it 
would be reasonable for them to accept that situation. 
This approach of dividing our positions into links and consider their interactions will 
allow us to consider the whole chain of assumptions which have led to our coming to 
our conclusions about how the state is to treat cultures. This would enable us to 
examine whether our positions on issues relating to culture coheres with our 
assumptions as we have understood them, or if we find ourselves having to revise 
either our assumptions on the links or our positions on the outcome of a case. This 
was then used in outlining the assumptions which went into our designing of our 
contractualist approach.  
The difficulties with this approach is that it, as we could see in the seventh chapter, 
has difficulty with the division between the public and the private sphere. As we saw, 
similar to Kymlicka, as our focus is on the state and how it should treat cultures, that 
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which takes place in the private sphere is challenging to deal with, as we on the one 
hand does not want to over extend the reach of the state, but at the same time we 
run the risk of allowing actions which we might find regrettable to take place as they 
are in the private sphere. 
A further shortcoming of this project is that it is premised on a number of 
assumptions of its own, and so could lack persuasive power to those who did not 
share these assumptions. Examples of this would be the assumption from the start 
of the project, that we do not wish people to be made to suffer due to their culture, 
either by those outside the culture or by the other members of the culture. This 
assumes that we take culture to be a valid criterion for consideration, someone who 
did not think that discrimination on the grounds of culture was an important issue 
would not share our starting point. A related point is the assumption built into our 
view on the ends of the state, as we saw in the quote we used from Rawls, that 
society is characterised by plurality, and as we said, we took this to be not only a 
statement of fact but a desirable state of being. This assumed that no one view of 
the good would be affirmed by all members of society, and that this was a good 
thing. Someone who took the view that society was to be based on a specific 
conception of the good, or alternatively one which is simply culturally supremacist, 
would not be as receptive to our arguments as they are based on these 
assumptions. A further assumption which has been mentioned before, is the view 
that internal dissent presents a problem. If we were willing to accept the situation 
where a section of the culture was being made marginalised by the rest of the 
culture, possibly justified on the grounds of cultural survival, then this would not be 
the problem which we have considered it to be in this project. The project also 
makes assumptions regarding the connection between corporate group rights and 
intrinsic value in a way which could be explored further. 
Apart from those assumptions mentioned, areas which would be, I would suggest, 
fertile grounds for further exploration, would be further investigation into the impact 
that our assumptions of the ends of the state has on our deliberations, in particular 
as it relates to culture. This could benefit from further engagement with feminist 
critiques and further considerations of the distinction between the private sphere and 
the public sphere.  
176 
 
This project aimed at answering the question of how the state is to treat cultures, to 
do this it first developed a method for analysing the component parts of our position 
on culture and see how these links interact and form chains. We then based on this 
used our own approach to contractualism to answer the question of how the state is 
to treat cultures by considering the perspective of the most burdened, and asked 
what they could reasonably be expected to accept.  
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